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Energy Management and Consumer Modeling in Smart Grid Systems
by Vassiliki Hatzi
In the last decades, energy efficiency has turned into a major research issue, since the
energy requirements of modern societies are growing continuously. Researchers have
focused on optimizing the efficiency of the modernized power grid, i.e., the smart grid,
which has evolved into a complex ecosystem with different actors such as consumers,
operators and generators having different active roles in the system. They have also
focused on improving the energy efficiency of ICT which is a prerequisite for efficient
smart grids. Moreover, the advance of key technologies such as energy storage, renewable
energy sources (RESs), communication and control has opened the way to new research
directions. In this thesis, we present some key research problems in the context of this
area, and we explore the use of control and optimization methods toward approaching
them. Specifically, our goal is to address i) system challenges pertaining to the integra-
tion of energy storage and RESs into the smart grid and ii) challenges related to the
energy consumer aspect.
Energy storage devices, like uninterrupted power supply (UPS) or batteries, and Plug-in
Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs), are prime resources for smart-grid efficiency improve-
ment which need to be appropriately managed and incorporated into smart grid systems.
In this context, we study two fundamental problems in energy storage management and
dimensioning in smart grids. Specifically, first, we introduce the optimal energy storage
control problem faced by an energy supplier, which amounts to deciding when and how
much to charge and discharge a storage device in order to achieve a certain optimization
objective in terms of energy generation cost. We address the problem above, first for a
single storage device, and then for multiple storage devices that are shared among mul-
tiple micro-grids. Our optimization objective leads us to policies which attempt to keep
balanced grid power consumption at all times. Next, we study a joint energy storage
placement, dimensioning and management problem, given an available storage budget,
where the goal is to minimize the power generation cost. We are interested in the way
storage capacity placement and control impact the overall cost of energy generation.
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The solution policy for this problem involves various parameters such as the demand
profiles of consumers, and power flow and balance constraints.
RESs rely mainly on energy that flows naturally through the environment on a continual
but time-varying basis and have received major attention in the last years due to their
significant potential in reducing the carbon footprint. In this thesis, we study the use of
renewable energy sources and scheduling techniques toward reducing the carbon foot-
print induced by an ICT system, namely, the web crawling component of a web search
engine. This component discovers and downloads new pages on the Web as well as re-
freshes previously downloaded pages in the web repository. We introduce the problem
of green web crawling, where the objective is to devise a page refresh policy that keeps
the web pages as much as possible fresh and the carbon emissions that the web crawling
process incurs on remote web servers low enough. We devise an optimal policy, which
can be implemented in an online fashion, based only on the type of energy consumed by
the servers and the staleness of the pages in the web repository. We also devise heuristics
along the lines of the optimal policy and study their performance through experiments
with real data.
Demand-side management (DSM) activities for the smart grid aim to reduce or smoothen
energy consumption by providing dynamic prices or incentives in the form of monetary
or non-monetary rewards to consumers. Different DSM techniques have been proposed,
however, a fundamental issue in their design and operation is the recruitment of users.
Serious-games design is an emerging area that can address precisely the issue of maxi-
mizing user engagement in various contexts. In this thesis, we discuss the use of serious
games for demand-side management in smart grids. We introduce the problem of op-
timal serious-games design for the purpose of enforcing prudent energy consumption.
We present a mathematical model of a simple gamification mechanism through which a
serious-game designer (e.g., a demand-side management entity) aims to motivate con-
sumers to reduce their energy consumption at peak hours by setting up a contest and
by providing them incentives in the context of a serious game. The game designer opti-
mally selects the game parameters, so as the utility-maximizing choices of consumers to
minimize the energy generation cost of the energy supplier. We demonstrate that even
such a simple serious-game design can provide adequate incentives to users for engaging
in demand-side management.
Finally, most proposed DSM schemes assume that consumers are rational decision mak-
ers which select their actions by solving complex optimization problems. However, con-
sumers are humans and their decisions, which are driven by different factors, are far from
rational. In this direction, we discuss the role of data in building behavior-based mod-
els for profiling energy consumers and predicting their behavior in DSM programs and
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venergy consumption curtailment campaigns. Our ultimate goal is to discover through
these models the different factors that determine consumer actions and the different im-
portance placed on them. We present two different data-driven approaches for consumer
modeling which are based on a popular machine-learning tool and a cognitive heuristic.
We show that both approaches succeed in capturing the different importance that each
consumer places on different factors and the uncertainty on consumer actions. We also
introduce the optimal load-reduction task and incentive allocation problem faced by the
designer of an energy consumption reduction campaign. The aim of the designer is to
target tasks and incentives appropriately based on the different consumer profiles, so as
to best fulfill the purpose of the campaign.
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ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΙΑΣ 
Περίληψη 
Τμήμα Ηλεκτρολόγων Μηχανικών και Μηχανικών Υπολογιστών 
Διδακτορικό Δίπλωμα 
Διαχείριση Ενέργειας και Μοντελοποίηση Καταναλωτών σε Έξυπνα Δίκτυα 
Ηλεκτρικής Ενέργειας 
Βασιλική Χατζή 
 
Τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες, η ενεργειακή αποδοτικότητα αποτελεί μείζον ερευνητικό θέμα, 
καθώς οι ενεργειακές απαιτήσεις των σύγχρονων κοινωνιών αυξάνονται συνεχώς. Οι 
ερευνητές έχουν επικεντρωθεί στην βελτιστοποίηση της αποδοτικότητας του 
εκμοντερνισμένου δικτύου ισχύος, δηλαδή του έξυπνου δικτύου ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας, το 
οποίο έχει εξελιχθεί σε ένα πολυσύνθετο οικοσύστημα με διάφορους παράγοντες/φορείς 
όπως καταναλωτές, φορείς εκμετάλλευσης (διαχειριστές) και παραγωγούς ηλεκτρικής 
ενέργειας οι οποίοι έχουν διαφορετικούς ενεργούς ρόλους στο σύστημα. Έχουν επίσης 
επικεντρωθεί στην βελτιστοποίηση της ενεργειακής αποδοτικότητας των Τεχνολογιών 
Πληροφορίας και Επικοινωνιών (ΤΠΕ), οι οποίες αποτελούν απαραίτητη προϋπόθεση για 
την ανάπτυξη αποδοτικών έξυπνων δικτύων ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας. Επιπλέον, η εξέλιξη 
βασικών τεχνολογίων, όπως η αποθήκευση ενέργειας, οι ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας 
(ΑΠΕ), η επικοινωνία και ο έλεγχος, άνοιξε τον δρόμο σε νέες ερευνητικές κατευθύνσεις. 
Στην παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή, παρουσιάζουμε μερικά καίρια ερευνητικά 
προβλήματα στο πλαίσιο αυτής της ερευνητικής περιοχής, και διερευνούμε τη χρήση 
μεθόδων ελέγχου και βελτιστοποίησης για την προσέγγιση τους.  Συγκεκριμένα, στόχος 
μας είναι να αντιμετωπίσουμε α) προκλήσεις σε επίπεδο συστήματος που αφορούν την 
ενσωμάτωση αποθηκών ενέργειας και ΑΠΕ στο έξυπνο δικτύο ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας και  
β) προκλήσεις που σχετίζονται με τον ίδιο καταναλωτή. 
Οι συσκευές αποθήκευσης ενέργειας, όπως η αδιάλειπτη παροχή ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος 
(UPS) ή οι μπαταρίες, και τα επαναφορτιζόμενα υβριδικά ηλεκτρικά αυτοκίνητα (PHEVs), 
είναι πρωταρχικοί πόροι για την βελτιστοποίηση της αποτελεσματικότητας του έξυπνου 
δικτύου ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας, οι οποίοι πρέπει να ενσωματωθούν και να διαχειρισθούν 
κατάλληλα σε συστήματα έξυπνων δικτύων ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, 
μελετούμε δύο θεμελιώδη προβλήματα που αφορούν την διαχείριση και διαστασιολόγηση 
αποθηκών ενέργειας σε έξυπνα δίκτυα ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας. Συγκεκριμένα, αρχικά, 
παρουσιάζουμε το πρόβλημα βέλτιστου ελέγχου αποθήκευσης ενέργειας που 
αντιμετωπίζει  ένας προμηθευτής ενέργειας, το οποίο αφορά την λήψη αποφάσεων σχετικά 
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με το πότε και πόσο να φορτίσει και να αποφορτίσει μια συσκευή αποθήκευσης έτσι ώστε 
να επιτύχει έναν συγκεκριμένο αντικειμενικό σκοπό βελτιστοποίησης σε όρους κόστους 
παραγωγής ενέργειας. Επιλύουμε το παραπάνω πρόβλημα, αρχικά για μία μοναδική 
συσκευή αποθήκευσης και έπειτα για πολλαπλές συσκευές αποθήκευσης οι οποίες 
χρησιμοποιούνται από κοινού από πολλαπλά μικρο-δικτύα. Ο αντικειμενικός στόχος του 
προβλήματος μας οδηγεί σε πολιτικές που προσπαθούν να διατηρήσουν μια ισορροπημένη 
κατανάλωση ισχύος στο δίκτυο ανά πάσα στιγμή. Έπειτα, μελετούμε ένα πρόβλημα 
τοποθέτησης, διαστασιολόγησης και διαχείρισης αποθηκών ενέργειας με δεδομένο ένα 
διαθέσιμο μπάτζετ αποθήκευσης, όπου ο στόχος είναι να ελαχιστοποιηθεί το κόστος 
παραγωγής ενέργειας. Μας ενδιαφέρει ο τρόπος με τον οποίο η τοποθέτηση και ο έλεγχος 
της χωρητικότητας αποθήκευσης επηρεάζουν το συνολικό κόστος παραγωγής ενέργειας. 
Η πολιτική που προκύπτει από την επίλυση του προβλήματος εμπλέκει διάφορες 
παραμέτρους όπως τα προφίλ ζήτησης των καταναλωτών, και περιορισμούς ροής και 
ισορροπίας ισχύος. 
Οι ΑΠΕ βασίζονται κυρίως σε ενέργεια που ρέει φυσικά μέσω του περιβάλλοντος σε 
συνεχή αλλά χρονικά μεταβαλλόμενη βάση, και τα τελευταία χρόνια έχουν προσελκύσει 
το ενδιαφέρον λόγω της σημαντικής τους προοπτικής να μειώσουν το αποτύπωμα 
άνθρακα. Στην παρούσα διατριβή, μελετούμε τη χρήση ΑΠΕ και τεχνικών 
χρονοπρογραμματισμού με στόχο την μείωση του αποτυπώματος άνθρακα που 
προκαλείται από ένα σύστημα ΤΠΕ, συγκεκριμένα, από το πρόγραμμα ανίχνευσης 
παγκόσμιου ιστού μιας μηχανής διαδικτυακής αναζήτησης. Αυτό το πρόγραμμα 
ανακαλύπτει και κατεβάζει νέες ιστοσελίδες του παγκόσμιου ιστού καθώς επίσης, 
ανανεώνει σελίδες που έχουν κατεβεί προηγουμένως στον αποθηκευτικό χώρο του ιστού 
(web repository). Eισάγουμε το πρόβλημα της πράσινης (οικολογικής) ανίχνευσης 
παγκόσμιου ιστού, όπου αντικειμενικός σκοπός είναι να αναπτύξουμε μια πολιτική 
ανανέωσης σελίδων η οποία να διατηρεί τις ιστοσελίδες όσο το δυνατόν περισσότερο 
ανανεωμένες και τις εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα, που η διαδικασία ανίχνευσης ιστού 
προκαλεί σε απομακρυσμένους διακομιστές διαδικτύου, αρκετά χαμηλές. Εξάγουμε μια 
βέλτιστη πολιτική η οποία μπορεί να εφαρμοστεί σε πραγματικό χρόνο βασιζόμενη μόνο 
στον τύπο της ενέργειας που καταναλώνεται από τους  διακομιστές διαδικτύου και στην 
παλαιότητα των σελίδων που βρίσκονται στον αποθηκευτικό χώρο του ιστού. 
Αναπτύσσουμε επίσης ευριστικές πολιτικές έχοντας ως πρότυπο την βέλτιστη πολιτική και 
μελετούμε την απόδοση τους μέσω πειραμάτων με πραγματικά δεδομένα. 
Οι δραστηριότητες διαχείρισης ζήτησης για το έξυπνο δίκτυο ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας έχουν 
ως στόχο να μειώσουν ή να εξομαλύνουν την κατανάλωση ενέργειας παρέχοντας στους 
καταναλωτές δυναμικές τιμές ή κίνητρα υπό την μορφή χρηματικών ή μη χρηματικών 
ανταμοιβών. Διάφορες τεχνικές διαχείρισης ζήτησης έχουν προταθεί, ωστόσο, ένα βασικό 
θέμα στον σχεδιασμό και στην λειτουργία τους είναι η στρατολόγηση των χρηστών. Ο 
σχεδιασμός σοβαρών παιγνίων είναι μια αναδυόμενη περιοχή που μπορεί να αντιμετωπίσει 
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με ακρίβεια το ζήτημα της μεγιστοποίησης της συμμετοχής των χρηστών σε διάφορα 
πλαίσια. Στην παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή, συζητούμε την χρήση των σοβαρών 
παιγνίων στο ζήτημα της διαχείρησης της ζήτησης στα έξυπνα ηλεκτρικά δίκτυα. 
Εισάγουμε το πρόβλημα του βέλτιστου σχεδιασμού σοβαρών παιγνίων έχοντας ως στόχο 
την επιβολή συνετής κατανάλωσης ενέργειας. Παρουσιάζουμε ένα μαθηματικό μοντέλο 
ενός απλού μηχανισμού παιχνιδοποίησης μέσω του οποίου ένας σχεδιαστής σοβαρού 
παιγνίου (π.χ. μια οντότητα διαχείρισης ζήτησης) επιδιώκει να παρακινήσει τους 
καταναλωτές να μειώσουν την ενεργειακή τους κατανάλωση σε ώρες αιχμής (υψηλής 
ζήτησης) στήνοντας έναν διαγωνισμό και παρέχοντας τους κίνητρα στο πλαίσιο ενός 
σοβαρού παιγνίου. Ο  σχεδιαστής επιλέγει βέλτιστα τις παραμέτρους του παιγνίου έτσι 
ώστε οι επιλογές των καταναλωτών, οι οποίες μεγιστοποιούν την χρησιμότητα/όφελος των 
καταναλωτών, να ελαχιστοποιούν το κόστος παραγωγής ενέργειας του προμηθευτή 
ενέργειας. 
Τέλος, οι περισσότερες προτεινόμενες στρατηγικές διαχείρισης ζήτησης υποθέτουν ότι οι 
καταναλωτές λαμβάνουν αποφάσεις ορθολογικά και ότι επιλέγουν τις δράσεις τους 
λύνοντας πολύπλοκα προβλήματα βελτιστοποίησης. Ωστόσο, οι καταναλωτές είναι 
άνθρωποι και οι αποφάσεις τους, οι οποίες οδηγούνται από διάφορους παράγοντες, 
απέχουν πολύ από τη λογική. Προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση, συζητούμε τον ρόλο των 
δεδομένων στο χτίσιμο μοντέλων που βασίζονται στην ανθρώπινη συμπεριφορά, τα οποία 
χρησιμοποιούνται για την δημιουργία προφίλ των καταναλωτών ενέργειας και την 
πρόβλεψη της συμπεριφοράς τους σε προγράμματα διαχείρησης ζήτησης και σε 
καμπάνιες/εκστρατείες μείωσης της κατανάλωσης ενέργειας. Στόχος μας είναι να 
ανακαλύψουμε μέσω αυτών των μοντέλων τους διαφορετικούς παράγοντες που 
καθορίζουν τις πράξεις/δράσεις των καταναλωτών και την διαφορετική βαρύτητα που 
δίνεται σε αυτούς. Παρουσιάζουμε δύο διαφορετικές προσεγγίσεις για την μοντελοποίηση 
των καταναλωτών, οι οποίες έχουν ως γνώμονα τα δεδομένα και βασίζονται σε ένα 
δημοφιλές εργαλείο μηχανικής μάθησης και σε ένα γνωσιακό ευριστικό μοντέλο. 
Δείχνουμε ότι και οι δύο προσεγγίσεις επιτυγχάνουν στο να συλλάβουν την διαφορετική 
βαρύτητα/σημασία που ο κάθε καταναλωτής δίνει στους διαφορετικούς παράγοντες και 
την αβεβαιότητα στις πράξεις των καταναλωτών. Εισάγουμε επίσης το πρόβλημα της 
βέλτιστης κατανομής κινήτρων και εργασιών μείωσης φορτίου που αντιμετωπίζει ο 
σχεδιαστής μιας καμπάνιας μείωσης της κατανάλωσης ενέργειας. Στόχος του σχεδιαστή 
είναι να κατευθύνει εργασίες και κίνητρα κατάλληλα βάσει των διαφορετικών προφίλ των 
καταναλωτών, έτσι ώστε να εκπληρώσει βέλτιστα τον σκοπό της καμπάνιας.   
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Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Contributions of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 Motivation
Electricity is the most widely used form of energy and global demand is constantly
increasing. World electricity demand is projected to double between 2000 and 2030,
growing at an annual rate of 2.4%. Also, electricity’s share of total final energy con-
sumption rises from 18% in 2000 to 22% in 2030 [1]. Our modern societies rely on the
power grid system to satisfy their energy needs. The power grid must respond quickly
to the increasing demand and continuously generate and route electricity to where it’s
needed the most. However, the generation of electrical energy makes a significant contri-
bution to climate change since it relies on fossil fuels and is currently the largest source
of carbon dioxide emissions. To satisfy both the increasing demand for energy and the
need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, we need a power grid system that can handle
these challenges in a reliable and economic way [2].
According to [2], “a smart grid is an evolved power grid system that manages electricity
demand in a sustainable, reliable and economic manner, built on advanced infrastructure
and tuned to facilitate the integration of all involved”. Smart power grids harness
ICT and smart metering in order to enhance their reliability, enforce sensible use of
energy, reduce CO2 emissions, and efficiently incorporate and control components such
as renewable energy sources (RESs), distributed micro-generators and energy storage
entities (e.g. plug-in electric vehicles, batteries, etc.) [3]. These modernized electricity
1
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Figure 1.1: Example electricity demand curve showing the effect of DR actions. Image
source: [4].
networks are complex ecosystems which are composed of new entering actors such as
prosumers, and traditional ones like consumers, operators and generators each having a
fundamentally different, active role in the system. In this thesis, we focus on developing
efficient mechanisms that optimally incorporate and manage energy storage devices in
smart grid systems so as to exploit their potential in reducing the energy generation cost
of energy supplier/s (utility operator).
Smart grids possess demand-side management (DSM) capability, also known as Demand
Response (DR), to better match the demand for energy with the supply and avoid energy
overconsumption. The goal of DR is to encourage consumers, through various methods
such as financial incentives and behavioral change through education, to use less energy
during peak hours, or to move non-emergency power demands to off-peak times such as
nighttime and weekends (Fig. 1.1). By smoothing out the system power demand profile
across time, grid reliability is enhanced as instabilities are reduced, power outages due
to sudden increases of demand are avoided, and the need for activating supplementary
power generation sources so as to satisfy high demand is eliminated. This supplementary
power may be generated from expensive sources, or it may be imported at high prices
from other countries. Therefore, in DR programs, end-users enjoy reduced electricity
bills due to lower real-time electricity prices, while the operator enjoys reduced operating
cost.
Current DR schemes provide incentives to the users, usually in the form of dynamic prices
and monetary or non-monetary rewards. They rely on strong rationality assumptions
about consumers, and they assume that the response of consumers to incentives is gov-
erned by the mathematics of optimization theory. However, it is known from behavioral
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Figure 1.2: Electricity consumption forecasts of ICT equipment during use [5].
science that human behavior is far from rational due to the fact that humans often make
decisions under certain cognitive biases, various natural predispositions, social norms,
various sentiments and prejudices, or even in the presence of limited information and
limited information processing capacity. Various DR schemes may often see hesitation
and even negativity of consumers, primarily because they are not presented to consumers
in an appropriate context. This means that the efficiency of the above programs mainly
depends on the participation of consumers and their behavior. The interfaces with which
such DR schemes are delivered to consumers should respect the limited time and atten-
tion of consumers and should make the interaction worthwhile and entertaining. In this
thesis, we focus on designing efficient mechanisms that exploit the concept of serious
games in order to encourage consumers to save energy by means of competition, and
increase consumer engagement in DR programs by creating a more enjoyable experience
for consumers. We also focus on providing behavior-based data-driven models for build-
ing personalized decision-making profiles for end-users, predicting consumer behavior,
and optimally providing incentives in DR programs.
Toward the aforementioned goal of energy consumption and carbon emissions reduction,
we also need to focus on the energy efficiency of large energy-consuming entities. Infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) and networked systems have been proved
to be big energy consumers with a large carbon footprint [5], [6] and thus, they need
to undergo significant adjustments. ICT is a prerequisite for efficient smart grids but it
is also responsible for a quick increase in worldwide energy consumption. The authors
of [5] argue that the relative contribution of ICT in energy consumption is expected
to grow from 8% in 2008 to more than 14% in 2020 (Fig. 1.2). Networks and data
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Figure 1.3: Main components of electricity consumption for the ICT sector. Image
source: [8].
Figure 1.4: Estimated distribution of global CO2 emissions from ICT. Image source:
[9].
centers have been proved to be major energy consumers and their energy consumption
is estimated to reach 29% and 21%, respectively, of the ICT sector’s electricity usage in
2017 [7]. (Fig. 1.3)
Moreover, the increased use of ICT contributes to global warming. According to [6],
the ICT sector itself (telecommunications, computing and the Internet, but excluding
broadcasting transmitters and receivers) contributes around 2.5% of greenhouse gas
emissions, at just under 1 Gigatonne of CO2 equivalent, and this share may well increase
over time. A portion 23% of this share is caused by data centers, while communication
networks (fixed and mobile) contribute a 24% of the total (Fig. 1.4). Therefore, it
is clear that the need for green energy-efficient ICT will be more and more evident in
the next years. This thesis investigates energy efficiency and greenness at the level of
the Internet, data centers and web servers. Specifically, we study the use of RESs and
scheduling techniques toward reducing the carbon footprint induced by an ICT system,
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namely, the web crawling component of a web search engine. We focus on the reduction
of the carbon emissions that this component incurs on remote web servers, that do not
belong to the search engine, during its operations. Our approach exploits the time-
varying renewable energy availability (i.e., the dynamic RES generation patterns) at
remote servers in order to schedule the search engine workload in a greener way.
1.2 Contributions of this thesis
We briefly describe the main contributions of this thesis which are analytically presented
in the following chapters:
In Chapter 2, we study two fundamental problems in energy storage management
and dimensioning. First, we address the optimal energy storage control problem from
the side of an energy supplier with the aim to minimize the long-term average cost of
generated power. The energy supplier controller receives power demand requests which
are immediately activated and controls one or more energy storage devices, each of which
is attached to a renewable energy source (RES). The supplier uses these storage devices
to mitigate time variations in demand load and RESs. For a single storage device, we
derive a threshold-based control policy that maintains balanced grid power consumption
at all times, and it is shown to be asymptotically optimal as the storage device capacity
becomes large. The optimal policy is then extended to the case of multiple storage
devices that are shared among multiple micro-grid entities each with its own demand
load. Our results provide evidence about the potential of our approaches in terms of
operational cost efficiency, in that they approach a cost global lower bound. Next, we
study the joint energy storage placement, dimensioning and management problem. We
are interested in the way storage capacity placement and control impacts the overall cost
of energy generation. It turns out that various aspects of power flow need to be taken
into account in the determination of the optimal policy. We discuss some simple special
cases of the problem by presenting two numerical examples. Our results show that the
solution policy entails various parameters such as the demand profiles of prosumers and
power flow constraints.
In Chapter 3, motivated by a real-world problem, we consider energy efficiency in the
context of a concrete application. Namely, we study the carbon footprint induced by the
web crawling component of a large-scale web search engine. This component, during its
page refresh operations, issues a large number of HTTP requests to remote web servers
that do not belong to the search engine. These requests increase the energy consumption
and carbon footprint of the web servers since computational resources are used while
serving the requests. We focus on reducing the induced carbon footprint by exploiting
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the renewable energy availability at remote servers. We model the dynamics of renewable
energy generation by means of an appropriately defined time-varying (greeness) index.
We introduce the problem of green web crawling, where the objective is to devise a
page refresh policy that minimizes the total staleness of pages in the repository of a web
crawler, subject to a constraint on the amount of carbon emissions due to the processing
on web servers. For the case of one web server and one crawling thread, the optimal
policy turns out to be a greedy one. At each iteration, the page to be refreshed is
selected based on a metric that considers the page’s staleness, its size, and the greenness
of the energy consumed at the web server premises. We then extend the optimal policy
to the cases of (i) many servers, (ii) multiple threads, and (iii) pages with variable
freshness requirements. We present experimental results for the optimal page refresh
policy as well as for various heuristics, in an effort to study the effect of different factors
on performance. This work was done in collaboration with Yahoo! Labs Barcelona
which provided us with a large, real-life dataset in order to evaluate the performance of
the proposed policies.
Next, in Chapter 4, we theoretically model and study a simple gamification mechanism
through which a demand-response entity aims to motivate consumers to adopt prudent
energy consumption patterns by setting up a contest and by providing them incentives
in the context of a serious game. Serious games are a promising approach for demand-
side management, and they aim at increasing user engagement and active participation.
We mathematically formulate the problem of optimal serious-game design for energy
consumption reduction. The serious game designer presents publicly to consumers a
list of top-K consumers and a list of bottom-M consumers according to their respective
energy-consumption reduction at peak hours. The consumer parameters that determine
user consumption behavior are the user discomfort due to demand load reduction, the
user desire for social approval, and the user sensitivity to social outcasting. The con-
sumer aims at maximizing her net expected utility function, while the game designer
aims at minimizing the total power generation cost. Central in the selection of the game
designer is the choice of parameters K, M as well as the statistical feedback provided
to the consumers. We experimentally show how the choices of K,M affect the energy
consumption reduction for different types of customers.
In Chapter 5, we migrate from conventional rational models for the consumer, and
we bring into the foreground behavior-based data-driven models for modeling and pre-
dicting consumer behavior. We aim at understanding the different criteria under which
consumers reach decisions regarding their participation in an energy consumption re-
duction campaign, and the different importance placed on them. Such criteria may be
monetary incentives, social or community recognition, environment-friendly behavior,
perceived dissatisfaction from consumption reduction, and willingness for cooperation.
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They are expressed by means of attributes that characterize the consumption reduction
suggestions made by the campaign designer to consumers. We consider that a consumer
profile and her/his decision on whether to participate in the campaign, are determined
by two controllable attributes of the suggestion made to her/him. We use a logistic
regression model from machine learning and a fast-and-frugal tree model inspired from
cognitive psychology and behavioral science to model the consumer decisions. We also
introduce the optimal task and incentive allocation problem faced by the designer of the
campaign which amounts to appropriately controlling the suggestion attributes in order
to achieve a certain expected load saving at minimum economic cost. We show that in
the case of LR the optimization problem turns out to be a sigmoid optimization one,
while in the case of FFTs it is an integer linear programming one.
We conclude with Chapter 6, where we summarize our findings and discuss various
future directions that warrant further investigation.
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2.1 Introduction to the Employment of Energy Storage
Devices in the Smart Grid
The smart power grid relies on information and communication technologies and ad-
vanced control methods to manage the dynamic demand load and to ensure efficient use
of electric energy [10]. Smart metering and bidirectional communication enable real-
time interconnection of the consumer and operator premises through IP addressable
components over the Internet. These technologies allow power-consumption monitoring,
automated control of consumption of customer appliances through messages from the
operator Command and Control center, real-time electricity price signaling, and fault
diagnosis.
Demand-load management is primarily employed by utility operators so as to reduce
the grid operational costs. The rationale of demand-load control is to alleviate high
demand load at peak times. This can be achieved for instance by using the time slack
of delay-tolerant demands so as to temporally shift part of the peak load in time when
it is feasible to do so [3]. Thus, the risk of a potential grid failure is reduced, while the
operational cost is lowered by avoiding the use of more expensive or less efficient power
generation sources.
Recent advances in electric energy storage technologies have rendered backup devices
like uninterrupted power supply (UPS) or batteries, and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehi-
cles (PHEVs) prime candidates for demand-load management. With appropriate storage
management policies, these devices can be quite advantageous for electric utility oper-
ators and consumers. If stored energy control is delegated to the grid operator, a valid
objective is to minimize the grid operational cost. Batteries can be charged at off-peak-
load times, and this stored energy can be used to satisfy increased demand load at peak
times. If energy storage management is performed at the consumer level (e.g. through
PHEVs), the goal is to minimize the cost of power consumption (i.e., the electricity
bill), assuming that an instantaneous time-of-use price per unit of consumed power is
fed back. Thus, energy can be stored when the price per unit of consumed power is low,
and it can be used to satisfy part of the demand when the price is high.
In future smart grid architectures, we anticipate the existence of multiple consumer
entities, oftentimes organized as micro-grids, each with its own power demand, and its
own power generation sources. In addition, energy storage devices with attached RESs
are also expected to be part of the architecture. RESs rely mainly on energy that
flows naturally through the environment on a continual but time-varying basis and have
received major attention in the last years due to their significant potential in reducing
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the carbon footprint. The potential of RESs is amplified when used in synergy with
energy storage devices.
In this chapter, first, we address the problem of optimal energy storage control faced
by the utility operator (energy supplier), which has a number of storage devices under
its control. The objective is to find a policy for managing the charging and discharging
processes of storage devices such that the long-term average cost of generated power
is minimized. This cost is modeled as a convex function of instantaneous total power
consumption. We study the problem above, first for a single storage device, and then for
multiple storage devices that are shared among multiple micro-grids. Next, we review
a joint energy storage placement, dimensioning and control problem, given an available
storage budget [11], where the goal is to minimize the energy generation cost.
2.1.1 Our contribution
Our work contributes on several levels to the literature.
 For the case of a single energy storage device, we formulate the online storage
control problem by devising a stochastic model for continually generated demands
and completions, and we consider minimizing long-term average cost. A threshold-
based control policy is derived that attempts to maintain balanced power consump-
tion from the grid by adaptively managing the storage device charge/discharge
processes. We prove that this policy is asymptotically optimal as the battery
capacity becomes large, and we show that it performs quite well even for finite
capacity.
 We also extend the model and structure of the optimal policy to account for the
case that one renewable energy source feeds the battery.
 The approach is then extended to the case of multiple storage devices that are
shared among multiple micro-grids each with its own demand load. First, we study
the problem of minimizing the grid operational cost in the case that micro-grids
act cooperatively in the sense that the total consumed load of micro-grids from the
main grid is aggregated, and the total cost is due to this aggregate load. Then, we
study the same problem in the case that each micro-grid is treated as a separate
grid with its own consumed load and operational cost, and the total system cost
is the sum of individual micro-grid operational costs. The proposed policy which
is common for both problems is again of threshold type and is asymptotically
optimal as storage capacities of batteries become large. These policies for the
different cases we consider provide a systematic way of handling storage facilities.
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 We study the problem of how much storage capacity should be placed on each node
of a power network given an available storage capacity budget. It turns out that
various aspects of power flow need to be taken into account in order to determine
the optimal policy. Our objective is to minimize the total average generation cost
through optimal storage dimensioning, storage management, and power flow. We
provide two simple numerical examples in order to present the optimal solutions
for some special cases of the problem.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, first, we study the online
control problem for a single storage device, we show the optimality of the proposed
threshold policy, and we present an extension to the model that includes a RES which
feeds the storage device. Then, we study the problem with multiple storage devices and
multiple grid entities. Subsection 2.2.6 provides hints for extensions of the proposed
models. In subsection 2.2.7, we evaluate the performance of our policies and present
numerical results. In section 2.3, the joint energy storage placement, dimensioning
and control problem is studied. Finally, section 2.4 presents the related literature and
section 2.5 concludes our study. This chapter contains material from works [12], [13]
and [14]. The terms “battery” and “storage device” are used interchangeably with the
same meaning in the chapter.
2.2 Optimal Energy Storage Control Policies for the En-
ergy Supplier
2.2.1 System model
Power demand arrival and service processes. We consider an energy supplier
(energy generation facility) that needs to serve the power demand tasks generated by
a pool of consumers. In the online version of the problem, power demand requests are
generated continually by consumers and arrive at a central controller at the supplier
premises according to a Poisson process, with rate λ.2 The time duration sn of each
request n is a random variable that is exponentially distributed with parameter s, i.e.,
Pr(sn ≤ x) = 1− e−sx, x ≥ 0. (2.1)
2A non-homogeneous Poisson process with time-varying request arrival rate λ(t) could model time-
variation of the demand load and affect load variation and peaks at different times. Here, we choose to ad-
here to a homogeneous Poisson process assumption with average rate λ. Since we study the system in an
infinite time-horizon, our approach encompasses the case of time-varying λ(t) if limT→+∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 λ(t)
exists and is equal to λ.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of system model with the energy storage device, the charging
and discharging process, and the interaction with grid consumption.
Equivalently, the mean duration of demand requests is 1/s time units, and s may be seen
as the average service rate of power demand tasks by the supplier. These assumptions are
motivated for mathematical tractability as they facilitate the derivation of the structure
of the optimal policy. However, they are quite close to reality since they capture (i) the
burst of arriving demand requests, (ii) the different durations of requests and (iii) the
fact that the chances of having large durations decrease fast. Further, let pn denote the
power requirement (in Watts) of demand n. Denote by P (t) the demand load on the
system at time t as a result of the demand arrival and completion processes above.
Consider the system above, first without the storage device. Let At denote the set of
active demands at time t. If the power requirement pn of each task n, is fixed and equal
to 1 unit of power, then the instantaneous demand load P (t) equals N(t) = |At|, i.e.
the number of active demand tasks at t, and it is a Markov chain. Since each power
demand task is activated upon arrival and there exists no waiting time or loss, P (t) is the
occupation process of an M/M/∞ service system. From state P (t), there are transitions
to state:
 P (t) + 1 with rate λ, when a new demand request arrives.
 P (t)−1 with rate sP (t), when one of the current P (t) active demands is completed.
The steady-state probabilities of P (t), qi = limt→∞ Pr
(
P (t) = i
)
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , are
derived from equilibrium equations [15, Sec.3.4.2] as
qi =
(
λ
s
)i e−λ/s
i !
. (2.2)
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Thus, P (t) is Poisson distributed with parameter λs , and the expected number of active
requests at steady state is E[P (t)] = λs , where the expectation is with respect to the
stationary Poisson distribution of P (t).
The extension to different power requirements goes as follows. Suppose that the power
requirement Pˆn of each demand n is a random variable with a discrete probability dis-
tribution on set {p1, . . . , pL}, with associated probabilities w1, . . . , wL (the case of con-
tinuous distribution of Pˆn is tackled similarly). Random variables Pˆn, are independent
from process N(t). Let Pˆ denote the random power requirement of a demand. Also,
let E[Pˆ ] = E[Pˆn] =
∑L
k=1wkpk be the expected power requirement of a demand n. The
power consumption at slot t is P (t) =
∑
n∈At Pˆn, and the average power consumption
at steady state is E[P (t)] = E[N(t)]E[Pˆ ] = λsE[Pˆ ].
Time-slotted model : We turn the continuous-time model above to a time-slotted one.
Let A(t) be the process that describes the total number of request arrivals from time 0
to time t. Then, the number of arrivals at time interval (t1, t2] is A(t2)−A(t1). Assume
a slotted system with slot length τ = 1. The number of arrivals is Poisson distributed
with parameter λ, that is
Pr[A(t+ 1)−A(t) = n] = e−λλ
n
n!
. (2.3)
Similarly, let D(t) be the process that describes the total number of request completions
from time 0 to time t. The number of completions is Poisson distributed with parameter
s, that is
Pr[D(t+ 1)−D(t) = n] = e−s s
n
n!
. (2.4)
Energy Storage Device. There exists an energy storage device (battery) of storage
capacity Emax kWh that is located at the supplier premises and is controllable by the
energy supplier. At each time slot t, the battery may be charging or discharging. Let
E(t) be the stored amount of energy at the battery at the beginning of slot t. Define
the decision variable h(t) as the rate at which the battery is charged/discharged at slot
t, with the following convention. If h(t) > 0, the battery charges, and energy flows into
it from the energy generation facility with rate h(t). This in turn implies that the total
power demand load to be served from the grid is h(t) plus the power demand P (t),
i.e. P (t) + h(t). If h(t) < 0, the battery is discharged, namely energy flows out of the
battery at rate |h(t)|, and it is used to serve part of the demand load P (t). Hence, the
amount of demand load that is actually served through the energy generation facility is
P (t) + h(t) < P (t), since an amount |h(t)| of the power demand is served directly from
the battery. The system model is depicted in Fig. 2.1.
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The level of stored energy at the battery evolves with time as:
E(t+ 1) = E(t) + h(t) . (2.5)
Since it is 0 ≤ E(t) ≤ Emax at all slots t, and time slots are of unit size, it becomes
evident that h(t) must satisfy:
− E(t) ≤ h(t) ≤ Emax − E(t) ,∀ t . (2.6)
Remark: In order to demonstrate the structure of our approach, we assume there are
no constraints on the maximum charge and discharge rate other than those implied by
(2.6). We also neglect the power losses during the charge and discharge process as these
could be easily absorbed in the charge and discharge rate. Finally, we assume that there
exists no switching delay for transferring power demands from the grid to the battery
and vice versa. The former transfers take place when we decide to discharge the battery,
and the latter occur when the battery empties while some tasks are served. We discuss
later how these and other modeling constraints can be incorporated in the problem and
affect the policy.
Cost Model. Let X(t) = P (t) + h(t) denote the total demand load to be served from
the energy supplier at slot t. We denote the instantaneous operational/generation cost
associated with load X(t) as C(X(t)), where C(·) is an increasing, differentiable convex
function. Convexity of C(·) reflects the fact that the differential or marginal cost of
power generation for the supplier increases as the demand load increases. That is, each
unit of additional power that is needed to satisfy the increasing demand becomes more
expensive to generate/obtain and make available to the consumers.
For example, the following average energy generation marginal costs are reported in
United States: Geothermal, 47 $/MWh; wind on-shore, 73 $/MWh; natural gas with
combined cycle, 75 $/MWh; hydro, 83 $/MWh; nuclear, 95 $/MWh; natural gas with
combustion turbine, 141 $/MWh; solar photo-voltaic, 125 $/MWh; wind offshore 197
$/MWh. Electricity suppliers have several different generation units at their disposal.
In order to cover the demand, suppliers activate units in increasing order of marginal
energy generation cost. Namely, when the energy generation capacity of one unit is
reached, they activate the next more expensive one. Thus, supplementary power for
serving high demand may be generated from expensive sources, or it may be imported
at high prices from other countries.
The form of the convex cost function may be considered as a piecewise linear one (differ-
entiable at every point), in which each linear segment represents one alternative energy
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Figure 2.2: Power generation cost as a piece-wise linear convex function of demand
load.
generation source, and the slopes of linear segments are the respective marginal gener-
ation costs (Fig. 2.2).
2.2.2 Problem formulation
At the beginning of each slot t, the controller observes the total grid consumption level
X(t) (and thus, also P (t)), as well as the current energy level E(t) in order to decide
whether it will charge or discharge the battery and how much.
Denote the system state at slot t as x(t) = (P (t), E(t)). For now, assume that all
quantities are restricted to positive integer values. Let the initial state be (P (0), E(0)).
A horizon of T time slots is assumed. The objective is to find a battery charge-discharge
control policy that minimizes the long-term average operational cost,
lim
T→+∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
Et
[
C(X(t))
]
= E[C(X(t))] , (2.7)
where the first expectation above is with respect to the randomness of P (t), and the
second one is with respect to the stationary distribution of {P (t)}. A policy pi selects
control variables {h(t)}t=0,1,..., subject to the evolution equation (2.5) and constraint
(2.6). A policy pi∗ is optimal if it minimizes the long-term average cost (2.7) over all
policies that satisfy the constraints above.
Under the assumptions above on arrival and completion processes, the problem of may
be cast as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) one. Instead of tackling the problem
through solving an MDP formulation, our focus here will be on simple control policies
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that operate based on P (t) as the system state. We obtain a simple policy and show
that it is asymptotically optimal for large storage capacity values.
2.2.3 An Asymptotically Optimal Control Policy
Consider the following battery charge-discharge control policy, which we refer to as
Policy (P). There exists a demand threshold, P0. At the beginning of each slot t, the
controller checks the amount of current demand to be fulfilled, P (t). Recall that the
current demand consists of all demand requests that are active, i.e., they are not yet
completed.
 If P (t) ≤ P0, then all current demand load is served with the available energy from
the grid, and a decision to charge the battery is taken, at a rate
h(t) = P0 − P (t) ≥ 0 . (2.8)
 If P (t) > P0, a decision to discharge the battery is taken, at a rate
h(t) = P (t)− P0. (2.9)
Hence, a portion P0 of the demand load is served by the available energy from the
grid, while the rest, P (t)− P0 is satisfied by the battery.
Whenever the battery energy level becomes zero during discharging, the controller serves
from the grid the rest of the load that the battery was serving at that slot t, and it holds
E(t+ 1) = 0. Since P0−P (t) can take positive or negative values, the policy above can
be succinctly described as:
h(t) = max{−E(t),min{P0 − P (t), Emax − E(t)}} . (2.10)
Theorem 2.1. Policy (P) is asymptotically optimal, in the sense that its performance
converges to the lower bound (2.11) as Emax →∞, and therefore it minimizes the long-
term average cost (2.7).
Proof. We provide an intuitive sketch of the proof. We need to realize that, regardless of
the charging/discharging decisions, it is E[X(t)] = E[P (t)] = λs . That is, charging/dis-
charging decisions may change the instantaneous values and steady-state probabilities
of process X(t), however the average total active demand will remain fixed and equal to
λ
s . This is because there are no charging or discharging losses; such losses would exist if
the battery was empty during discharge or it was full during charge.
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Figure 2.3: Extension to the model, with a renewable source feeding the battery.
To make this more intuitive, note that as the available storage capacity grows larger,
more energy can be stored when there is opportunity to do so (i.e. the values of process
{E(t)} increase in general as well), which in turn implies that there will almost always
exist enough stored energy to discharge. Thus, as Emax increases, the process h(t) takes
values in the respective set of feasible controls such that−E(t) ≤ h(t) ≤ Emax−E(t) with
probability that approaches 1.Hence, the events {P (t) − P0 ≥ E(t)} and {P0 − P (t) ≥
Emax − E(t)} have diminishing probability as Emax → ∞. Thus, h(t) < Emax − E(t)
and h(t) > −E(t) almost surely as Emax →∞. These imply that the battery will almost
never go empty during discharge and it will almost never get full during charge.
From Jensen’s inequality, for a random variable X and a convex function C(·), it is
E[C(X)] ≥ C(E[X]). Equality holds if and only if X = E[X], i.e., when random variable
X is constant. In our setup, Jensen’s inequality implies:
E[C
(
X(t)
)
] ≥ C(E[X(t)]) . (2.11)
The policy above maintains E[X(t)] = P0. If we combine this with the rationale above,
we get that the optimal threshold must be P0 = E[P (t)] = λs .
As a byproduct of the above, we have that limEmax→∞ E[h(t)] = 0, since the battery
charges with rate P0 − P (t) whenever P (t) < P0, and it discharges with rate P (t)− P0
whenever P (t) > P0. For P0 =
λ
s , the charging and discharging events take place for
half the amount of time each on average in the long-run, and thus E[h(t)]→ 0.
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2.2.4 Extension to the model: Renewable source
We now consider the following extension to the model. There exists a RES which feeds
the battery. Denote by R(t) the renewable energy generation process, which is assumed
to be an arbitrary (wide-sense) stationary process with expectation R¯ = E[R(t)]. The
rest of the model is the same as the one presented in subsection 2.2.1, and the system
is depicted in Fig. 2.3.
Now, the battery energy level evolution equation is,
E(t+ 1) = E(t) +R(t) + h(t) , (2.12)
and the feasible control set at slot t is such that,
−R(t)− E(t) ≤ h(t) ≤ Emax − E(t)−R(t). (2.13)
Note that this system is equivalent to one without the RES, where h(t) is substituted
by h(t)−R(t).
Again, our objective is to minimize the long-term average energy generation cost E[C
(
X(t)
)
].
From Jensen’s inequality, it is E[C
(
P (t) + h(t)
)
] ≥ C(P¯ + h¯) , where h¯ = E[h(t)] and
P¯ = E[P (t)]. From (2.12), we have:
lim
T→+∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
Et[E(t+ 1)]− lim
T→+∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
Et[E(t)] = R¯+ h¯⇒
lim
T→+∞
1
T
(
E[E(T )]− E[E(0)]) = R¯+ h¯⇒ h¯ = −R¯ . (2.14)
which means that in the long run, the average amount (dis)charged from the battery
is equal to the average amount of energy generated from the renewable source. Note
also that for R¯ = 0, equation (2.14) is a rigorous way of showing h¯ = 0 in the Theorem
above. Thus,
E[C
(
P (t) + h(t)
)
] ≥ C(P¯ − R¯) . (2.15)
This holds with equality if and only if:
P (t) + h(t) = P¯ − R¯⇒ h(t) = P¯ − R¯− P (t).
Therefore, the policy that minimizes long-term average cost for the setup with a RES is
as follows:
 If P (t) ≤ P¯ − R¯, charge the battery at rate P¯ − R¯− P (t).
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Figure 2.4: System with multiple storage devices and appended renewable energy
sources.
 If P (t) > P¯ − R¯, discharge the battery at rate P (t)− P¯ + R¯.
Observe that if P¯ − R¯ < 0, battery (dis)charge does not take place since in that case
the RES output fully covers the power demand load requirements.
2.2.5 Multiple Storage Devices and Grid Entities
System Architecture. Consider now N grid entities (GEs). A first instance of GE
may be an aggregator that aggregates demand load requests of consumers and acts as
an intermediary between the utility operator and consumers. The set of all GEs results
in a total consumed load from the main grid (and hence the need to generate this load),
and the total cost is due to the needed amount of energy in order to satisfy this total
load. A second instance of GE may be that of a micro-grid with its own power demand
and autonomous power generation, and hence its own operational cost. In that case,
each micro-grid is treated as a separate grid with its own demand load and operational
cost, and the cost of total generated power for the entire system is the sum of individual
micro-grid (GE) operational costs. There also exist M energy storage devices, each
with an attached RES. These storage devices are shared among the N GEs, but they
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are owned and controlled by the central operator. That is, they can be charged from
power generated by the GEs, or they can be discharged to satisfy demand load in GEs.
Continual arrival and completion of power demands takes place at each GE location.
The system is depicted in Fig. 2.4.
Power Demand Model. Power demand requests arrive at each GE i according to
a Poisson process, with average arrival rate λi requests per unit of time. The time
duration sn of each power demand task n is exponentially distributed with parameter s
and pn = 1, ∀n. With no loss of generality, the average service rate s is taken to be the
same for demand tasks of all GEs. Since pn = 1, ∀n, let Pi(t) be the number of active
requests on GE i at time t and it is a continuous-time Markov chain. Therefore, the
expected number of active requests on GE i at steady state is P¯i = E[Pi(t)] = λis . The
extension to different power requirements is similar to the one described in section 2.2.
In this case, the average power consumption on GE i at steady state is P¯i = E[Pi(t)] =
E[Ni(t)]E[Pˆ ] = λis E[Pˆ ], where Ni(t) is the number of active requests on GE i at t.
The process to turn the continous-time model to a time-slotted one is similar to that
described in section 2.2.
Energy Storage Devices. Each storage device j, j = 1, . . . ,M has storage capacity
Ejmax kWh, j = 1, . . . ,M , and it is accessible by some or all GEs. Denote by Ki the
subset of storage devices that are accessible to GE i. Let Rj(t) be the time-varying
amount of generated energy at RES j which is appended to storage device j. This
is assumed to be an arbitrary (wide-sense) stationary process with expectation R¯j =
E[Rj(t)]. Renewable source j is appended to storage device j in the sense that its
energy feeds storage device j. At the beginning of each slot t, the central controller
decides whether each GE i will charge or discharge each storage device j, and by how
much. The charging and discharging processes for each battery are determined based on
the GE power demand levels and the renewable energy generation levels. Specifically,
when the demand load of a GE i is low, it may charge one or more batteries, since the
energy generation cost is low. On the other hand, at peak consumption, when the cost
of power generation is high, GE i may satisfy part of its increased demand load using
part of the stored energy of its accessible batteries.
Let Ej(t) be the amount of stored energy at storage device j at the beginning of slot
t. Define the decision variable hij(t) as the charging/discharging rate for storage device
j and GE i at slot t. If hij(t) > 0, battery j is charged, and energy flows into it from
GE i with rate hij(t). If hij(t) < 0, battery j discharges, namely energy flows out of
the battery with rate |hij(t)|, and it is used to serve part of the demand load of GE i.
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Define hi(t) as the total charging rate of all batteries that are accessible by GE i,
hi(t) =
∑
j∈Ki
hij(t) , (2.16)
and expectation h¯i = E[hi(t)]. Hence, for GE i, the amount of demand load that is
actually served by the grid (or GE i) at slot t is Xi(t) = Pi(t) + hi(t), with expectation
X¯i = E[Xi(t)].
Further, let htot,j(t) be the net rate at which energy flows into the storage device j at
slot t,
htot,j(t) =
N∑
i=1
hij(t) . (2.17)
Note that a battery j may be charged from some GEs and discharged from some others
at the same time, which means that it can be used in a different way by each GE at each
slot t. For instance, for battery j it can be hkj(t) < 0 and hlj(t) > 0 for two different
GEs k and l. The energy level of storage device j evolves as,
Ej(t+ 1) = Ej(t) +Rj(t) + htot,j(t) (2.18)
and the feasible control set at slot t is such that,
−Rj(t)− Ej(t) ≤ htot,j(t) ≤ Ejmax − Ej(t)−Rj(t), ∀t . (2.19)
By using a similar argument as for the case of a single storage device, we get
N∑
i=1
h¯i = −
M∑
j=1
R¯j . (2.20)
We distinguish two different objectives that make sense in future smart grid architec-
tures. In case A, the different micro-grids receive energy from one energy generator
entity. In this case, the total energy generation cost amounts to the generation cost
of the aggregate demand load of all micro-grids. In case B, each micro-grid is treated
as a separate grid with its own energy generation facility. Now a plausible objective
is to minimize the total cost of energy generation for the system, which is the sum of
individual generation costs for each micro-grid (GE). In the sequel, we formulate and
discuss the two corresponding optimization problems.
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2.2.5.1 Case A: Minimization of cost of aggregate demand
In case A, the demand loads of all GEs are aggregated, and the controller aims to
minimize the energy generation cost so as to satisfy the total demand, by determining
appropriate charging and discharging rates for each battery.
The generation cost associated with total power consumption X(t) =
∑N
i=1Xi(t), is
given as:
C(X(t)) = C(
N∑
i=1
Xi(t)) = C
( N∑
i=1
(
Pi(t) + hi(t)
))
. (2.21)
Moreover, for the long-term average cost, we have the following lower bound from
Jensen’s inequality:
E[C
( N∑
i=1
Xi(t)
)
] ≥ C( N∑
i=1
(
E[Pi(t)] + E[hi(t)]
))
=
(2.20)
= C
( N∑
i=1
P¯i −
M∑
j=1
R¯j
)
. (2.22)
Optimal policy for N = 2 GEs and M = 2 storage devices:
From (2.22),
E[C
(
X1(t) +X2(t)
)
] ≥ C(P¯1 + P¯2 − R¯1 − R¯2) , (2.23)
and equality holds if
X1(t) +X2(t) = P¯1 + P¯2 − R¯1 − R¯2. (2.24)
The conditions that make the inequality above hold with equality are:
P1(t) + h1(t) = P¯1 − α(R¯1 + R¯2)⇒
h1(t) = P¯1 − α(R¯1 + R¯2)− P1(t)
(2.25)
and
P2(t) + h2(t) = P¯2 − (1− α)(R¯1 + R¯2)⇒
h2(t) = P¯2 − (1− α)(R¯1 + R¯2)− P2(t) ,
(2.26)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. The quantities
P 10 = P¯1 − α(R¯1 + R¯2) (2.27)
and
P 20 = P¯2 − (1− α)(R¯1 + R¯2) (2.28)
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show one possibility for setting the thresholds for the optimal policy for GE 1 and GE
2, respectively for charging and discharging. For α = 1/2, the thresholds are:
P 10 = P¯1 −
R¯1 + R¯2
2
(2.29)
and
P 20 = P¯2 −
R¯1 + R¯2
2
(2.30)
2.2.5.2 Case B: Minimization of sum of individual GE costs
We assume that each GE represents an separate entity with its own power generation
capabilities and power demand, and thus its own operational cost. Hence, the demand
loads of the different GEs cannot be aggregated, and the meaningful objective for the
controller is to minimize the sum of individual GE costs. The cost model is the same as
the one above, but now each GE i has its own operational cost function, Ci(·).
The instantaneous generation cost for GE i associated with power consumption Xi(t) is
Ci(Xi(t)), and the total long-run average total cost is limT→+∞ E[ 1T
∑T−1
t=0
∑N
i=1Ci
(
Xi(t)
)
].
From Jensen’s inequality, we get:
E[
N∑
i=1
Ci(Xi(t))] =
N∑
i=1
E[Ci
(
Pi(t) + hi(t)
)
] ≥
≥
N∑
i=1
Ci
(
P¯i + h¯i
) ≥
≥ min
h¯i
{ N∑
i=1
Ci
(
P¯i + h¯i
)}
, (2.31)
where the last inequality follows from the selection of values for h¯i, i = 1, . . . , N that
minimize
∑N
i=1Ci(P¯i + h¯i).
Optimal policy for N = 2 GEs with the same cost function and M = 2 storage
devices:
From (2.20), it is
h¯1 + h¯2 = −R¯1 − R¯2. (2.32)
Substituting from (2.32), the right side of (2.31) becomes:
min
h¯1
{
C
(
P¯1 + h¯1
)
+ C
(
P¯2 − R¯1 − R¯2 − h¯1
)}
. (2.33)
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Setting the derivative of the term above with respect to hi equal to zero and assuming
that C ′(·) is a one-to-one function, we get
h¯∗1 =
P¯2 − P¯1 − R¯1 − R¯2
2
(2.34)
and
h¯∗2 =
P¯1 − P¯2 − R¯1 − R¯2
2
. (2.35)
From (2.31), we have
2∑
i=1
E[C
(
Pi(t) + hi(t)
)
] ≥
2∑
i=1
C
(
P¯i + h¯
∗
i
)
(2.36)
and equality holds if
P1(t) + h1(t) = P¯1 + h¯
∗
1 (2.37)
and
P2(t) + h2(t) = P¯2 + h¯
∗
2. (2.38)
Therefore, using (2.34) and (2.35), we have the charging / discharging decision control
for the two micro-grids given by
hi(t) =
P¯1 + P¯2 − R¯1 − R¯2
2
− Pi(t), i = 1, 2. (2.39)
The quantity P i0 =
P¯1+P¯2−R¯1−R¯2
2 , which is the same for both GEs, will be the threshold
for the asymptotically optimal policy.
2.2.5.3 Asymptotically Optimal Control Policy
We now describe some meaningful policies for a system with multiple GEs. There exist
N thresholds, P i0, one for each GE i. At the beginning of each slot t, the controller
checks each Pi(t). If Pi(t) ≤ P i0, then all active demand requests on GE i are served by
the grid (or GE i), and a decision to charge one or more batteries is taken, with total
charging rate hi(t) = P
i
0−Pi(t). On the other hand, if Pi(t) > P i0, a decision to discharge
one or more batteries is taken, with total rate hi(t) = Pi(t)−P i0. Whenever the battery
j energy level becomes zero during discharging, the controller sets hij(t) = 0 for all GEs
i that were discharging battery j at that slot t (namely, it serves from these GEs the
rest of their loads that battery j was serving at slot t), and it holds Ej(t+ 1) = 0.
The key difference between the policy presented in section 2.2 and the one presented
here is that each charging (or discharging) rate hi(t) must now be allocated among
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the different batteries based on certain criteria pertaining to the storage devices. For
instance, each charging or discharging rate may be split equally among the batteries.
In this case, it is hij(t) =
hi(t)
|Ki| , ∀j ∈ Ki. As a second case, we may use the amount of
stored energy Ej(t) as a criterion. We may also use the intuition that batteries with
smaller amount of stored energy and larger capacity need to be charged with higher
charging rate, and that batteries with higher battery energy level should be discharged
with a higher rate so as to avoid the case of empty or fully charged batteries that cannot
be further discharged or charged, respectively. Based on the criterion above, each GE
i could assign time-varying weights wcij(t) and w
d
ij(t) to each storage device j ∈ Ki in
case of charging and discharging, respectively that take values between 0 and 1. For one
GE i, the controller would then set hij(t) = hi(t)w
c
ij(t) or hij(t) = hi(t)w
d
ij(t),∀j ∈ Ki,
taking also into account constraint (2.19). Observe that
∑
j∈Ki hij(t) = hi(t) since∑
j∈Ki w
c
ij(t) = 1 and
∑
j∈Ki w
d
ij(t) = 1.
The expressions for the thresholds that we have provided in subsections 2.2.5.1 and
2.2.5.2 can be generalized for N,M > 2, and they are:
P i0 = P¯i −
∑M
j=1 R¯j
N
, ∀i (2.40)
and
P i0 =
∑N
i=1 P¯i −
∑M
j=1 R¯j
N
, ∀i (2.41)
for the first and second problem, respectively.
Theorem 2.2. For both the cases above, the proposed policy with the above-mentioned
thresholds is asymptotically optimal, in the sense that its performance converges to the
lower bound as Ejmax → ∞, ∀j, and therefore it minimizes the long-term average total
cost.
2.2.6 Extensions to the model
2.2.6.1 Non-Stationarity of Renewable Energy Generation
In subsection 2.2.4, we assumed that the RES that feeds the battery, is characterized by
a (wide-sense) stationary energy generation process. This assumption does not affect the
generality of the model, since for time-varying average generated power R¯(t) we assume
that it holds R¯ = limT→+∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 R¯(t) and that the limit exists.
However, some RESs like solar and wind are characterized by variations of energy gener-
ation and might exhibit non-stationary behavior. In order to tackle this non-stationary
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behavior, we propose an approach similar to that presented in [16]. Namely, we derive
an empirical estimate for the time-varying average of generated power based on the most
recent historical data, by using a moving time window of length L.
Let us denote by P˜ and R˜ the empirical estimate of the average of power demand P (t)
and the empirical estimate of the average of generated energy R(t), respectively. These
quantities are estimated from the data gathered over the L most recent observation
periods, i.e. the actual average power demands P¯d1 , · · · , P¯dL , and the actual average
amounts of generated energy R¯d1 , · · · , R¯dL , respectively. We have: P˜ = (P¯d1 + · · · +
P¯dL)/L and R˜ = (R¯d1 + · · ·+ R¯dL)/L.
Based on the above, a heuristic extension of the optimal energy storage control policy
can be provided by keeping the structure of the optimal policy, and by setting P¯ = P˜
and R¯ = R˜. In the same sense, a heuristic policy can be devised for multiple GEs and
batteries.
2.2.6.2 Storage Device Modeling
Charge/discharge rate bounds and losses: In this work, we assumed that there are no
constraints on charge/discharge rates other than those implied by (2.6), (2.13) or (2.19),
and we neglected losses during the charge and discharge process. In reality, a storage
device has bounded charge and discharge rate. One could derive various extensions to
the basic policy presented above that are expected to perform close to the optimal. For
instance, if hB > 0 denotes the absolute upper bound on charge or discharge rate, i.e.
|h(t)| < hB, then one could consider the following policy:
h(t) = max{−E(t), P0 − P (t), hB} , (2.42)
whose performance approaches the optimal one as hB increases. Furthermore, a storage
device may have charge and discharge power losses. Battery performance is affected
by the charging and discharging efficiencies ηc, ηd ∈ (0, 1] of the storage technology
used. Namely the power flowing in or out of the battery at slot t is ηch(t) or
1
ηd
h(t),
respectively.
2.2.6.3 Transmission Losses
One could incorporate to the model possible transmission losses as the power is trans-
ported from storage devices to GEs. The power loss function for transported amount of
power x is P loss(x) = βx2, where β = Rd
V 2
. In this expression, R is the ohmic resistance
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Figure 2.5: Performance of the proposed energy storage control policy as a function
of available storage capacity.
per unit distance of the transmission line, V is the operating voltage of the transmission
line that connects the two end-points of the transport, i.e the storage device and the
GE, and d is the distance between them. Typical values of R range from 0.1 to 0.5
Ohm/km, while V could be 220V or tens of kV. Depending on the distance considered,
the losses could be either ignored or incorporated in the model. The structure of the
optimal policy will not change.
2.2.7 Numerical Results
2.2.7.1 One Storage Device
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed policy (P) for a single storage
device, we first compute the long-term average energy generation cost and compare it
to the lower bound (2.11). Our simulation scenario ran for a horizon of 240 hours. The
power demand arrival and completion processes are Poisson with λ = 200 requests /
hour and s = 2 requests / hour, i.e. the average demand duration is 1/s = 1/2 hour.
Also, the average power requirement per demand is 1 kW. Thus, the average demand
load is E[P (t)] = λs = 100 kW. We consider here the cost function C(x) = x
2 for
simplicity.
Fig. 2.5 shows the average generation cost resulting from policy (P) for different values
of storage capacity Emax. As anticipated, the average cost decreases as Emax increases,
and it ultimately converges to the lower bound (λ/s)2. It can be observed that the
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.6: Amount of stored energy for A) Emax = 10 kWh and B) Emax = 24
kWh.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.7: Total instantaneous grid load for A) Emax = 10 kWh and B) Emax = 24
kWh.
performance of the policy is optimal at Emax ≥ 24 kWh, when the resulting average
generation cost reaches the lower bound.
Next, we compare two scenarios, one with storage capacity Emax = 10 kWh and one
with Emax = 24 kWh. In Fig. 2.6a and 2.6b, we show the instantaneous residual stored
energy across the time horizon for the two scenarios. When Emax = 10 kWh, the battery
empties (E(t) = 0) for a total of 69 times, whereas for Emax = 24 kWh, the battery
is never fully discharged. In Fig. 2.7a and 2.7b we depict the total instantaneous load
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Figure 2.8: Minimum required capacity Emax for which the policy is optimal, versus
the demand load.
on the grid, X(t), for the two cases above. Observe that if Emax = 10 kWh, the total
load exceeds P¯ = 100 for a total of 69 times as well. Clearly, these are the times when
the battery empties, and the load that the battery was serving is moved to the grid.
On the contrary, for Emax = 24 kWh, X(t) remains constant and equals P¯ = 100,
since the battery is never fully discharged. These findings verify the earlier theoretical
investigation.
We also seek the value of the minimum required storage capacity for which our policy
reaches the lower bound in (2.11), as a function of demand load λ/s. Fig. 2.8 presents
our findings. The minimum required capacity can be seen to increase in a concave-like
fashion in four out of the five test points as the demand load increases. This seems to
imply that the additional amount of capacity needed to fulfill an additional unit of load
decreases as the load increases, which is in accordance to the existence of a limiting
value of storage capacity derived above.
2.2.7.2 Two storage devices and GEs
Now, we study the performance of the policy presented in section 2.2.5 for the case of
minimization of the sum of individual GE costs, by evaluating the long-term average
cost for the optimal policy and comparing it to the lower bound. We consider N = 2
GEs and M = 2 storage devices with no renewable resources attached, and a cost
function C(x) = x2 for both GEs. We also assume λ1 = 200 requests/hour, λ2 = 100
requests/hour, and s = 2 requests/hour. The average power requirement per demand
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Figure 2.9: Performance of the proposed policy for the case of multiple batteries as
a function of available storage capacities with λ1 6= λ2, E1max = E2max.
Table 2.1: Average cost of the proposed policy for M = 2 storage devices
E1max(kWh) E
2
max(kWh) average cost
1 4 11479
4 7 11323
7 10 11267
10 13 11251
13 16 11250
is 1 kW and the batteries have equal storage capacities, E1max = E
2
max = Emax. The
threshold values are computed to be P 10 = P
2
0 = 75.
In Fig. 2.9, we show the values of the total long-term average cost for different values
of the common storage capacity Emax. We observe that, as storage capacities increase,
the average total cost converges to the lower bound which is 11250. Specifically, for
Emax ≥ 12 kWh the cost reaches the lower bound. Finally, we ran the same experiment
for E1max 6= E2max. Some of the resulting average costs are depicted in Table 2.1. Again,
it can be observed that as storage capacities increase, the average total cost converges
to the lower bound (11250).
2.3 Storage Placement and Power Flow
In this section, we study the problem of how much storage capacity should be placed
on each node –prosumer entity or bus– of a power network given an available storage
capacity budget. We are interested in the way storage capacity placement impacts the
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overall cost of energy generation. In determining the optimal policy, it turns out that
various aspects of power flow need to be taken into account. The solution policy for this
energy storage dimensioning problem entails various parameters such as the demand
profiles of prosumers and the power flow constraints. This section is based on work [11].
The references for the power flow analysis are [17], [18] and [19].
2.3.1 Power flow analysis
We consider a power network which consists of a set N = 1, 2, ..., N of N prosumer
nodes. Each node may be connected to other nodes through power distribution links.
We also use the equivalent, smart-grid term “bus” to refer to a node. Let (k, `) denote
the power distribution link between nodes k, l ∈ N . For each link (k, `), let Yk` be its
admittance, which is a complex number. Each node can be a power supplier (generator)
through some renewable energy source (RES) (e.g., a solar panel or a wind-turbine), or
a power consumer, both or neither.
Let Vk be the complex voltage at bus k ∈ N and |Vk| denote its magnitude. Let Ik
denote the current injected at bus k. The node equation at bus k is,
Ik =
N∑
l=1
YklVl . (2.43)
Define Sk to be the net complex power injection (generation minus load) at bus k ∈ N .
This is written as,
Sk = Pk + jQk = VkI
∗
k , (2.44)
where I∗k is the complex conjugate of the current at bus k, and Pk, Qk are the active
(real) and reactive powers. We can write,
I∗k =
Pk + jQk
Vk
⇒ Ik = Pk − jQk
V ∗k
(2.45)
and thus
Pk − jQk = V ∗k
N∑
l=1
YklVl =
N∑
l=1
YklV
∗
k Vl . (2.46)
Now let Ykl = |Ykl|ejδkl and Vk = |Vk|ejθk . Since
Pk − jQk =
N∑
l=1
|Ykl||Vk||Vl|ej(δkl+θl−θk) (2.47)
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
04/06/2020 23:30:17 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 3. Optimal Energy Storage Management and Dimensioning in Smart Grid
Systems 32
we have
Pk =
N∑
l=1
|Ykl||Vk||Vl| cos(δkl + θl − θk) (2.48)
and
Qk = −
N∑
l=1
|Ykl||Vk||Vl| sin(δkl + θl − θk) (2.49)
Here, we use the linearized DC approximation. In this approximation, the network is
assumed to be lossless, the voltage magnitudes |Vk| are assumed to be at their nominal
values at all nodes k ∈ N , and the voltage phase angle differences (θk − θl) between
end-points of a link (k, l) are small.
The first step to this approximation is to neglect the reactive power, i.e., Qk ≈ 0.
Through standard trigonometry, we obtain
Pk =
N∑
l=1
|Ykl||Vk||Vl|(cos δkl cos(θl − θk)− sin δkl sin(θl − θk)) . (2.50)
The second step is to neglect the real part of the admittance, i.e., δkl ≈ pi/2. Then
Pk =
N∑
l=1
|Ykl||Vk||Vl| sin δkl sin(θk − θl) . (2.51)
Finally, we assume that |Vk| = |Vl| = 1, and that the voltage angle differences (θk − θl)
between end-points of a link (k, l) are very small, so that sin(θk − θl) ≈ θk − θl. We
also set Bkl = |Ykl| sin δkl for the imaginary part of the admittance, which is also called
reactance, and we get the power flow equation
Pk =
N∑
l=1
Bkl(θk − θl) . (2.52)
This power-flow equation is called direct-current (DC) one because of its analogies with
the flow equation in a DC circuit.
If we denote with Pkl ≥ 0 the real power flowing from node k to node l through line
(k, l), and k, l ∈ N , it is
Pkl = Bkl(θk − θl) . (2.53)
2.3.2 Storage and power flow model
For the power flow model, we use the linearized DC approximation described above.
For our model, we assume a time-slotted system with slots of unit length, and study
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its operation for an horizon of T time slots. The value of power flow Pkl(t), for nodes
k, l ∈ N , at different times t is limited by stability constraints and thermal effects, and
we have:
|Pkl(t)| ≤ fkl, (2.54)
where fkl is the capacity of the line connecting nodes k and l.
Let Lk(t) be the instantaneous demand load at node k ∈ N at time slot t and let Gk(t)
be the amount of generated power at node k at slot t. We denote the instantaneous
operational cost associated with power generation Gk(t) as Ck(Gk(t)), where Ck(·) is an
increasing, differentiable convex function.
Typically, the energy demand of prosumers follows specific patterns such as periodic
ones [20], [21]. Thus, the energy demand patterns of buses can be characterized. In
order to extract these patterns, estimation techniques from historical data regarding the
power demand of buses may be used. Here, we will assume that the demand profiles
for a finite horizon T , which we denote here as vectors Lk = (Lk(t) : t = 1, . . . , T ), for
k ∈ N , are obtained and known in advance.
The decision variable hk(t) is the charging/discharging rate of the battery of bus k at
slot t, respectively. Also, let Ek(t) be the stored amount of energy at the battery of
node k at the beginning of slot t. Define Ekmax ≥ 0 as the storage capacity allocated at
node k. Clearly, ∑
k∈N
Ekmax ≤ SB (2.55)
where SB is the total available storage budget, and 0 ≤ Ek(t) ≤ Ekmax for t = 1, . . . , T .
The level of stored energy Ek(t) at the battery of node k evolves with time as:
Ek(t+ 1) = Ek(t) + hk(t). (2.56)
Since 0 ≤ Ek(t) ≤ Ekmax at all slots t and time slots are of unit size, the quantity hk(t)
must satisfy,
− Ek(t) ≤ hk(t) ≤ Ekmax − Ek(t) (2.57)
Here, we assume that each battery is empty at installation time t = 0, i.e., Ek(0) = 0.
We have the following succinct time-evolution formula:
Ek(t+ 1) = min{Ekmax,max{Ek(t) + hk(t), 0}} . (2.58)
Clearly, if Gk(t) > Lk(t) there exists a power surplus and the excess energy Gk(t)−Lk(t)
of prosumer k can be used to charge her installed battery with rate hk(t) > 0, and/or
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Figure 2.10: Power balance at node k.
satisfy any energy needs of another prosumer l 6= k through transferring power Pkl(t)
to her. On the other hand, if Gk(t) < Lk(t), then there exists a power deficit and
thus prosumer k may satisfy her residual demand load Lk(t)−Gk(t) by discharging her
battery at rate |hk(t)|, and/or by receiving power |Pkl(t)| from a prosumer l .
At each time t, the power that flows in and out of a bus k should be balanced, i.e., it
must hold:
Gk(t) = Lk(t) + hk(t) +
∑
l 6=k
Pkl(t) (2.59)
This power balance constraint can be observed in Fig. 2.10.
2.3.3 Problem formulation
In the system design phase, there exists an amount SB of available storage budget/ca-
pacity which should be allocated among buses. The charging/discharging and energy
exchange decisions of the nodes would need to be considered as well.
Given the energy demand pattern Lk for each prosumer k, we need to decide at each
time slot: (i) whether and how much the battery will be charged or discharged, and (ii)
whether power |Pkl(t)| will flow from or to some other prosumer l. Further, partitioning
the finite storage capacity across buses and placing corresponding storage facilities there
to optimize the generation cost is needed. The jointly optimal policy will encompass
the variables above and can be derived from the solution of the following optimization
problem:
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Figure 2.11: A power network consisting of two buses. It must hold E1max +E
2
max ≤
SB
min
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈N
Ck(Gk(t)) (2.60)
over (hk(t), Pkl(t), E
k
max), t = 1, . . . , T, k, l ∈ N
subject to: (2.54), (2.55), (2.58), (2.57), (2.59),
where constraint (2.54) should be satisfied by a feasible power flow, constraint (2.55)
stands for the limited storage capacity over all storage devices, constraint (2.58) repre-
sents the constraint on the stored amount of energy at each battery, constraint (2.57)is
about the charging/discharging rates of the energy storage devices, and constraint (2.59)
represents the power balance constraint at each node of the network.
In the sequel, we present and discuss some simple special cases of the problem.
2.3.4 Numerical Example 1: Storage placement for N=2 buses
Consider a toy power network with two nodes, which is depicted in Fig. 2.11. Both
buses k = 1, 2 have generator units and loads, and let G¯k, L¯k denote the average power
generation and consumption load respectively at bus k. To simplify the scenario, we
assume that storage capacity and power link capacity are unlimited, and we focus on
the impact of placing the entire storage at bus 1 or 2. If storage is placed at bus 1, the
power conservation equations at the two buses are
G¯1 − P12 − h1 = L¯1 (2.61)
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and
G¯2 + P12 = L¯2 . (2.62)
Note that the average charging rate cannot exceed the total injected power in the bus,
and it cannot also exceed the load, i.e.
h1 ≤ G¯1 − P12 , and h1 ≤ L¯1 . (2.63)
The objective is to minimize the total generation cost, C(G¯1) +C(G¯2), which is written
as,
min
P12,h1
C(L¯1 + h1 + P12) + C(L¯2 − P12) . (2.64)
We can take the partial derivatives with respect to P12 and h1. We get
P12 =
1
2
(L¯2 − L¯1 − h1) , C ′(L¯1 + h1 + P12) = 0 . (2.65)
If for example C(x) = x2, we have h1 = −(L¯1 + P12). Finally,
h1 = min{−(L¯1 + P12), L1, G¯1 − P12} . (2.66)
Depending on the arithmetic values of the load and generation parameters involved, we
obtain the expressions. We can make similar computations for storage placed in bus 2,
and we then decide where to place storage. For a numerical illustration, let the cost of
generation at each bus k be C(G¯k) = G¯
2
k, and the average demand loads at nodes 1 and
2 be L¯1 = 10 and L¯2 = 20. Also, suppose that the line capacity f12 is infinite. If there
is an infinite storage budget, then:
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 1, then h1 = −30, P12 = 20, G¯1 = 0, G¯2 = 0
and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 0
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 2, then h2 = −30, P12 = −10, G¯1 = 0,
G¯2 = 0 and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 0 .
Thus, the average cost remains the same regardless of the bus at which storage is placed,
and this is true for other values of the loads as well. Even for a different set of values of
the average demand loads, the result is the same. Namely, for L¯1 = 15 and L¯2 = 5:
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 1, then h1 = −20, P12 = 5, G¯1 = 0, G¯2 = 0
and C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 0
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 2, then h2 = −20, P12 = −15, G¯1 = 0,
G¯2 = 0 and C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 0.
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This cost invariance holds even if the storage capacity available is finite, e.g. SB = 5,
and for example L¯1 = 10 and L¯2 = 20:
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 1, then h1 = −5, P12 = 7.5, G¯1 = 12.5,
G¯2 = 12.5 and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 312.5
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 2, then h2 = −5, P12 = 2.5, G¯1 = 12.5,
G¯2 = 12.5 and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 312.5,
and for L¯1 = 15 and L¯2 = 5 :
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 1, then h1 = −5, P12 = −2.5, G¯1 = 7.5,
G¯2 = 7.5 and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 112.5
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 2, then h2 = −5, P12 = −7.5, G¯1 = 7.5,
G¯2 = 7.5 and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 112.5.
Again, we observe that the total cost is independent of the placement location of the
storage capacity. It can be checked that the same holds for every possible value of SB.
However, for L¯1 = 10, L¯2 = 20, SB = 5 and finite line capacity f12 = 1, we calculate
that:
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 1, then h1 = −5, P12 = 1, G¯1 = 6, G¯2 = 19
and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 397
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 2, then h2 = −5, P12 = 1, G¯1 = 11, G¯2 = 14
and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 317,
which means that the storage capacity should be placed in bus 2.
On the other hand, for L¯1 = 15, L¯2 = 5, SB = 5 and f12 = 1 :
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 1, then h1 = −5, P12 = −1, G¯1 = 9, G¯2 = 6
and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 117
 if the storage capacity is placed in bus 2, then h2 = −5, P12 = −1, G¯1 = 14,
G¯2 = 1 and thus, C(G¯1) + C(G¯2) = 197,
which means that the storage capacity should be placed in bus 1.
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Figure 2.12: The optimal system performance for different values of the available
storage SB and line capacity f12.
2.3.5 Numerical Example 2: Storage dimensioning for N=2 buses
Consider the same toy power network of Fig. 2.11. We assume that the demand load
profiles Lk(t) of nodes k = 1, 2 and the power flow capacity f12 of the line connecting
the two nodes are known. Further, we assume that there is an available storage budget
SB which can be split into amounts E
1
max, E
2
max and allocated at the two nodes, so that
E1max + E
2
max = SB. We study our system for a time horizon of T = 2 slots.
The objective is to minimize the total average generation cost through optimal storage
dimensioning, storage management, and power flow. Namely, we need to optimally share
the available storage budget SB among the two nodes, and find the charging/discharging
rates hk(t) and power flow P12(t) at each slot t, so as to minimize the total average
generation cost, 12
∑2
t=1
∑2
k=1Ck(Gk(t)), which can be written as
1
2
2∑
t=1
C1
(
L1(t) + h1(t) + P12(t)
)
+ C2
(
L2(t) + h2(t)− P12(t)
)
. (2.67)
We conduct a numerical study for different values of demand loads L1(t), L2(t), power
flow capacity f12 and storage budget SB. Here, we assume C1(·) = C2(·) = C(·) and
C(Gk(t)) = (Gk(t))
2. Our results are depicted in Fig. 2.12 and Table 2.2.
In Fig. 2.12, the optimal total average generation cost (2.67) for SB ∈ [0, 5] and line
capacity f12 = 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2 is depicted. For all values of f12, we observe that as the
available storage capacity SB increases, the optimal generation cost decreases, and for
storage larger than a certain value, i.e., for SB ≥ 1.4, it becomes constant. Also, as we
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Values for f12 = 0.5 Values for f12 = 1
L1(1) 5 1 7 3 5 1 7 3
L1(2) 7 7 1 7 7 7 1 7
L2(1) 1 5 5 5 1 5 5 5
L2(2) 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1
h1(1) 1 2.5 0 1.67 1 2 0 1.33
h1(2) −1 −2.5 0 −1.67 −1 −2 0 −1.33
h2(1) 1 0 0 0 1 0.001 0 0
h2(2) −1 0 0 0 −1 −0.001 0 0
P12(1) −0.5 0.5 −0.5 0.17 −1 1 −1 0.33
P12(2) −0.5 −0.5 0.5 −0.5 −1 −1 1 −1
E1max 2.67 3.54 2.77 3.22 2.66 3.33 2.78 3.11
E2max 2.33 1.46 2.23 1.78 2.34 1.67 2.22 1.89
Table 2.2: Optimal storage dimensioning, charging/discharging and power flow for
SB = 5 and f12 = 0.5, 1.
allow larger line capacity, the optimal cost decreases, but it does not reduce beyond line
capacity f12 = 1.5.
Table 2.2 shows the optimal battery capacities, charging/discharging rates and power
flows of the two buses for different values of the demand profiles L1(t), L2(t) and for line
capacity f12 = 0.5, 1. It can be seen that for both values of f12, more storage capacity
is placed in buses which need greater charging/discharging rates. When the two buses
need to charge or discharge with the same rate, the available capacity is almost equally
shared among the two buses.
2.4 Related Work
There exists significant amount of work on leveraging stored energy in various contexts.
From a wireless networking perspective, the work [22] uses the stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming framework to obtain an optimal battery discharge policy for maximizing the
lifetime of power-limited wireless nodes. The problem of energy-aware routing is studied
in [23]. The designed algorithm computes an energy-weighted shortest path from the
source to the destination node of each service request. The wireless nodes are assumed
to have knowledge of the future short-term recharge process. However, this is an as-
sumption that the authors of [24] dispense with in their work. They present a modified
adaptive backpressure policy that maximizes throughput and whose asymptotic opti-
mality is shown using the notion of Lyapunov drift. A similar problem is considered in
[25] using a similar Lyapunov optimization approach. The proposed algorithms jointly
manage the stored energy and make power allocation decisions for packet transmissions
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without requiring any knowledge of the harvestable energy process and the channel
qualities.
One classic problem in the literature is the optimal stored energy control problem from
the consumer point of view, in the presence of time-varying prices. In [26], [27], for
instance, the proposed cost-minimizing storage control policy is shown to be a simple
threshold-based one, while [28] proposes SmartCharge, a charging/discharging system
that determines when and how much to store low-cost energy for use during high-cost
periods. SmartCharge’s algorithm leverages next-day electricity prices and a prediction
model which forecasts future demand. Based on the Lyapunov optimization technique,
the authors of [29] develop energy management schemes for load-serving and demand-
response. Each power consuming entity’s objective is to find a control policy for deter-
mining the load consuming, purchasing/selling, and charging/discharging actions, so as
to minimize her average cost. In [30], the authors proposed a threshold-based control
policy for a single battery and extended their policy to the multiple-battery case in order
to reduce the cost payed by users for energy supply.
In the context of game theory, two games are discussed in [31]. The first is a non-
cooperative one played between storage unit owners, who schedule their energy use to
minimize their energy cost. The second is a Stackelberg game played between the utility
provider and the energy consumers, in which the users minimize their cost, while the
utility maximizes its profit. Work [32], instead, introduces a prospect theory-based
framework which explains how real-life user decisions can deviate from those predicted
by conventional game theory. A non-cooperative game is formulated between storage
unit owners, which aim to maximize their utility functions that capture benefit-cost
tradeoffs.
Energy storage has also received significant attention as a way to efficiently integrate
renewables into the electricity grid. In particular, in [33] storage has been proposed as a
strategy for increasing the average energy sold and reducing curtailment of wind energy
in a wind-based system that trades electricity in electricity markets. The corresponding
problem is formulated as a Markov decision process and a triple-threshold policy is pro-
posed. The stochastic network calculus framework is extended in [34] to investigate the
effects of energy storage on the power supply reliability in configurations with different
levels of renewable generation.
In the same context, the impact of wind prediction quality on the performance of a
system equipped with a storage system and a set of wind sources is studied in [35]. The
authors present two production scheduling policies: a deterministic one, and a heuristic
one which is obtained using the statistics of wind-forecast errors. Two techniques to
mitigate the intermittent nature of renewables are considered in [36]: the use of storage
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and the concept of distributed generation combined with cooperation among distributed
sources. The objective is to minimize the time average cost of energy exchange among
the grid. An algorithm is developed using the technique of Lyapunov optimization.
The works [37] and [38] present ways to reduce power costs in data centers. Using the
technique of Lyapunov optimization, an online control algorithm is developed in [37] that
exploits UPS storage devices to minimize the time average electricity bill in a data center.
The proposed algorithm operates without any knowledge of the statistics of the workload
or electricity cost processes. The authors of [38] apply the same optimization technique
to solve the problem of optimal traffic distribution and battery charging/discharging
management in Internet data centers under location-varying and time-varying electricity
prices.
The problem of optimal dimensioning and placing of energy storage systems within the
distribution grid is studied in [11], [39]. In [11], the placement of storage is shown to
affect the power generation costs, and the objective is to minimize the power generation
cost, yet assuming that there is no cost for storage devices. The goal is to optimally
place and partition a given amount of storage capacity and to control the storage unit
across a power network so as to minimize the long-term average generation cost. The
work [39] proposes a model for collaborative prosumption of energy in a community of
prosumers that collectively use energy storage systems. The objective of the prosumers
is to minimize the total cost of battery deployment and that of power drawn from the
grid. The decisions amount to battery charging and discharging at each time slot as well
as partitioning of a storage budget among a set of candidate locations. Nash bargaining
theory is used to determine how the total cost should be shared in a fair fashion among
prosumers.
The benefits of cooperation are studied in [40] for the case of micro-grids that transfer
power among themselves. The proposed algorithm, based on coalitional game theory,
allows the microgrids to form coalitions so as to minimize the costs due to losses of power
over the distribution lines. However, the potential of energy storage is not addressed.
An other work that deals with micro-grid challenges is [41]. Leveraging the dual decom-
position method, a distributed power scheduling approach is developed, tailored for a
micro-grid with RESs. The objective is to minimize the microgrid net cost, but neither
cooperation among micro-grids nor sharing of storage resources is considered.
The majority of those works study the optimal energy storage management problem
from the perspective of the consumer. In the first part of this chapter, we study the
optimal energy storage control problem from the perspective of the utility operator, with
the goal of minimizing the long-term average grid operational cost. It turns out that
the convexity of cost gives rise to simple intuitive control policies.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the optimal stored energy control problem for the case of a
single storage device, and for multiple storage devices that are shared among multiple
micro-grid entities. Our objective of minimizing the average grid operational cost (or,
the sum of GE operational costs), led us to policies which attempt to keep balanced grid
power consumption at all times. Our numerical results demonstrate that the proposed
asymptotically optimal policies are excellent approximations even for finite storage ca-
pacity values, as small as a few tens of kWh. We also studied the joint energy storage
placement, dimensioning and control problem given an available storage budget, where
the goal is to minimize the power generation cost. We provided two simple numerical
examples in order to present the optimal solutions for some special cases of this problem.
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3.1 Introduction to the Energy Efficiency of Web Search
Engines
The operations of a web search engine can be grouped under three main components: web
crawling, indexing, and query processing [42]. Web crawling is responsible for traversing
the hyperlink structure among the web pages to discover and download the content in
the Web, as well as for refreshing already downloaded pages in the web repository. The
indexing component converts downloaded content into compact data structures that can
be easily searched. Finally, the query processing component evaluates user queries by
processing these data structures and matches each query to a set of pages deemed to be
relevant to the query.
Motivated by a real-world problem, in this chapter, we consider energy efficiency in
the context of a concrete application that comes from web crawling. Namely, we focus
on the greenness of the web crawling process. In search data centers, thousands of
computers are allocated to crawl the Web. Maintaining an infrastructure of this scale
results in certain implications in terms of energy consumption and carbon footprint. In
general, web crawlers lead to carbon emissions in two different ways, due to (i) local
operations performed on the crawling nodes in the data centers (e.g., parsing web pages)
and (ii) remote operations performed on the web servers while serving HTTP requests
(e.g., retrieving a page from disk). In this chapter, we are interested in the latter case,
i.e., the carbon emissions that the web crawler incurs on remote computers that do not
belong to the search engine.
In practice, a web crawler may lead to significant energy consumption on web servers
while the HTTP requests issued by the crawler are processed on the servers (e.g., during
disk accesses, processing in the CPU, and network operations). We motivate this by
some back-of-the-envelope calculations: Let us assume that there are five billion pages
in the Web [43]. According to a conservative estimate, we can assume an average of 200
J (0.055 Wh) of energy consumption per HTTP request [44]. Let us assume that each
page in the web repository is refreshed once per minute, on average. Now, refreshing only
one-tenth of the repository requires about 40 GWh of energy per day. Web crawling is
also a costly operation in terms of the carbon emissions of web servers. In our example,
if the carbon footprint of the fuel used to generate electricity is 0.85 kg/KWh [45], on
average, the carbon emissions due to web crawling can be estimated as 34,000 tons per
day.
Unfortunately, there is little a web crawler can do to reduce the energy consumption it
incurs to web servers without sacrificing the coverage or freshness of its web repository.
This is because the amount of energy consumed on web servers depends only on factors
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related to the hardware and software resources that are not managed by the search
engine company. Nevertheless, certain optimizations can be employed to reduce the
carbon emissions that a crawler incurs to web servers. Our main observation is that
the carbon footprint of a web server depends on the type (greenness) of the consumed
energy, which varies depending on the time of the day if the server is supported by a
RES (e.g., a solar panel). For example, a web server is more likely to consume green
energy in daytime, while it is more likely to consume brown energy during the night.
This intra-day variation creates an opportunity to reduce the carbon footprint of web
servers as HTTP requests may be scheduled such that pages are downloaded from web
servers that are more likely to be consuming green energy.
Motivated by the observation above, we devise a web repository refreshing technique
that takes into account both the greenness and staleness concepts when scheduling the
download of web pages. This technique aims to reduce the total staleness of pages in
the web repository while constraining web servers’ total carbon footprint resulting from
the activities of the crawler. The goal of our approach is to reduce/contraint the carbon
footprint of web servers by exploiting the dynamics of renewable energy generation,
which are here modeled by means of an appropriately defined time-varying (greeness)
index. Beyond creating an environment-friendly crawler, our work has implications
for large-scale web search engines, which should comply with regulations about carbon
footprint reduction.
The concept of staleness is unique to our green web crawling problem and it arises only in
the context of keeping the downloaded pages fresh enough. Our objective of minimizing
the total staleness of a web repository is related to the problem of minimizing the total
waiting time of scheduled jobs [46, 47]. However, our problem differs in that the crawler
needs to consider both the staleness and greenness aspects while making its scheduling
decisions. The concept of freshness could be related to a hard deadline constraint on
the refreshing of pages. However, the nature of the crawling process necessitates a softer
version of the deadline, that of staleness.
Due to the constraints on the amount of carbon emissions, the opportunities for schedul-
ing each page weigh differently, and the concept of greenness needs to be considered
explicitly in scheduling. To accommodate the average greenness constraints in our prob-
lem, we weigh them with the Lagrange multiplier λ and include them in the objective
function. In that respect, our work could be considered, in abstract terms, as a schedul-
ing problem under both deadline and average energy constraints. This same problem
could also be studied from the point of view of a smart grid system; continually gen-
erated power demand requests have to be scheduled under both timeliness and average
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greenness constraints taking into account the dynamic patterns of renewables. In con-
trast to works that present policies for time- or energy-efficient offline job scheduling
under constraints [48], our work proposes online policies, where the crawler makes its
decisions as the page download requests arrive. Finally, the concepts of page size and
page freshness requirement differentiate our work further from previous works.
Our main contributions are the following:
 We introduce the green web crawling problem, where we study a page refresh policy
that minimizes the total staleness of pages in the web repository of a crawler, while
keeping the amount of carbon emission on remote web servers low enough.
 For one web server and one crawling thread, we show that the optimal page refresh
policy is a greedy one. At each time slot, the page to be refreshed is selected based
on a metric that considers the staleness of the page, its size, and the greenness of
the energy consumed by the web server.
 We extend the optimal policy to the cases of (i) many web servers, (ii) multiple
crawling threads, and (iii) web pages with variable freshness requirements. We
also propose various heuristics along the lines of the optimal policy.
 We conduct simulations with a large-scale, real data set obtained from Yahoo.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we describe our system
model. In section 3.3, we formulate our core optimization problem, devise an optimal
policy, and provide some extensions. In section 3.4, we describe our experimental setup,
present some heuristics, and set forth numerical results obtained via simulations. Finally,
section 3.5 provides an overview of related work and section 3.6 concludes our study.
This chapter is based on works [49] and [50].
3.2 System Model
3.2.1 Web Crawler
In large-scale search engines, web crawling is performed by clusters of computers, where
each computer runs multiple crawling threads. A crawling thread either downloads
a newly discovered URL or re-downloads a previously stored page in the repository by
issuing HTTP requests to web servers. These two operations are known as discovery and
refresh, respectively. The discovery operations increase the size of the web repository
of the crawler. The refresh operations help to decrease the staleness of pages in the
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Figure 3.1: Our system model for the crawler: m crawling threads concurrently
retrieve pages from N web servers at time slot t.
repository. The focus of this work is on the page refresh operations only. Decreasing the
staleness of a page repository is important since this has a direct impact on the quality
of the search results presented to the users, thus affecting the monetization of the search
engine.
3.2.2 Web Servers
The system model is depicted in Fig. 3.1. We assume that there exists a set K of N
web servers. Also, let Wi be the set of web pages that are hosted in server i ∈ K and
thus, W = ⋃i∈KWi be the set of all pages in the system. For each page j ∈ Wi, let pj
be the size of its content, in bytes. The hardware devices located in the remote servers
consume energy for serving the page download requests issued by the crawler. Fetching
the requested pages from the disk, processing them in the CPU, and transmitting them
through the server transmit circuit, all consume energy. To account for the factors
above, we assume that the amount of energy consumed to download a page j is a linear
function of pj , i.e., ej = αpj+β, with α, β > 0, known constants. These assumptions are
made to better expose the main characteristics of our approach, namely server greenness
and web page staleness, to be presented below.
We also assume that each page may have its own freshness requirement which is mainly
determined by two factors: (i) its PageRank and (ii) its likelihood of change. The
PageRank of a page measures its relative importance within the set of web pages [51].
On the other hand, the likelihood of change of a page is determined by the estimated
frequency of content change of the page. Pages with high PageRank value and high
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likelihood of change may have higher freshness requirements. We define weights γj ,
∀j ∈ Wi with i ∈ K, which indicate the different freshness requirements of pages. Web
pages with high γj should be refreshed more often. These weights can be estimated
based on crawler statistics and past crawling history.
3.2.3 Greenness of Server Energy Consumption
For each server i, we define a time-varying value, gi(t), which indicates (on a given scale)
the amount of produced carbon emissions per unit of consumed energy (Wh). This value
denotes the “greenness” of the energy consumed to run the server. For example, in the
[0, 1] scale, the carbon emissions (or greenness) of a very green energy source is close to
zero (no carbon emissions, maximum greenness) and, as the value increases, the source
becomes more “brown”. For instance, a server may be powered entirely by clean nuclear
energy or wind power, or entirely by brown energy generated from coal or lignite, or by
a mixture of these. The gi(t) values may vary in time due to the time-varying power
output generated by renewable energy sources or because the local electricity company
increases the brownness due to high demand. We assume that there is no a priori
knowledge of the gi(t) values, and they can be communicated from the web servers to
the crawler only at the time that a decision needs to be made.
3.2.4 Web Page Staleness
We assume that time is divided into slots and that the slot size is large enough to cover
the download of the largest page. Hence, page downloads occur on a time slot basis. This
assumption is made to simplify the subsequent analysis and better expose the structure
of the optimal policy. Nevertheless, it is not restrictive since it still captures different
energy consumption incurred to remote web servers.
At the beginning of each slot, m threads are directed by the crawler toward m web
pages that are selected for download. For each page j, we need to define a measure of its
staleness. Let sj(t) be the staleness of a page j at the beginning of slot t. If this page is
selected for download, then at most by the end of the slot the page download will finish,
and at the end of the slot its staleness will be 0. However, if this page is not selected,
then its staleness will increase and at the end of the slot it will be sj(t) + 1. We observe
that as long as page j is not selected, it becomes more and more stale, which means
that the staleness of the page depends on the time elapsed since the last time it was
downloaded. It should be noted that the slot assumption above leads to a somewhat
conservative consideration in terms of the computed staleness, in the sense that it leads
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to larger staleness increase for pages that are not scheduled for download. However, even
if this assumption is relaxed, the structure of our analysis is not expected to change.
3.3 Problem Formulation
We are interested in scheduling the page download threads from the crawler to the web
servers with the objective to keep the web pages as much as possible fresh and the carbon
emissions due to page download requests low enough. The decision at each time t is to
pick a server i ∈ K and a page j ∈ Wi to download in such a way that the total staleness
of the pages is minimized and the amount of carbon emissions is kept below a given
threshold. On the one hand, we would like to choose pages with large staleness. On the
other hand, we would like to schedule downloads of pages from servers that have low gi(t)
values. Also, out of all pages it is not clear whether we should schedule for download the
ones with smaller size or the ones with larger size. Small-size pages consume less energy.
However, larger pages should also be downloaded at some point in order to reduce their
staleness. There may also be pages with high freshness requirements γj , which should
be given high priority in the download process.
The joint consideration of all parameters above and the conflicting objectives of keeping
the pages fresh and the carbon emissions at the remote servers low, make the thread
scheduling problem non-trivial. First, we formulate and solve the basic single-server,
single-thread problem presenting the various intuitions behind it. We then extend it to
the cases of many servers, multiple crawling threads, and pages with different freshness
requirements.
3.3.1 Single Web Server, Single Thread Scheduling Problem
First, we consider the simple case of one server that hosts a set W of web pages. A
horizon of (T + 1) time slots is assumed. As we mentioned above, the page download
time is one slot, and we assume that g(t) remains stable over the time slot. At each
time t, m = 1 thread is sent to fetch one web page. We define the vector variable
x(t) = (xj(t) : j ∈ W), where xj(t) = 1 if at time slot t the web page j ∈ W is
downloaded, else xj(t) = 0. Clearly,
∑
j∈W xj(t) = 1, ∀t = 0, . . . , T − 1, since at each
slot t, only one thread to a web page is allowed to be active to the server. We note that
the staleness of a web page j at the beginning of slot t+ 1 is:
sj(t+ 1) =
{
0 if xj(t) = 1
sj(t) + 1 if xj(t) = 0.
(3.1)
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The time evolution of the staleness of a page j can be written as sj(t + 1) = (sj(t) +
1)(1− xj(t)). Our goal is to find a policy x∗ = (x(t) : t = 0, . . . , T − 1) that minimizes
the total (over time and over pages) staleness of the server, i.e.,
min
x∗
T∑
t=0
∑
j∈W
sj(t) (3.2)
subject to the constraints that only one thread to a web page is allowed to be active to
the server at each time t, i.e.,
s.t.
∑
j∈W
xj(t) = 1, ∀t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (3.3)
and that the total amount of carbon emissions due to page download requests does not
exceed a given threshold G¯, i.e.,
s.t.
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j∈W
xj(t)ejg(t) ≤ G¯, (3.4)
where G¯ is set by the agreement between the crawler and the remote server. Since
we estimate the total staleness (over pages) at the beginning of each slot t, we assume
that the last scheduling decision is made at the beginning of slot T − 1, the last page
download finishes by the end of slot T − 1, the last total staleness estimation is made at
the beginning of slot T , and no action is taken during slot T . We observe that the time
evolution of the total (over pages) staleness is:
∑
j∈W
sj(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈W
sj(t) + (|W| − 1)− sj∗(t)(t), (3.5)
where j∗(t) is the selected web page at time slot t with staleness sj∗(t)(t) (which becomes
zero at the beginning of slot t+ 1). We observe that for t = T − 1, and after a number
of calculations, equation (3.5) can be written as:
∑
j∈W
sj(T ) =
∑
j∈W
sj(0) + T (|W| − 1)−
T−1∑
t′=0
sj∗(t′)(t
′).
Therefore, for any t = 0, . . . , T − 1, we have:
∑
j∈W
sj(t) =
∑
j∈W
sj(0) + t(|W| − 1)−
t−1∑
t′=0
sj∗(t′)(t
′) , (3.6)
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and using the decision variable x(t), (3.6) can be written as:
∑
j∈W
sj(t) =
∑
j∈W
sj(0) + t(|W| − 1)−
t−1∑
t′=0
∑
j∈W
xj(t
′)sj(t′). (3.7)
Using (3.7), the total staleness
∑T
t=0
∑
j∈W sj(t) can now be written as:
(T + 1)
∑
j∈W
sj(0) +
T (T + 1)
2
(|W| − 1)−
T∑
t=0
t−1∑
t′=0
∑
j∈W
xj(t
′)sj(t′). (3.8)
In order to minimize (3.8) we just have to maximize the quantity∑T
t=0
∑t−1
t′=0
∑
j∈W xj(t
′)sj(t′). Moreover, in order to accommodate constraint (3.4) in
our problem, we include it in the objective function parameterized by Lagrange multiplier
λ ∈ R+. Thus, we end up with the following objective:
max
x∗
T∑
t=0
t−1∑
t′=0
∑
j∈W
xj(t
′)sj(t′)− λ
( T−1∑
t=0
∑
j∈W
xj(t)ejg(t)− G¯
)
. (3.9)
Parameter λ denotes the significance of greenness for the server. Its value, which is set
in consultation with the crawler, depends on the capability of using green energy at the
local server premises. If there is no such capability, then λ = 0 and the crawler’s goal is to
just minimize the total staleness. On the other hand, if there is high potential for energy
from renewable sources, the value of λ is high. In that case, besides minimizing staleness,
the crawler also wishes to keep the carbon footprint as low as possible, as suggested by
the values of λ and G¯. We observe that as λ increases, the amount of carbon emissions
becomes more and more important for the server and the page download scheduling is
largely determined by its value.
3.3.2 Optimal Web Page Download Scheduling Policy
Now, we will try to understand the structure of objective (3.9). We write (3.9) for T = 2
and after some algebra we get:
max
x∗
∑
j∈W
(
2sj(0)− λejg(0)
)
xj(0) +
∑
j∈W
(
sj(1)− λejg(1)
)
xj(1) + λG¯ . (3.10)
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For T > 2, the objective is written as:
max
x∗
∑
j∈W
(
Tsj(0)− λejg(0)
)
xj(0) +
∑
j∈W
(
(T − 1)sj(1)− λejg(1)
)
xj(1) + . . .+
+
∑
j∈W
(
sj(T − 1)− λejg(T − 1)
)
xj(T − 1) + λG¯ . (3.11)
Since g(t) is not known a priori, we study the online version of the problem. Objective
(3.11) can be decomposed to separate terms to be optimized with respect to the schedul-
ing decision only at slot t, which means that the crawler’s decision at t is independent of
the decisions made at the other slots. Thus, the optimal policy involves greedy decision
making.
Optimal policy: At the beginning of each slot t, the crawler chooses x(t) that maxi-
mizes ∑
j∈W
(
(T − t)sj(t)− λejg(t)
)
xj(t)
such that
∑
j∈W xj(t) = 1. For the selected web page j
∗(t), it holds:
j∗(t) = arg max
j∈W
((T − t)sj(t)− λejg(t)),
which means that at each time t, given g(t), the crawler decides based on the values of
sj(t) and ej , for j ∈ W.
In the special case where all pages need the same energy to be downloaded, i.e., ej = e,
∀j ∈W , the crawler chooses the page j with the maximum staleness sj(t). On the other
hand, if all pages have the same staleness at t, i.e., sj(t) = s, ∀j ∈W , then the crawler
chooses the page j with the minimum required energy ej , i.e., the one with the minimum
size pj .
3.3.3 Extensions to the Model
3.3.3.1 Many Web Servers
Consider a set K of N > 1 web servers where each server is characterized by its own gi(t)
value. Again, we assume that at each slot t, only one thread to a web page is allowed
to be active to any server (m = 1).
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Our goal is to find a policy x∗ = (x(t) : t = 0, . . . , T − 1) that minimizes total staleness
(over time and all pages) of all servers, i.e.,
min
x∗
T∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Wi
sj(t), (3.12)
subject to the constraints that only one thread to a web page is allowed to be active to
any server at each slot t, i.e.,
s.t.
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈Wi
xj(t) = 1, ∀t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (3.13)
and that the total amount of carbon emissions of each remote server i does not exceed
a given threshold G¯i, i.e.,
s.t.
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j∈Wi
xj(t)ejgi(t) ≤ G¯i, ∀i ∈ K. (3.14)
where G¯i is set by the agreement between the crawler and the remote server i. Based
on (3.13), we observe that a policy x∗ is a sequence of vectors x(t), where for given t,
xj(t) = 1 for only one i and only one j ∈ Wi.
Similar to Section 3.3.1, objective (3.12) is converted to:
max
x∗
T∑
t=0
t−1∑
t′=0
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Wi
xj(t
′)sj(t′). (3.15)
By bringing (3.14) in the objective with Lagrange multipliers λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ) ∈ RN+ ,
our problem becomes:
max
x∗
[ T∑
t=0
t−1∑
t′=0
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Wi
xj(t
′)sj(t′)−
N∑
i=1
λi
( T−1∑
t=0
∑
j∈Wi
xj(t)ejgi(t)− G¯i
)]
, (3.16)
subject to (3.13). As in Section 3.3.2, the objective can be decomposed to separate
objectives, where each objective needs to be optimized with respect to the scheduling
decision only at time slot t. Similarly, the optimal policy in the case of many web servers
involves greedy decision making.
Optimal policy for many web servers: At the beginning of each slot t, the crawler
chooses the server i and the web page j ∈ Wi with the maximum value of
(
(T − t)sj(t)−
λiejgi(t)
)
.
We observe that at each slot t, the crawler makes its decisions based on the values of
sj(t), ej , λi, and gi(t), for i = 1, . . . , N and j ∈ Wi. We identify some special cases here:
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 If at slot t, sj(t) = s, ∀i ∈ K, ∀j ∈ Wi, then the crawler chooses the server i ∈ K
and the web page j ∈ Wi with the minimum product λiejgi(t). If it is also λi = λ
and ej = e, ∀i ∈ K, ∀j ∈ Wi, then the crawler chooses randomly a page from the
server with minimum gi(t).
 If λi = λ and ej = e, ∀i ∈ K, ∀j ∈ Wi, then at slot t the crawler chooses the server
i ∈ K and the web page j ∈ Wi with the maximum sj(t)− gi(t). If also at slot t,
gi(t) = g(t), ∀i ∈ K, then the crawler chooses out of all pages the web page j with
maximum staleness sj(t).
3.3.3.2 Many Web Servers, Multiple Crawling Threads
Now, we assume that the crawler uses m > 1 threads at each slot. The problem is the
same as the one above but now, at each slot t, the crawler selects m pages for fetching.
This means that in the above problem, constraint (3.13) is transformed to:
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈Wi
xj(t) = m, ∀t = 0, . . . , T − 1. (3.17)
Again, the optimal policy turns out to involve greedy decision making.
Optimal policy for many web servers and multiple simultaneous crawling
threads: At the beginning of each time slot t, the crawler selects the m server-page
pairs (i, j) with largest values of (T − t)sj(t)− λiejgi(t).
3.3.3.3 Web Pages with Variable Freshness Requirements
Here, we incorporate into our problem the weights γj defined in Section 3.2, which
indicate the variable freshness requirements of web pages. Our optimization problem
becomes:
min
x∗
T∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Wi
γjsj(t) , (3.18)
subject to constraints (3.14) and (3.17).
Optimal policy for many web servers, multiple threads and pages with vari-
able freshness requirements: At the beginning of each slot t the crawler chooses the
m server-page pairs (i, j) with largest values of (T − t)γjsj(t)− λiejgi(t).
The following simple example for m = 1 shows the influence of weights γj on the crawler’s
decisions: Assume that at slot t the crawler has to decide between two pages k, l hosted
in the same server (i.e., the same gi(t), λi). If sk(t) = sl(t), ek = el and γk > γl, the
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crawler gives priority to the one with the biggest freshness requirement, i.e., it selects
page k.
3.4 Performance Evaluation
3.4.1 Data Set
As a web collection, we used web pages sampled from a large web crawl performed by
Yahoo. The web crawling was a continuous process. Therefore, our data represents
only a snapshot of this crawl (the snapshot was obtained in November 2011). The data
contains the most important web servers (about 500,000 servers) and the pages hosted on
those servers (about two billion pages). The importance of a web server was estimated
by a proprietary link analysis metric. This metric is similar to PageRank in that the
importance of a server is computed based on the number of its inbound links and the
estimated importance of servers that provide those links. Hence, our collection is large
and also represents high-quality content that is of importance to a web search engine.
The scale of the collected dataset makes us confident that the numerical investigation
of our problem (Section 3.4.4) is realistic and gives a good sense of the performance in
a realistic system.
In our simulations, we estimate the greenness value of a web server based on the time-
zone of the country in which it is physically located and the time an HTTP request
is issued to the web server. We estimate the country information for each server by
means of a proprietary classifier. The classifier assigns each server to a country based
on a number of features, including the IP address of the server, some link features (e.g.,
the country information associated with the servers providing inbound links) and some
content features (e.g., the language of pages hosted on the server). For each server, we
also compute some information about the number of pages hosted on it as well as its
average page size p¯i =
(∑
j∈Wi pj
)
/|Wi|.
3.4.2 Greenness and Staleness Computation
Estimation of Carbon Emissions: First, we assume that each server can be powered
by a mixture of solar (green) energy during the day and energy provided by the grid
(brown) during the night. The actual solar insolation/irradiance reaching a solar array
is strongly dependent on the solar array’s position on the Earth and on local weather
conditions [52]. It varies throughout the day from 0 kW/m2 at night to a maximum
of about 1 kW/m2. Fig. 3.2a shows an example in which the solar irradiance reaches
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Figure 3.2: The variation in (a) the solar irradiance [52] and (b) the gi(t) values
during the day.
its maximum value at noon when the sun is at its highest point in the sky. The actual
solar irradiance is usually below this value because it depends on the angle of incidence
of the sun’s rays with the ground. Here, for simplicity, we ignore the case of clouds on
the horizon.
Based on the day of the year, the time-zone, latitude and longitude of each server, we
estimate the day length as well as the sunrise and sunset times at the server location.
We define gi(t) = 1−normalized solar irradiance (using the maximum solar insolation as
a measure of scale). This definition captures the fact that the amount of solar insolation
determines the amount of generated solar energy and thus, the amount of produced
carbon emissions. We observe that gi(t) takes its minimum value in the middle of the
day, whereas during the night it takes its maximum value 1.
For example, if for a server i located in a country in the northern hemisphere, the sun
in winter rises at 07:30 a.m. and sets at 17:00 p.m., the gi(t) value is 1 at 07:30 a.m.,
around 0 at 12:15 p.m., again 1 at 17:00 p.m. and 1 during the night. From Fig. 3.2a,
we observe that during the intermediate hours the values of gi(t) will range between
0 and 1 and that they can be approximately determined by a linear function α1t + β1
between sunrise and noon, and by a function α2t + β2 between noon and sunset. For
the pair of points (07:30,1), (12:15,0), we get α1 = −0.21 and β1 = 2.57, while for the
pair (12:15,0), (17:00,1) we get α2 = 0.21 and β2 = −2.57. Fig. 3.2b shows the daily
variation of gi(t) for the above example.
Note that our approach is transparent to such derivations and may be used in conjunction
with various regimes of computing the time evolution of gi(t). For example, in the case
of wind energy, gi(t) could be computed using wind velocity and direction [53]. Also,
gi(t) could be estimated using the expected energy generation pattern of each renewable
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source installed at server i premises, which can be approximated by an average time
sequence based on historical data [21].
Staleness Computation: For the experimental scenario, we assume that the scheduling
of a thread towards a web page j results in a download time of kj slots, which is
proportional to size pj . We assume that kj = ` +
pj
b , where b is the bandwidth and
` is the network latency between the crawler machine and the server, which we take
for simplicity to be the same across servers. Since the available data does not allow us
to estimate the staleness of each page separately, we use a more practical method to
compute the total staleness Si(t) of a server i. For example, let us consider a server n
with |Wn| pages. We assume that at time t0 a page j from that server is selected to
be crawled. After kj time units, the total staleness of each server i increases by |Wi|kj ,
i.e., Si(t0 + kj) = Si(t0) + |Wi|kj , since each page gets kj time units older. Now, at time
t0 + kj + 1, we assume:
Sn(t0 + kj + 1) =
Sn(t0 + kj + 1)(|Wn| − 1)
|Wn| , (3.19)
i.e., after crawling a page from server n, we simply decrease its current total staleness
by its average staleness.
3.4.3 Heuristic Policies
Here, we devise some heuristic page download scheduling policies, along the lines of
the optimal policy, in order to evaluate the relative importance of the different system
parameters and study the tradeoff between staleness and greenness. Due to the na-
ture of the collected data described in Section 3.4.1, the proposed policies work at the
granularity of servers. Each policy achieves a different objective and relies on different
parameters to make its decisions, using less information than the optimal policy. We
define two more metrics: the average page staleness (over all pages) at slot t as,
s¯(t) =
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈Wi sj(t)∑
i∈K |Wi|
, (3.20)
as well as the average staleness of a server i at slot t as,
S¯i(t) =
∑
j∈Wi sj(t)
|Wi| . (3.21)
The proposed heuristic policies are the following:
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 Random Server Selection (RS): The crawler picks a server uniformly at random
out of all servers in the system. Then, it selects a random page in that server to
crawl. We use this policy for benchmarking.
 Maximum Greenness Server Selection (MG): The crawler picks the server with
the minimum gi(t) value (maximum greenness). Then, it selects a random page in
that server to crawl. This policy tries to minimize the amount of carbon emissions
produced by the crawling process.
 Maximum Average Staleness Server Selection (MS): The crawler selects the server
with the maximum average staleness S¯i(t). Then, it selects a random page in that
server to crawl. This policy does not take greenness into account at all. Its goal
is to minimize the average staleness of the servers (and thus, that of the pages).
 Maximum Product of Average Server Staleness and (1−carbon emissions) (MPSC):
The crawler selects the server with the maximum product S¯i(t)(1− gi(t)). Then,
it selects a random page in that server to crawl. Among the servers with gi(t) = 0,
the crawler chooses the one with the maximum average staleness. The goal is to
maintain the amount of carbon emissions and the average staleness of the servers
at low levels.
 Maximum Product of Average Server Staleness and (1/average page size) (MPSS):
The crawler selects the server with the maximum product S¯i(t)(1/p¯i). Then, it
selects a random page in that server to crawl.
 Maximum Product of Average Server Staleness, (1/average page size), and (1−carbon
emissions) (MPSSC): The crawler selects the server with the maximum product
S¯i(t)(1/p¯i)(1 − gi(t)). Then, it selects a random page in that server to crawl.
Among the servers with gi(t) = 0 (maximum greenness), the crawler prefers servers
with large average staleness and small average page size.
By experimenting with the last two policies we try to understand the impact of average
page size on system performance in terms of reduction in carbon emissions and staleness.
3.4.4 Experimental Results
Here, we present our experimental results in order to (i) show the performance of the
optimal policy in terms of total staleness and total carbon emissions as a function of
parameter λ, and compare it with the performance of an EDD-like policy, (ii) show
the performance of our heuristics in terms of average amount of carbon emissions and
average staleness reduction, and (iii) compare the performance of all proposed policies.
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Figure 3.3: The performance of the optimal policy in comparison with that of the
EDD-like policy in terms of a) total staleness, and b) carbon emissions as a function of
λ.
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Figure 3.4: a) The average amount of carbon emissions (measured in grams (g))
generated by the proposed heuristic policies, and b) the performance of all heuristics
in terms of staleness reduction.
We run our experiments for T=24 hrs, `=100 ms, b=1 Mbps, and m=1, 50, 100, 150,
200.
3.4.4.1 Performance of the Optimal Policy
First, we study the performance of the optimal policy for the case of a single server
and a single thread as a function of λ. Here, we use synthetic data as a way to study
the performance at the level of web pages. We use a set of 1000 pages and normalized
values between 0 and 1 for the energy required for page download. As mentioned in
Section 3.3.1, the page download time is one slot, and during this slot g(t) remains
stable. The page staleness values are calculated using the method described in Sec-
tion 3.2 and 3.3.1. The g(t) values are computed according to the method described
in Section 3.4.2. We assume that staleness is measured in minutes (min) and that the
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amount of carbon emissions at each slot t, ejg(t), is measured in grams (g). Since the
crawler decides based on the value of (T − t)sj(t)− λejg(t), the measurement unit of λ
is minutes/grams (min/g).
Figs. 3.3a and 3.3b show the performance of the optimal policy in terms of total (over
time and over pages) staleness and total carbon emissions, respectively. As λ increases,
the total staleness increases in a non-linear convex manner, whereas the total carbon
emissions decrease almost linearly. It is obvious that there is a tradeoff between page
staleness and server greenness, and that λ can be set to quantify this tradeoff. These re-
sults stem from the fact that as λ increases, the potential of using green energy increases
as well and the server wants more and more to exploit this potential. Thus, although
the crawler wants to minimize the staleness of pages, it is hindered by the server’s desire
to keep its carbon footprint low.
Figs. 3.3a and 3.3b also depict the performance of a carbon-unaware web crawling tech-
nique that places emphasis only on the freshness of the downloaded web pages. This
policy is reminiscent of the earliest due date (EDD) policy [46] since at each slot it
selects the web page with the maximum staleness. As expected, this EDD-like policy
outperforms our optimal policy in terms of total staleness for all values of λ, whereas
the reverse occurs in terms of total carbon emissions. The performance values of the
two policies coincide for λ = 0.
3.4.4.2 Performance of the Heuristic Policies
Here, we study the performance of our heuristics using the collected real data described in
Section 3.4.1. Figs. 3.4a and 3.4b show their performance in terms of average (over time)
amount of carbon emissions and average (over time) staleness reduction, respectively.
As the number of threads increases, the crawler potential increases, and the differences
between the policies are more pronounced. We observe that both carbon emissions and
staleness reduction constantly grow due to the increasing number of downloaded pages
per unit of time.
In Fig. 3.4a, MG outperforms the other five policies in terms of reduced carbon emissions
as expected. Compared to the case where there is no possibility of using green energy, i.e.,
gi(t) = 1, ∀i and ∀t, it achieves on average a 99.35% reduction in the amount of carbon
emissions. The other two policies that also take the value of gi(t) into account, MPSC
and MPSSC, are characterized by an average carbon emissions reduction of 97.74% and
63.42%, respectively. Their gain is lower since they also count in server staleness and/or
web page size. The tradeoff between staleness and greenness prevents the amount of
carbon emissions from being as small as possible.
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Table 3.1: Performance results as the impact of cold-start is reduced
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4
Avg. staleness reduction of MS (in min) 71.9 215.7 359.1 502.1
Avg. staleness reduction of RS (in min) 71.8 214.2 355.4 495.1
difference (in min) 0.1 1.5 3.7 7.0
difference (%) 0.14 0.67 1.03 1.39
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Figure 3.5: The average page staleness of a) the first four heuristic policies and b) all
heuristics at the end of the simulation.
In Fig. 3.4b, we observe that MS, which can be considered as an EDD-like heuristic
policy, outperforms four of the other five policies in terms of staleness reduction. The
fifth one (i.e., RS) performs almost the same as MS. This happens due to a “cold start”
phenomenon: in the first hours of the simulation, the great majority of servers have the
same average staleness since the number of downloaded pages (and hence, the number
of staleness reduction events) during this period is too small compared to the number
of the pages that are not downloaded. Thus, each time a decision must be made, RS
is more likely to select a page from a server whose staleness is at maximum. In order
to eliminate the impact of this phenomenon on our results, we ran both RS and MS for
three more days (m = 1). Table 3.1 shows the results. We observe that as the algorithm
runs for more days, the difference between the two policies in terms of staleness reduction
builds up.
In Figs. 3.4a and 3.4b, we observe that MPSC tries to strike a balance between staleness
and greenness. Besides its relatively high gain in terms of reduced carbon emissions, its
average staleness reduction is only 4.34% lower than that of MS.
Figs. 3.5a and 3.5b depict the average page staleness after running the proposed policies
for one day. Considering only the first four policies, we observe that RS and MS, as
expected, achieve the lowest average page staleness. On the other hand, the performance
of MPSS and MPSSC, as shown in Fig. 3.5b, reveals the impact of average page size on
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Table 3.2: Performance comparison of the proposed policies
Avg. page stale-
ness (end of day)
(min)
Total staleness
reduction (x106)
(min)
Total carbon
emissions (x104)
(g)
Optimal 1 125.3 19.72 3.13
Optimal 2 126.2 19.7 3.11
RS 250.1 17.84 3.3
MG 673.0 11.5 0.41
MS 248.6 17.87 3.29
MPSC 431.5 15.12 1.72
MPSS 248.7 17.86 3.28
MPSSC 431.1 15.13 1.7
page freshness. Although the average staleness reduction of both policies remains low
(Fig. 3.4b), the average page staleness at the end of the day is much lower than that of
the first four policies. Their ability to keep pages more fresh stems from the following
fact: Since both policies give priority to pages with relatively small size, the number of
downloaded pages during the horizon of the T + 1 slots is much greater (88.98% and
87.44% on average for the MPSS and the MPSSC, respectively) than that of the other
policies. This yields to an increased total staleness reduction, which offsets the low
average staleness reduction per unit of time, and which in turn yields to a relatively low
average page staleness at the end of the day.
In Figs. 3.4a and 3.5b, we observe that MPSSC could also be used by the crawler
according to our objective. Although the carbon emission reduction of MPSSC is lower
than that of MPSC, its average page staleness at the end of the simulation is lower than
that of MPSC.
3.4.4.3 Performance Comparison
In order to compare the performance of all policies, we use synthetic data. Our system
consists of 15 servers and each server hosts 1000 pages. Again, we use normalized values
between 0 and 1 for the energy required for page download. For the optimal policy,
we consider the same value of λ for all servers, i.e., λi = λ for i = 1, . . . , 15. As we
mentioned above, the page download time is one slot, and we assume that during this
slot the gi(t) values, for i = 1, . . . , 15, remain stable. At each slot t, m = 1 thread is
sent to fetch one web page. The decision at each time slot t is to pick 1 out of the 15
servers and a page from the selected server to download.
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Table 3.2 shows the performance of all proposed policies. We ran our optimal policy
both for λ = 100 (Optimal 1) and for λ = 500 (Optimal 2). As we can see, both versions
of the optimal policy outperform all the heuristic policies in terms of total staleness
reduction and average page staleness at the end of the simulation. This stems from
the fact that the optimal policy works at the granularity of web pages. Specifically, for
relatively low values of λ, it applies more weight to the staleness factor. Thus, in contrast
to all heuristics, which select a web page from the selected server at random, it has the
ability to examine in more detail the characteristics of all web pages and pick a web page
with relatively high staleness. As λ increases, the servers’ desire to keep their carbon
footprint low increases as well and thus, the crawler is obstructed from minimizing the
staleness of pages. As we mentioned above, λ is a parameter that can be set to quantify
the tradeoff between staleness and greenness. On the other hand, for the specific values
of λ, the policy that outperforms all the other ones in terms of reduced carbon emissions
is MG. However, the produced carbon emissions of the optimal policy (in both cases)
are less than those of the RS, MS (EDD-like heuristic) and MPSS policies which do not
consider the greenness of the servers at all.
3.5 Related Work
3.5.1 Refreshing Web Repositories
The pages in the web repository of a crawler need to be refreshed to prevent the search
engine from presenting stale results to its users. A research problem here is to find an or-
der in which the pages will be refreshed such that some freshness metric is optimized over
the entire repository. Early papers on the topic suggest refreshing frequently updated
pages more often, relying on the observed update frequency of pages as a proxy [54], [55].
Certain works use the update history of related pages to capture the actual update like-
lihood of a page better [56], [57]. Works in another line devise page refresh strategies
that aim to minimize the negative impact on users due to stale search results [58], [59].
Finally, the work in [60] suggests avoiding to refresh fast-changing content as much
as possible. To the best of our knowledge, so far, no prior work has investigated this
research problem taking into account the greenness aspect of web servers as a constraint.
3.5.2 Job and Packet Processing
A line of work that is relevant to ours is that of scheduling jobs under deadlines. The work
in [46] presents the earliest due date (EDD) scheduling policy for wire-line networks. In
this policy, at each time, the job with the earliest due date is scheduled, hence minimizing
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the expected lateness. From a wireless networking perspective, the work in [47] presents
a wireless channel-aware version of EDD, the feasible earliest due date (FEDD) policy.
The authors of [48] study the problem of scheduling constant-bit-rate traffic over wireless
channels and devises a policy that minimizes the packet loss rate due to packet delivery
deadline expiration. The work in [61] studies the design of a downlink packet scheduler
for real-time multimedia applications and proposes a channel- and QoS-aware version of
EDD, named CA-EDD. We note that none of the above works considers energy efficiency.
A number of works aim to minimize the total energy consumption. In [62], a CPU sched-
uler is presented for mobile devices. This scheduler integrates dynamic voltage scaling
into soft real-time scheduling and decides when, how long, and how fast to execute mul-
timedia applications based on their demand distribution. In [63], the authors propose
offline and online packet scheduling algorithms for uplink and downlink in wireless net-
works with constraints imposed by packet deadlines and finite buffers. The reader may
refer to [64] for a survey of studies on energy-efficient scheduling without deadlines. In
contrast to these works, our work tries to minimize the total staleness of a web page
repository while keeping the amount of carbon emissions of web servers below a given
threshold.
3.5.3 Energy Efficiency and Greenness of Data Centers
There is significant amount of work on reducing the energy consumption of data centers.
The work in [65] aims to optimize the workload, power, and cooling system management
of a data center with the objective of saving energy. In order to emphasize the role
of communication fabric in energy consumption, the work in [66] presents a scheduling
technique which makes decisions based on a run-time feedback from data center switches
and links. The work in [67] uses delay-tolerant jobs to fill the extra capacity of data
centers and designs energy-efficient mechanisms that achieve good delay performance.
The survey in [68] analyzes software- and hardware-based techniques and architectures
as well as mechanisms to control data center resources for energy-efficient operations.
A different line of works focuses on increasing renewable energy utilization and reducing
the carbon footprint of data centers. Specifically, the authors of [53] propose an adaptive
data center job scheduler that leverages green energy prediction to reduce the number
of canceled jobs due to lack of available green energy. The work in [69] focuses on
renewable energy capacity planning and proposes an optimization-based framework to
achieve specified carbon footprint goals at minimal cost. The work in [70] proposes a
policy for request distribution across data centers with the objective of data center cost
minimization while enabling Internet services to leverage green energy and respect their
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SLAs. The work in [71] investigates three issues related to the feasibility of powering
an Internet-scale system exclusively with renewable energy: the impact of geographical
load balancing, the optimal mix of renewable sources, and the role of storage.
Data centers hosting cloud applications consume huge amounts of energy. The works
in [72], [73], and [74] use virtualization as a power management and resource allocation
technique for energy efficiency in cloud computing environments. In particular, the work
in [72] assumes deterministic virtual machine (VM) demands, whereas stochastic VM
demands are considered in [73]. They key idea of the approach presented in work [74]
is to match the VM load with the renewable energy source (RES) provisioned power
with the goal of minimizing the total cost of power consumption for the cloud provider.
The work in [75] proposes a graph-based approach which utilizes Voronoi partitions to
control the operation of a cloud system with the goal of minimizing a combination of
average request time, electricity cost, and carbon emissions.
The works surveyed above (subsections 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.3) are related either to refreshing
the repositories of crawlers, effective processing of jobs, or energy efficiency and greenness
of data centers. Our work introduces the green web crawling problem, which combines
these research threads. It brings together the scheduling concepts with the problem of
reducing the staleness of a web repository while limiting the carbon emissions incurred
to web servers. We believe that this combination, along with the observation that the
type of the energy consumed by a web server varies in time, are unique to our work.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the problem of green web crawling: minimizing the total
staleness of pages in the repository of a web crawler while keeping the amount of carbon
emissions on web servers, due to HTTP requests issued by the crawler, low enough. We
devised an optimal policy, which can be implemented in an online fashion, based only
on the instantaneous values of page staleness and greenness indicators of the servers.
We also devised some heuristics along the lines of the optimal policy and studied their
performance through experiments with real data.
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4.1 Introduction to the Concept of Serious Games for Demand-
side Management
The reduction of carbon footprint is the holy grail of our times and is to be realized
primarily through prudent energy consumption. Different techniques have been pro-
posed, spanning the entire chain of energy generation, transmission, distribution and
consumption in the context of realizing a smart energy grid toward reaching the goal
above. However, the weakest link in the chain above remains the end-consumer. No
matter how sophisticated these techniques become for the rest of the chain, it is the
end-consumer that determines to a large extent the mode of energy consumption in the
end.
Demand-side management (DSM), which includes demand response (DR)1, is an active
research area that aims to reduce or smoothen energy consumption. Pricing-based and
incentive-based DR schemes have been proposed; e.g., by having different prices per
unit of energy presented to consumers for different times of the day (i.e., TOU pricing),
rational consumers are forced to shift part of their demand-load from peak-times to
off-peak times. Incentives may be provided to the consumer in the form of monetary
or non-monetary rewards. For example, in the Critical Peak Rebate incentive scheme,
participants are paid for the amounts of power by which they reduce consumption below
their predicted consumption levels during critical peak hours. In the presence of a DR
scheme, consumers optimize some form of utility functions that factor the monetary
gains from load shifting/reduction and the inconvenience cost induced by the shift.
The main shortcomings of pricing-based and incentive-based schemes are the strong ra-
tionality assumptions about consumers. They assume and that consumers are inherently
driven by financial rationality and that the response of consumers to incentives is gov-
erned by the mathematics of optimization theory. Also, more often than not, consumers
are not the bill-payers (e.g., they are employees in an office building or younger/elderly
household members), while their energy literacy level (i.e., awareness and capability to
act on energy savings) varies.
Various incentives schemes may often see hesitation and even negativity of consumers,
primarily because they are not presented to consumers in an appropriate context. Con-
sumers are humans and more often than not, they are driven in their decisions by
1DR mechanisms involve behavioral changes in energy consumption as a response to certain signals
to the consumers, e.g., price changes, rewards, etc.
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factors other than financial motives, such as various biases and sentiments, or the desire
to outperform others. The interface with which the incentive scheme is delivered to the
consumer is important, in the sense that should make the interaction worthwhile and
entertaining, and it should respect the limited time and attention budget of consumers.
Serious games design is an emerging area that aims at addressing precisely the issues of
educating and maximizing user engagement in various contexts [76]. A serious game is a
game that is designed for a purpose that goes beyond that of offering pure entertainment.
There have been some initial attempts to use serious games for demand-side management
[77–80] with great success in realistic case studies [81]. To the best of our knowledge,
building a foundational theory on modeling and understanding serious games with the
purpose of extracting guidelines for serious games design in this context has not hitherto
been explored.
In this chapter, we introduce the problem of optimal serious-games design for the purpose
of enforcing prudent energy consumption, and we make a first attempt to mathematically
model it. We define a simple serious-game scenario that does not employ direct monetary
incentives for the consumers and a generic game-theoretic mathematical framework for
the optimization of the parameters of the serious-game. We assume that a serious-game
designer entity (e.g., the energy supplier, a private entity or an energy-efficiency minded
administrative authority) aims to design a serious game for smoothening the energy
consumption behavior of consumers across time. The serious-game designer runs daily
contests on energy consumption reduction on behalf of the players during the peak hours.
We consider a simple class of serious games, where the serious-game designer publicly
announces a list of top-K consumers and a list of bottom-M consumers according to
their respective energy-consumption reduction at the contest of the previous day. Here,
the driving forces are the user discomfort due to consumption-load reduction, the user
desire to enter to top-K list and the user sensitivity to social outcasting if she/he enters
the bottom-M list.
We formulate the problem faced by the serious-game designer as an operational-cost
minimization problem for the utility company and that of the consumer as a utility-
maximization one. The serious-game-design problem is to decide on K,M and on the
feedback provided to the consumers, while the consumer-side problem amounts to select-
ing the consumption-load reduction that maximizes the user utility under the serious-
game rules. These two problems constitute the two stages of an overall Stackelberg-
game setting, where the choice of the parameters K,M affects the optimal responses
of consumers in terms of their energy-consumption reduction. Most importantly, the
serious-game designer does not necessarily need any information about the user-utility
parameters that characterize the user discomfort due to the consumption-load reduction
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
04/06/2020 23:30:17 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 4. Optimal Serious-Games Design for Smart Grid Consumer Engagement 69
???????????????
Game Designer 
Energy Supplier 
r??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????
????????????????????? ??? ? ?? ?? ??
Player ?
Energy consumer 
Player ?
Energy consumer 
Player ?
Energy consumer 
??????????? ?? ?
??????????K, M ??????????????????
?????????? ????????????
Figure 4.1: The serious-game interactions among consumers, the serious-game de-
signer and the utility company.
or the importance for each user to be in either list. Through analysis and a series of
numerical simulations, we show how the various serious-game-design choices affect the
energy consumption reduction and investigate the driving forces in this serious game.
Evidently, even such a simple serious-game design can provide adequate incentives to
users for engaging in demand-side management.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 4.2, we describe the
setup of our serious game. In Section 4.3, we analyze our system model and formulate
its constituent problems, namely the consumer problem and the serious-game-designer
problem. In Section 4.4, we experimentally analyze the effect of various serious-game-
design parameters. Section 4.5 reviews the related work. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes
our work. This chapter is based on works [82] and [83].
4.2 Serious Game Setup
We consider a energy supplier that aims to reduce the total energy generation (or oper-
ational) cost. If the energy generation cost is a convex function of demand, this problem
is equivalent to that of smoothening the total energy consumption across time. The
energy supplier has instrumented its customer premises with smart-meters. Based on
consumption baselines [84] that are dynamically calculated on a sliding window of his-
torical data, it identifies the time slots where peak overall consumption is observed. We
also consider a serious-game designer to which the energy supplier outsources the task
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of designing a gamification platform for reducing the total energy generation cost. The
serious-game designer organizes contests about energy consumption reduction among
consumers for each peak time slot of the day. On a daily basis, the customers play the
serious game for a specific peak time slot by adjusting their energy demand in that time
slot of the next day. Their actions are monitored by smart meters and are communicated
to the serious-game designer by the energy supplier.
The next day of each serious-game instance at a peak time slot, the serious-game de-
signer ranks customers according to their relative energy-consumption reduction in the
corresponding time slot of the previous day, and it selects the top-K ones to be the
“winners” and the bottom-M to be the “losers” of this day-round of the serious game at
the particular time slot. K,M are serious-game parameters determined by the designer.
The outcome of each competition and the serious-game parameters K,M are announced
to customers via the mobile app and may also be shared with customer friends in various
social applications. The serious-game designer keeps statistics on customer performance.
Based on these statistics, it communicates to the customers useful historical information
(e.g., in the form of histograms) on the performance effort that, if exerted in the next
day, is expected to include them in the upper list of top-K consumers or in the bottom
list of bottom-M consumers of the serious game the day after the next one. The overall
serious-game scenario is depicted in Fig. 4.1.
This approach for “winner” and “loser” determination aims to exploit the desire of
customers for social approval [85]. On the one hand, a consumer that is included in the
upper list may feel proud for her accomplishment relative to others. On the other hand,
the inclusion of a player in the lower list is intended to make her feel embarrassed and
perhaps socially pinpointed for her bad consumption behavior, so as to force her to be
more active in the future if she is sensitive on that issue. However, the extent to which
the consumption behavior of each player is affected depends on her sensitivity to the
social approval or outcasting.
4.3 System Model
We consider an energy supplier, N consumers (residential users) and a serious-game
designer entity. The serious-game designer sets the parameters K and M that deter-
mine the sizes of the upper list U of “prudent” consumers and of the lower list L of
“non-prudent” consumers, respectively. We assume a fixed unit price for the electricity
denoted by q $/kWh. Time is divided into slots. We focus on a serious-game instance
that concerns energy-consumption reduction of consumers at a specific time slot. Let pi
be the energy demand of consumer/player i, i = 1, . . . , N , at the target time slot with
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Figure 4.2: The Stackelberg game structure arising from serious-game interactions.
0 ≤ pi ≤ pi,max, where pi,max is an upper bound on the demand of consumer i at each
time slot (given fixed power capacity of residential circuit). Without loss of generality,
we assume that pi,max = pmax, for i = 1, . . . , N . Also, let P =
∑N
i=1 pi be the total
energy demand of all consumers at that time slot.
We denote by ri = (p
0
i − pi)/p0i the normalized energy reduction of player i, where p0i
is the baseline (nominal) energy demand of consumer i which is assumed to be known
to the supplier and the game designer. Note that pi is the modified energy demand as
a result of the serious game. We refer to ri as the consumption reduction performance
of consumer i. Consumers are ranked by the serious-game designer according to their
performance. Each customer i adjusts her demand pi, so as to maximize her net utility,
to be defined in the sequel, given the values of the parameters K,M set by the serious-
game designer. The game designer, on the other hand, aims to optimally select the
values of K,M , so as to minimize the operational cost of the energy supplier. It also
chooses the type of statistical feedback to provide to consumers; this will be taken into
account by consumers when deciding on their strategy.
The overall serious-game design problem resembles the two levels of a Stackelberg game,
where the serious-game designer is the leader and the residential customers are the fol-
lowers (see Fig. 4.2). The serious-game designer aims to optimally select the parameters
K,M , so that the consumption strategies of consumers, in their effort to enter the up-
per list and/or avoid the bottom list, result in such energy consumption that minimizes
energy generation cost. First, we formulate the consumer problem and then we proceed
to the game designer’s problem.
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4.3.1 Consumer’s problem
The utility of a consumer i is quantified through a utility function that factors her
dissatisfaction caused by energy-consumption reduction, her desire to enter the top-K
list U and her sensitivity in being included in the bottom-M list L.
4.3.1.1 Dissatisfaction
In order to capture the dissatisfaction caused due to deviation of the modified demand
pi from the nominal demand p
0
i of consumer i, we define a function di(r). We assume
that di(·) is increasing and convex so as to model the increasing marginal dissatisfaction
for the consumer as a function of deviation from the nominal consumption pattern, as
in [86]. Here, we assume
di(r) = air
2, r ∈ [0, 1], (4.1)
while di(r) = 0 for r < 0. Parameter ai ≥ 0 is referred to as the inelasticity parameter
of consumer i and it models her tolerance or sensitivity on the deviation from the
nominal consumption profile. The intuition of such a simple generic dissatisfaction
model, which is chosen here for algebraic tractability, is the following: Assume a set
of energy consumption activities of a consumer in a time slot. Each activity involves
a number of appliances. Reducing the overall energy consumption at the time slot
is done by shifting less important activities at a different time slot or by canceling
them. As the total shed energy increases, more important consumer activities need
to be shifted/canceled and thus, the marginal dissatisfaction of the consumer increases
more per shed energy unit. Considering more sophisticated dissatisfaction models, e.g.,
as in [87], is left for future work.
4.3.1.2 Social recognition
Social recognition can be defined as the appreciation an observer holds for the person
she observes. It is a three-mode phenomenon, since one may receive positive, neutral,
or negative recognition. Here, we consider that each consumer elicits one of the three
levels of social recognition based on her performance strategy, which leads to one of three
possible outcomes: (a) sher is included in the upper list U of the top-K consumers, (b)
she is included in the bottom list L of the bottom-M consumers, (c) neither of the
above. Social recognition for consumer i can be modeled as a reward hi or a penalty
−hi, according to her position and the value she places on social recognition. For each
consumer i, we define a social recognition function Si(ri, r−i) as function of consumer
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
04/06/2020 23:30:17 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 4. Optimal Serious-Games Design for Smart Grid Consumer Engagement 73
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Series 1 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f
 o
c
c
u
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875 1 
Normalized energy reduction of players at slot ? for ?=?=?
r??? ??0 
(a)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Series 1 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f
 o
c
c
u
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875 1 
Normalized energy reduction of players at slot ? for ?=?=?
r??? ??0 
(b)
Figure 4.3: Sample performance histograms of players at a time slot; δ=0.125.
i’s action ri and others’ action vector r−i,
Si(ri, r−i) =

hi , if i ∈ U
−hi , if i ∈ L
0 , otherwise.
(4.2)
The dependence on ri and r−i is implied in the inclusion in the lists. The sensitivity
hi ≥ 0 of a consumer quantifies the importance for the consumer of being included
in the U or L list. For reasons of symmetry, we assume that for each consumer, the
emotional reward extracted from pride for being in the list of best consumers is equal
to the emotional cost due to embarrassment for being in the list of worst consumers.
For example, if a player i with a great value of hi is included in U , then she receives
a social recognition, which is considered rewarding for her. On the other hand, if she
is included in L, she receives a negative recognition that makes her feel embarrassed.
Being somewhere in the middle in terms of consumption is assumed to be a neutral
situation with no reward or penalty inflicted to the consumer.
4.3.1.3 Feedback to consumers
In order to aid consumers in taking energy consumption decisions, the game designer may
provide cumulative statistics about consumer actions (e.g., in the form of the histograms
(Fig. 4.3)) as feedback to them. This feedback may take the form of the empirical
cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (x) and empirical probability density function
(PDF) f(x), where x stands for consumer performance concerning energy reduction. All
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consumers are treated as one virtual consumer with a PDF f(x) and CDF F (x), namely
these show the empirical probability distribution of energy reduction of any consumer
in the past. For example, F (x) may be interpreted as the percentage of times that the
energy reduction performance of a consumer is below x. The absence of such feedback
may be modeled by taking F (x), f(x) as corresponding to a uniform distribution over a
certain range of values. Other types of statistical information may be available.
4.3.1.4 Probability of inclusion in the top-K and the bottom-M lists
Denote Xj the random variable of the energy consumption reduction of player j and
Fj(·) the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of her distribution. Also, denote F (·)
the CDF of the joint performance distribution for all consumers and X the random
variable of the performance of any individual consumer. Given a normalized energy
consumption reduction ri of player i, a rational software agent residing at the consumer
side, e.g., at the mobile app calculates the probability that consumer i is included in the
upper list (U) or in the bottom list L. These probabilities are computed as:
Pr (i ∈ U|ri) =
K−1∑
l=0
(
N − 1
l
) l∏
j=1
(1− Fj(ri))
N−l−1∏
j=1
Fj(ri)
Pr (i ∈ L|ri) =
M−1∑
l=0
(
N − 1
l
) l∏
j=1,j 6=i
Fj(ri)
N−l−1∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− Fj(ri))
(4.3)
Pr(i ∈ U|ri) (resp. Pr(i ∈ L|ri)) considers all combinations of other consumers ranked
above (resp. below) consumer i, when consumer i takes any position in the top-K (resp.
bottom-M) list. Fj(·) could be estimated based on a histogram on the performance of
consumer j. However, there are practical difficulties toward this direction. First, this
would require O(N) storage space for the histograms of one K,M pair. Second, all these
histograms would have to be communicated to all consumers prior to each serious-game
round, thus creating a high communication overhead. Third, this approach would raise
privacy concerns for the consumers. Fourth, the statistical significance of individual
histograms would be low, since the number of individual choices is much lower than the
total number of choices of all consumers. Given the statistical information f(r), F (r)
about the ensemble of consumers, a consumer may assume Fj(·) = F (·), ∀j 6= i for
calculating her probabilities to be included in the top or the bottom lists (according to
equation (4.3)).
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Figure 4.4: (A) Probability of consumer i to be included in the top-K or in the
bottom-M lists with respect to ri. (B) Expected utilities of consumer i based on
equation (4.3) (“probability-based”) and on equation (4.6) (“indicator function-based”)
with respect to ri. Parameters values: X ∼ U [0, 1], N = 100, K = M = 10, ai = 1.5,
hi = 1.01, p0 = 6 kWh, q = 0.124.
The probabilities in equation (4.3) can be simplified according to the following obser-
vations. Observe that Pr(i ∈ U|ri) increases with ri and Pr(i ∈ L|ri) increases as ri
decreases. Denote ru (resp. rl) the performance threshold above (resp. below) which
the expected number of consumers is K (resp. M). ru, rl can be calculated as follows:
(1−ru)/δ∑
j=0
f(X = ru + jδ) =
K
N
(rl−rmin)/δ∑
j=0
f(X = rmin + jδ) =
M
N
,
(4.4)
where rmin = (mini p
0
i − pmax)/mini p0i is the minimum ri. Interestingly, both the
Pr(i ∈ U|ri) with ri ≥ ru and Pr(i ∈ L|ri) with ri ≤ rl approach 1 for various numerical
instantiations of the problem (see Fig. 4.4a). More formally, it can be assumed that:
(1−ru)/δ∑
j=0
Pr(i ∈ U|ri = ru + jδ) ≈ 1
(rl−rmin)/δ∑
j=0
Pr(i ∈ L|ri = rmin + jδ) ≈ 1
(4.5)
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We can then simplify (4.3) via the following approximations:
Pr (i ∈ U|ri ≥ ru) = 1ri≥ru
Pr (i ∈ L|ri ≤ rl) = 1ri≤rl ,
(4.6)
where 1A is an indicator function on event A with 1A = 1 or 0 if event A is true or false
respectively.
4.3.1.5 User utility function
We define the expected utility of each player i with strategy ri as follows:
E{ui(ri)} = Pr(i ∈ U|ri)hi − Pr(i ∈ L|ri)hi − di(ri) + qp0i ri , (4.7)
This definition captures the net payoff for consumer i from normalized load reduction ri,
which consists of the expected social reward/cost (if any) minus the incurred dissatis-
faction, plus her energy consumption savings from load reduction. Note that the benefit
from energy consumption savings becomes cost if ri < 0. The expected utilities of the
consumer i based on the formulas of equations (4.3) and (4.6) are depicted in Fig. 4.4b
for certain numerical parameters. As becomes evident from this figure, the simplifying
assumptions of equation (4.6) can be quite accurate approximations of equation (4.3).
The objective of each consumer i is to determine a normalized consumption reduction
ri that achieves optimal balance of the factors above in the sense of maximizing her
expected utility function. Thus, based on (4.3) and (4.7) the consumer optimization
problem becomes:
max
ri
(
1ri≥ru − 1ri<rl
)
hi − di(ri) + qp0i ri (4.8)
4.3.2 Game Designer’s Problem
We denote the generation/operational cost for the energy supplier with an increasing
convex function C(P ) of total demand load P at a specific time slot (i.e., marginal energy
generation cost increases with energy demand). Under the current common practice of
flat pricing, a fixed price q is charged per unit of energy consumption irrespectively of the
consumption time. Therefore, the energy supplier maximizes its revenue by minimizing
the operational expenses for satisfying the energy demand.
The supplier aims to minimize energy generation costs, and it delegates this task to the
game designer, with the anticipation that the appropriate induced user consumption
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behavior will achieve the goal. The serious-game designer selects the settings of the
serious game which in our case are abstracted as (i) size K of the best-consumer list,
(ii) sizeM of the worst-consumer list and (iii) feedback f(·) to be provided to consumers.
Assuming that consumers (or rather software agents that reside in their side) are rational
self-interested entities that seek to optimize their expected utility in the sense specified
above, different values of K and different modes of feedback f(·) incur different con-
sumption strategies. Specifically, different values of K incentivize differently consumers
to be included in the top-K list. On the other hand, M serves as disincentive to users
for avoiding the bottom-M list. Of course the impact of a given set of (K,M) values to
different consumers depends on consumer parameters hi, ai.
Given a serious game with parameters K,M , the total demand of consumers at a specific
time slot is:
P (K,M) =
N∑
i=1
p0i (1− ri(K,M)) , (4.9)
where ri(K,M) is the normalized consumption reduction of consumer i given serious-
game parameters K,M . Thus, the problem faced by the serious-game designer is as
follows:
min
K,M∈{1,2,...,N/2}
C(P (K,M)) . (4.10)
The initial reference consumption p0i of each player i is given to the serious-game de-
signer by the utility company. Therefore, the game designer only needs to estimate the
performance ri(K,M) of each player i for certain serious-game parameters K,M , in
order to calculate C(P (K,M)).
4.3.2.1 Full information of consumer utility functions
If full information was available to the serious-game designer regarding consumer utility
functions (e.g., hi, di(·), etc.), then a closed-form solution for K,M could be found as
the equilibrium of the two-stage Stackelberg game. Alternatively, a numerical solution
to the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game can be found as follows: The serious-game
designer finds optimal r∗i (K,M) values for each consumer i by solving (4.8) for a certain
set of pairs of K,M parameters and replaces the r∗i (K,M) values to (4.10), in order to
find the values of K,M that lead the system to Stackelberg equilibrium. Specifically, the
expected utility function of the player in equation (4.7) can be re-written using equation
(4.6) in a segmented form as follows:
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E{ui(ri(K,M))} =

hi − di(ri(K,M)) + qp0i ri(K,M), ri(K,M) ≥ ru(K)
−di(ri(K,M)) + qp0i ri(K,M), rl(M) < ri(K,M) < ru(K)
−hi − di(ri(K,M)) + qp0i ri(K,M), ri(K,M) ≤ rl(M)
(4.11)
For convenience, denote the upper segment of equation (4.11) as u1(·), the middle seg-
ment as u2(·) and the lower segment as u3(·). Toward maximizing the expected utility
of the player, the first derivative of E{ui(ri(K,M))} with respect to ri(K,M) is given
by:
(E{ui(ri(K,M))})′ = −2airi(K,M) + qp0i (4.12)
We identify three cases according to the sign of (4.12):
(i) (4.12) is negative for all ri(K,M) ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the expected utility of the player
is maximized at r∗i (K,M) = arg max{u1(ru(K)), u2(rl(M) + ε), u3(0)}, where 0 <
ε << 1 an arbitrarily small positive number.
(ii) (4.12) is positive for all ri(K,M) ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the expected utility of the player
is maximized at r∗i (K,M) = arg max{u1(1), u2(ru(K)− ε), u3(rl(M))}.
(iii) (4.12) is 0 at ri(K,M) = x0 := qp
0
i /2ai and x0 ∈ [0, 1]. Here, there are three
subcases:
- If x0 ≤ rl(M), then (4.12) is negative for ri(K,M) > rl(M) and the expected
utility of the player is maximized at r∗i (K,M) = arg max{u1(ru(K)), u2(rl(M)+
ε), u3(x0)}.
- If rl(M) < x0 < ru(K), then (4.12) is positive for ri(K,M) ≤ rl(M) and
negative for ri(K,M) ≥ ru(K). Therefore, the expected utility of the player
is maximized at r∗i (K,M) = arg max{u1(ru(K)), u2(x0), u3(rl(M))}.
- If x0 ≥ ru(K), then (4.12) is positive for ri(K,M) < ru(K) and the expected
utility of the player is maximized at r∗i (K,M) = arg max{u1(x0), u2(ru(K)−
ε), u3(rl(M))}.
We replace the optimal r∗i (K,M) values for the N players in (4.9) and if the partial
derivatives of C(·) in (4.10) with respect to K,M are defined, then closed-form solutions
for optimal K∗,M∗ can be analytically found. Observe, that the energy consumption
behavior of players whose performance is maximized in values other than those involving
ru(K), rl(M) does not depend on K,M . According to the above, the complexity for
finding optimal K∗,M∗ parameters in the full-information case is either O(N) when
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closed-form solutions can be analytically derived for K∗,M∗ or O(N3) when K∗,M∗
are numerically approximated by evaluating C(·) over all (K,M) pairs.
4.3.2.2 Historical information about consumer actions
Since full information may not be readily available in some practical scenarios, the
serious-game designer can aggregate historical data on the consumption performance of
customers in the serious game for different values of K,M and employ them to extract
personalized information about player behavior. Histograms like the ones depicted in
Fig. 4.3 can be created by the game designer and the appropriate information can be
provided to supplier so as to estimate P (K,M) for the various (K,M) pairs.
Given the 2D histogram for specific values of K,M , the operator can estimate the
expected normalized consumption reduction E{r(K,M)} from any consumer as follows:
E{r(K,M)} =
∑
y∈Y
yPr(r(K,M) = y) , (4.13)
where Y is the set of values ranges (with width δ = 0.125 in Fig. 4.3) of energy
consumption reduction that are summarized in the histogram, and the probability
Pr(r(K,M) = y) equals the relative number of consumers that had a normalized energy
reduction r(K,M) = y in the previous serious games with parameters K,M . There-
after, the serious-game designer can calculate its expected total load E{P (K,M)} and
the operational cost for the energy supplier as follows:
C(E{P (K,M)}) = C( N∑
i=1
p0i (1− E{r(K,M)})
)
. (4.14)
In order to find the values of K,M that minimize the energy generation cost, the game
designer should repetitively run serious games for multiple pairs K,M of parameters and
build performance histograms similar to those of Fig. 4.3 for each pair of parameters.
In theory, K,M can take values in {1, 2, . . . , N/2}. However, in practical settings, the
maximum cardinalities of the upper and lower lists are expected to be much lower than
N/2. Then, iterating among all pairs of K, M , the serious-game designer can find the
one that gives the minimum operational cost according to equation (4.14). According
to the above, the expected performance of any consumer is calculated in O(1) and the
minimum operational cost is found after O(N2) iterations. Thus, the complexity of the
historical-information case is O(N2).
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
04/06/2020 23:30:17 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 4. Optimal Serious-Games Design for Smart Grid Consumer Engagement 80
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(rl, ru) pairs in steady state for different values of K 
rl
r u
 
 
K=1
K=50
K=100
K=150
K=200
K=250
K=300
K=350
K=400
K=450
K=500
Figure 4.5: The steady (set of) states <(rl,ru)> for different K=M .
4.3.3 Equilibrium of the Stackelberg game arising from serious-game
interactions
Given the empirical cumulative distribution function F (·) for each K,M pair, followers’
game accepts one equilibrium and so does the overall Stackelberg game. This is because,
according to the analysis of equation (4.11) (which is an approximation of equation (4.7)
using (4.3)), for fixed ru, rl, each consumer has a unique utility maximizing strategy.
Iterating through K,M pairs or by means of the partial derivatives of the operation
cost with respect to K,M , the serious-game designer selects the pair (K∗,M∗) that
minimizes the energy generation cost.
Regarding the followers’ game, it is important to argue on why the cumulative perfor-
mance statistics for each K,M pair will converge for repetitive instances of the serious
game. Observe that players play according to equation (4.7) using (4.3), while the game
designer uses equation (4.11) that results from equation (4.7) using the indicator func-
tion (4.6). Thus, the utility functions of the players are continuous, the strategy space
is non-empty and compact, and the set of players is finite. So, the followers’ stage of
our Stackelberg game is a continuous game on its own. According to Glicksberg theo-
rem [88], every continuous game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the
consumers’ game will have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, in which each consumer
i plays according to a mixed strategy regarding her performance ri. It then follows
that the empirical cumulative statistics will converge for every K,M pair. Note that
until it converges, the empirical cumulative distribution function F (·) (and thus, f(·)) of
consumers is the sole feedback through which a consumer may adapt her best-response
performance strategy toward the equilibrium point.
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Figure 4.6: The percentage of operational-cost reduction achieved by our approach
for different percentages of consumers leaving the game.
4.4 Simulation Results and Analysis
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
We consider N=1000 consumers, fixed power-unit price q=0.124 $/kWh, fixed upper
bound on the demand of each consumer pmax=9 kWh and ε=10
−4. For simplicity, we
assume K=M . The baseline energy demand p0i of each player i is assumed to follow
the normal distribution N(5, 1). Moreover, first, we assume that ai follows U(5, 40)
and hi follows U(1, 4). At the beginning of each serious-game instance, each consumer
is provided with the evolving probability distribution of consumer performance in the
form of a histogram with bar width δ=0.025. The performance thresholds ru, rl are
calculated according to (4.4).
4.4.2 Steady-State Convergence and Wear-off Effects
For the aforementioned setup, we experimentally observed that for each pair of K,M
our system passes through various transient states. Each state is characterized by a
specific pair of thresholds (rl, ru). After conducting a number of serious-game rounds
for each pair of K,M , we noticed that our system reaches in a few tens of game rounds
either a unique steady state or a steady set of states that alternate each other in a
closed loop, as it was theoretically expected in Subsection 4.3.3. Fig. 4.5 shows the
states, i.e., the pairs of thresholds, that appear for different (K,M) pairs. Employing a
factor β = 0.985 to discount the significance of the past in the probability distribution of
consumer performance, we experimentally found the convergence time to be around 40
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Figure 4.7: Utility functions of two players for K = 4 and two different states.
Figure 4.8: Operational cost for different values of K=M .
to 50 game rounds. For larger societies, the convergence time has been experimentally
found to be shorter.
We also investigated the impact of gaming wear-off, i.e., players leaving the game, to the
effectiveness of our approach. As depicted in Fig. 4.6 for K=M=350, the percentage
reduction in the operational cost for remaining players achieved by our approach remains
roughly the same when a percentage of random or worst-performing players leave the
game.
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4.4.3 Experimental Results
First, we show in Fig. 4.7 how the different values of hi, ai and p
0
i affect the utility func-
tions of two different consumers of the community and the values of their performance
ri that maximize these functions. We consider two different states (rl1 , ru1)=(0.025, 0.8)
and (rl2 , ru2)=(0.05, 0.825). From Fig. 4.7a, we observe that for hi=3.9, ai=5.27 and
p0i=4.3, the consumer’s utility is maximized at ri=ru1=0.8 and at ri=ru2=0.825, respec-
tively for the different states. Fig. 4.7b shows that for the consumer with parameters
hi=3.85, ai=6.9 and p
0
i=5.8, the optimal utility results for ri=ru1=0.8 and ri=x0=0.052,
respectively for the different states.
Based on these results, we observe that when consumers desire to be included in U
due to their high sensitivity hi to social impact, they choose the minimum value of ri
that enables them to be on U , i.e., the threshold ru. On the other hand, when they are
relatively socially-indifferent (i.e., low hi), then they choose the minimum ri that enables
them to stay out of L, i.e., a value slightly larger than the threshold rl. The selection
of the minimum possible value stems from the desire of consumers to achieve social
recognition with the minimum possible dissatisfaction cost. However, bigger values of
ai reduce the ability of consumers to be on U or stay out of L, since these ai values
discourage them from making substantial efforts. The baseline energy demand p0i also
influences each player’s decision ri, since it determines the benefit or the cost from energy
consumption savings (equation (4.7)) and thus, each player’s net payoff.
Fig. 4.8 depicts the average (over all states for each K=M) operational cost of our
approach for different values of K=M and for different communities of consumers, as
compared to the dynamic-pricing approach of [89] (“Low”) and to the no Demand Side
Management approach (“no DSM”). For a community of consumers with ai∼U(5, 40),
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of ri for different pairs (rl, ru) in the cases of a) K = 4 and
b) K = 350.
hi∼U(1, 4), the value of K that minimizes the operational cost is K=M=350, and it
becomes K=M=250 when hi∼U(1, 6). For a “segmented” society with two different
communities of consumers, one of 30 consumers with ai∼U(5, 40), hi∼N(40, 2) and
another of 970 consumers with ai∼U(110, 115), hi∼U(0.1, 0.3), the minimum generation
cost arises for K=1. Note that the first community is very socially-sensitive, while the
second is expected to exert zero effort for any K. Therefore, K is selected in this case,
so as to minimize the operational cost of the first community.
In general, the lower the mean sensitivity hi of consumers to social approval, the higher
the value of K that must be selected by the serious-game designer in order to: a)
considerably decrease the threshold ru so as to be easier and more beneficial for these
consumers to exert the effort to enter U , and also, b) considerably increase the threshold
rl so as to force them make substantial effort to avoid entering L.
When a community of consumers is socially-insensitive (“no social factor”), i.e., hi=0,
then the choice of K makes no difference, while the operational cost is high. As compared
to the dynamic-pricing DSM approach of [89], referred to as “Low”, we observe that the
minimum operational cost achieved by our approach can be lower than that of [89]
for low prices per energy unit. Thus, the preferable choice between our serious-game
approach and that of [89] depends on the financial rationality, the elasticity of energy
demand and the sensitivity of consumers to social approval. Fig. 4.9 shows the social
welfare (total utility of players) for different K values for a consumer community with
ai∼U(5, 40), hi∼U(1, 4).
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Fig. 4.10 shows the distribution of performance ri for the different pairs of thresholds
that arise for K = 4 (Fig. 4.10a) and K = 350 (Fig. 4.10b). Only three of the seven
possible values of ri (described in Subsection 4.3.2) appear in our results: x0, rl + ε and
ru. For K=4, a slight increase in the value of ru (for both rl = 0.025 and rl = 0.05)
forces 2 out of the 5 players with performance ri = ru make an effort smaller than ru
and namely, x0. Similarly, for K = 350, a slight increase in the value of rl forces 161
out of the 337 players with performance ri = rl + ε make an effort smaller (i.e., x0) or
greater (i.e., ru) than rl + ε.
Thus, we observe that for low values of K (Fig. 4.10a), a slight increase in the value
of rl increases the number of players that achieve rl + ε due to the fact that their net
payoff for ri = rl + ε is greater than the one for ri = x0. In contrast, for higher values
of K (Fig. 4.10b), such an increase reduces the number of consumers with performance
rl + ε. Furthermore, we observe that the number of consumers that choose ri = ru for
K = 4 is much smaller than the one for K = 350. This stems from the fact that a low
value of K makes it more difficult for consumers to achieve ri = ru.
4.5 Related Work
There have been some prior efforts to employ serious games for demand side manage-
ment [77–80, 90, 91], albeit with no modeling or analysis on the serious-game design, as
opposed to our work. In [79], a serious game for smart grids is organized as a virtual
world with many user roles and actions, involving direct actions and training for sharing
a Medium/Low Voltage transformer among prosumers. A serious game for energy con-
servation among students is described in [80]. The serious-game website and associated
game mechanics are provided by the Makahiki system [92]. Similarly to our setting, no
monetary rewards are included in the game; incentives are introduced through competi-
tion among consumers for points for energy conservation actions and for participation to
online educational and real-world activities. According to [80], energy feedback systems
should be actionable, include training and be time-persistent to have long-term effect
into energy consumption behavior. Our serious-game model is time-persistent.
Also, the game “Energy Battle” [90], similarly to [80], aimed at encouraging occupants
of student-households to save energy by means of competition. In [93], the authors re-
view multiple energy competitions among university students and identify several pitfalls
in their design. Specifically, the use of total energy consumption or (relative) energy-
consumption reduction for winner determination is deemed as not adequate when static
baseline calculation methods are employed and may be unfair for already “green” con-
sumers.
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An online game for improving home energy behavior, named Power House, is proposed
in [78]. Its objective is to track activities and assist each member of a virtual family to
save energy, while real-world energy behaviors produce particular in-game advantages
and disadvantages. An online serious game (“EnerCities”) is presented in [77] to increase
the environmental and energy-related awareness of secondary school students, and to
influence their energy-related behaviors. Also, a virtual pet game designed for energy
use reduction in a commercial office setting is presented in [91], where device-specific
energy consumption is reflected in the fitness of virtual pets. There are also a number of
studies on gamification in general [94], [95], which verify that specific serious-game design
elements, such as leaderboards, points and levels, positively influence user participation,
engagement and behavioral change.
In a different class of work, a number of game-theoretic dynamic-pricing schemes that in-
volve interaction between the utility company and the consumers for energy-consumption
smoothening have been proposed [89], [96]. However, [97] shows that dynamic pricing
mechanisms can lead to peak-shifting when consumers rationaly respond to price signals,
unless specific strategies of bounded rationality are employed. In our paper, consumers
take decisions based on social influence, as opposed to financial incentives.
Finally, prospect theory is employed in [32] for studying the problem of customer-owned
energy storage management in the smart grid in a less rational manner, as opposed
to the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem employed here. In [32], a human
player subjectively observes and makes her charging/discharging decisions based on the
potential value of the benefit from selling energy and of the penalty from power regulation
rather than the final outcome.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the problem of optimal serious-game design for reducing
energy consumption and increasing user engagement. We considered a serious game,
where a serious-game designer entity presents publicly to all consumers a list of top-
K consumers and a list of bottom-M consumers according to their respective energy
consumption reduction at peak hours. The driving forces of this serious game are the
user discomfort due to demand load reduction, the user desire for social approval and the
user sensitivity to social outcasting. We formulated the problems of the serious-game
designer as an operational-cost minimization one for the utility company and that of each
consumer as a utility maximization one. The serious-game design problem faced by the
utility company is to decide on K,M and on the feedback provided to the consumers,
while the consumer-side problem amounts to selecting the behavioral change to energy
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consumption that maximizes the expected user utility. By a series of simulations, we
showed how the choices of K,M affect the energy consumption reduction for different
types of customers.
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5.1 Introduction to Data-driven Energy Consumer Profil-
ing and Behavior Prediction
The penetration of new components in the traditional energy management system, such
as smart meters, energy storage systems, bidirectional communication links between con-
sumers and utility operators, and renewable energy sources, has led to a fundamental
change in the energy consumers’ role. In this new and smart energy grid, consumers can
now influence their energy consumption profile, i.e., curtail or shift in time their energy
demand loads, and they can also generate and store power. Moreover, the proliferation
of smartphones has facilitated the participation of consumers in demand-response pro-
grams and energy consumption reduction campaigns. Such programs/campaigns aim at
optimally matching energy demand and supply, and at reducing consumption in peak
periods by making suggestions/offers to users on tasks to be fulfilled, along with offered
incentives. A fundamental issue in their design and operation is the recruitment of users.
Consumer participation is subject to various types of costs she/he may experience, such
as discomfort from shifting energy demand tasks in time or from not performing them
at all, or expenditure of time and effort on using a dedicated mobile app and performing
a suggested task.
In literature, there is a great number of works on incentive mechanisms that try to
motivate users to participate in demand-response programs and energy consumption
curtailment efforts [83, 86, 98–102]. Most of them assume that consumers are rational
decision-makers which aim at maximizing some notion of expected net utility and which
select their actions by solving complex optimization problems. However, consumers are
humans and their decisions are far from rational. Decisions regarding their participation
in a campaign may depend on various attributes that characterize the demand load
shifting/reduction suggestions, which are prioritized or weighed differently by different
users (different consumer preferences).
In this work, instead of relying on conventional rational models for the consumer, we
study the role of data in building behavior-based data-driven models for predicting
consumer behavior. First, we build two different models to learn consumer individual
preferences through historical data consisting of past load reduction suggestions and
user decisions. The first model is based on a popular machine-learning technique while
the second one on a cognitive psychological heuristic. The derived consumer preference
models (profiles) are then used to predict the probability that a consumer will carry
out specific consumption reduction tasks. Each load reduction suggestion made to a
consumer comprises attributes that are present in the user decision-making model and
which are either beyond or under the control of the campaign designer (CD). Then, the
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ultimate goal of the CD is to determine appropriately the controllable attributes so as
to accomplish the purpose of the campaign.
Our first data-driven approach to model consumer preferences and predict consumer
behavior is based on Logistic Regression (LR). LR [103, 104] is a popular machine-
learning framework for probabilistic classification. It is the most celebrated instance of
generalized linear models. The binary logistic regression model is used to estimate the
probability of a binary response based on one or more predictor variables (attributes).
Important properties of LR are: (i) the objective for learning the model parameters is
convex, so there are no local optima in optimization problems that involve this objective,
and (ii) the model is probabilistic, hence it comes with well-calibrated estimates of
uncertainty in the classification decision [103, 104].
It has been proved that there are small differences in performance (predictive accuracy)
between simple mathematical models, known as simple decision heuristics, and com-
putationally more complex methods developed in statistics, such as logistic regression,
neural networks, categorization and regression trees (CART) and naive Bayes [105–107].
These heuristic models aim to a) capture the bounded rationality of decision-makers and
the fact that decision-makers try to satisfice rather than optimize [108], and b) give
insight into the actual decision-making mechanism. They need less time, information,
and effort compared to more complex methods.
Our second approach is based on such a decision heuristic, namely the Fast-and-Frugal
Tree (FFT) model [109]. FFTs are cognitive heuristic models which are suitable for
classification tasks [105, 110]. They are decision trees with at least one exit leaf at
every level and are composed of sequentially ordered attributes. This means that for
every checked attribute, at least one of its branches can lead to a decision. It has
been shown that they operate as lexicographic heuristics for categorization [110]. FFTs
are constructed with binary attributes and a binary criterion but are generalized to
other cases. They possess three advantages over other decision models: 1) fastness and
frugality, 2) simple decision rules, and 3) potential robustness (less susceptible to over-
fitting). However, FFTs are not naturally probabilistic; they only predict the class that
a given sample should belong to. Nevertheless, there exist a number of methods [111–
113] that can generate calibrated probability estimates from decision trees and thus,
from FFTs.
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5.1.1 Our contribution
This work studies how different behavior-based data-driven models can be applied to
model and predict consumer behavior. It also investigates the impact of consumer be-
havior uncertainty on the determination of the load reduction suggestions to be made
to consumers, and on the resulting system performance. We rely on logistic regression
from machine learning, and on fast-and-frugal trees inspired from cognitive psychology
and behavioral science to build probabilistic models of consumer participation. Our
main goal is to discover through these models the different factors that determine con-
sumer actions and the different importance placed on them, and to predict consumer
reaction to load reduction suggestions. We consider that a consumer views a suggestion
made to her/him as a pair of two controllable attributes; namely, the offered monetary
payment/reward and the suggested amount of load reduction. The CD aims to appro-
priately control/set these attributes in order to achieve a certain expected load saving
at minimum economic cost.
Specifically, our main contributions are the following:
 We formulate the problem of minimizing the maximum potential total cost (i.e., the
sum of offered payments) of the campaign designer that results from the allocation
of load reduction tasks and monetary rewards (incentives) to consumers in order
to achieve at least a certain expected load reduction.
 We build personalized decision-making profiles for consumers using a logistic-
regression model and a fast-and-frugal tree model, based on past load reduction
suggestions and the corresponding consumer responses. We show that in the case
of LR the optimization problem turns out to be a sigmoid optimization one, while
in the case of FFTs it is an integer linear programming one.
 We present a numerical example for a system of two consumers that highlights
the need for optimal allocation of tasks and incentives (i.e., optimal control of
suggestion attributes), and that shows how the selection of the attribute values
affects the consumer offer acceptance probabilities and thus, the expected total
energy consumption reduction.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, we describe the simple
scenario studied in this work. In section 5.3, we analyze our system model, while in
Section 5.4, the CD optimization problem is formulated. In section 5.5, we present the
two behavior-based data-driven approaches for consumer profiling, and the form of the
optimization problem in each approach. Section 5.6 includes a representative numerical
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example that concerns a simple special case of the problem. In section 5.7, we present
the related literature. Finally, section 5.8 concludes are work. This chapter is based on
work [114].
5.2 Energy Consumption Reduction Campaign: A simple
scenario
We consider a peak-load reduction campaign that asks consumers to reduce their baseline
energy demand in exchange for some payment. We assume that there is an expected
overload at time t that the campaign designer (CD) aims to avoid. The campaign mobile
app makes suggestions of the following form: (a) “Please reduce your demand load X at
time slot t by d kWh for a payment $p”, or (b) “If you reduce your demand load X at
time slot t by d%, you will save $p in your bill and you will reduce your carbon footprint
by z%”.
Let us assume that a consumer decides whether to curtail a demand load X based on
the following parameters (attributes) that characterize a suggestion:
 The payment, $p
 The amount of load reduction, d (in kWh)
in the case of example recommendation (a), and
 The payment, $p
 The percentage load reduction, d (%)
 The percentage reduction of the consumer’s carbon footprint, z (%)
in the case of example suggestion (b). Here, we focus on suggestions of the form (a). The
above attributes are prioritized or weighted differently by different consumers. Also, each
suggestion may comprise attributes that are beyond the control of the CD and attributes
that are under its control, such as the incentives to be designed.
The first goal of the CD is to learn consumer individual preferences, i.e., derive user
profiles that capture the different importance that each user places on the different at-
tributes, through records of past load reduction suggestions and user decisions. Then,
its second goal is to determine appropriately the controllable attributes of each sugges-
tion, based on the derived decision-making profiles, so as to achieve an expected total
load reduction of at least Q units of energy with the minimum possible total offered
compensation).
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5.3 System Model
Denote by I the set of energy consumers that participate in the peak-load reduction
campaign. Time is divided into slots. Here, as we mentioned above, we focus on a single
time slot of the day at which the CD needs to achieve an expected total load reduction
greater than or equal to Q. The CD interacts with consumers through a mobile app.
It suggests a specific task for load curtailment to each consumer offering at the same
time a monetary reward as an incentive to carry out the task, i.e., it makes a single load
reduction suggestion ri to each consumer i ∈ I. Each suggestion r can be viewed as
a set of n attributes (interchangeably called cues hereafter) r = (c1, c2, . . . , cn). These
attributes include the monetary reward c1 = p, the amount of load to be curtailed c2 = d,
and maybe the description of the corresponding energy demand task(s) to be canceled
c4, c5, c6, . . . .
The attributes p, d can be manipulated by the campaign designer in order to incentivize
consumers to undertake specific load reduction tasks. The attributes that are related
to the energy demand tasks to be cancelled, such as the time when the demand task(s)
is(are) scheduled to start by the consumer (during the target peak slot), the appliance(s)
involved, and the power consumption level of the appliance(s), are inherent ones to the
energy demand task(s). We assume that the time of the day or the type of load does
not determine whether the user will do the reduction or not (we are talking about
homogeneous load for all users). Therefore, it is safe to assume that each consumer
i ∈ I views a suggestion ri only as a pair of attributes pi, di, i.e., ri = (pi, di). There
may exist other attributes besides the two above that determine the decision of the
consumer. Some might be related to the specific load reduction task, while some others
might be related to the consumer per se, e.g., the social recognition consumers get about
their prudent energy consumption or the intrinsic motivation to be environment friendly.
Without loss of generality, attributes p, d are taken to be continuous variables. Let
pmin ≥ 0 and pmax > 0 be the minimum and maximum allowed payment that can
be offered to a consumer i, respectively, and dmaxi ≥ 0 be the maximum possible load
reduction of each consumer i. If the baseline energy demand of consumer i at the target
slot t is e0i , with 0 ≤ e0i ≤ e0max then dmaxi = e0i . We denote as d′i = di/e0i the normalized
demand load reduction, with 0 ≤ d′i ≤ 1. We observe that d′i can also be expressed as a
percentage, i.e., d˜i = 100 d
′
i %.
Consumers decide to undertake a demand load curtailment, and they do so probabilisti-
cally, depending on how well suggestions compare with their own individual preferences.
This probabilistic reaction of consumers depends on the suggested load reduction tasks
and the corresponding offered payments, and on the consumer profiles that define their
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preferences. Consumer preferences are expressed over the attributes p, d, which are con-
trollable by the campaign designer. Hence, each consumer is faced with a two-attribute
decision problem.
We approach consumer reaction to a load reduction suggestion as a two-class probabilis-
tic classification problem. The possible outcomes of the consumer decision-making pro-
cess determine the two classes. Specifically, when a suggestion ri is made to a consumer
i, class 1 (C1) corresponds to accepting it and performing the suggested load curtailment,
while class 0 (C0) corresponds to rejecting it. Thus, an instance ri = (pi, di) is assumed
to belong either to class C1 or to class C0. For a given vector of values r = (p, d) for the
different suggestion attributes, the probability that consumer i performs the suggested
load reduction task, i.e., accepts the offer r, is P ia(r) = Pi(C1|r) = Pi(C1|(p, d)). This
offer acceptance probability is not assumed to be a priori known, but it will emerge from
our subsequent analysis.
In our scenario, each consumer decides whether to undertake a load reduction task with a
specific fixed reward and if s/he does, s/he deterministically receives the offered payment
(decision-making under certainty). We assume for now that whether a consumer will
perform a suggested task is independent of all other consumers’ decisions. Also, the
outcomes (i.e., the received reward) for a decision-maker depend only on her/his own
choices/actions.
5.4 Incentive and load-reduction task allocation: Problem
formulation
Given a set of users I, each user i ∈ I with a given preference/decision-making profile,
the CD has to find the most economically efficient payment and load-reduction task
allocation scheme that achieves an expected total load reduction of at least Q units of
energy. I.e., the CD seeks to optimally control the suggestion attributes pi, di so as to
achieve an expected load saving greater than or equal to Q with the minimum possible
total offered reward (i.e., sum of offered payments). Namely, the optimization problem
faced by the CD is:
min
p,d
∑
i∈I
pi (5.1)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
di P
i
a(pi, di) ≥ Q (5.2)
pmin < pi ≤ pmax, ∀i ∈ I (5.3)
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0 ≤ di ≤ dmaxi , ∀i ∈ I, (5.4)
where p = (p1, p2, . . . , p|I|) is the vector of the offered payments and d = (d1, d2, . . . , d|I|)
is the vector that contains the suggested amounts of load reduction. The objective
function denotes the sum of offered payments, namely the maximum potential cost of
the CD which is the cost that results from the acceptance of all recommended offers.
Introducing the concept of normalized load reduction into the above formulation, the
optimization problem becomes:
min
p,d′
∑
i∈I
pi (5.5)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
d′i P
i
a(pi, d
′
i) ≥ Q′ (5.6)
pmin < pi ≤ pmax, ∀i ∈ I (5.7)
0 ≤ d′i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I. (5.8)
In order to solve the optimization problem (5.1)-(5.4) or the modified problem (5.5)-
(5.8), we need to predict the probabilities P ia(pi, di) or P
i
a(pi, d
′
i), ∀i ∈ I, respectively.
5.5 Consumer profiling
As we mentioned above, our main goal is to predict the probability P ia(ri) that a con-
sumer i will accept an offer ri (i.e., will perform a suggested load reduction task), so as to
solve the optimization problem (5.1)-(5.4) or (5.5)-(5.8) defined in section 5.4. In order
to achieve our goal, we need to profile consumers. Namely, we need to build a model for
each consumer i, using historical data, that describes the way s/he assesses a suggestion
ri to reach a decision regarding her/his participation/action in the campaign. Such a
decision depends on the suggestion attributes pi, di (or d
′
i or d˜i), which are prioritized
or weighed differently by different consumers.
Here, we employ two different techniques to learn consumer individual preferences (pro-
files) through records of past load reduction suggestions and user decisions: a) the Logis-
tic Regression (LR) model and b) the Fast-and-Frugal Tree (FFT) model. The derived
consumer profiles capture the different importance that each consumer places on the
different attributes that characterize the suggestions. We then use these personalized
consumer preference models to predict the probability P ia(ri), ∀i ∈ I, and subsequently
solve the optimization problem (5.5)-(5.8).
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5.5.1 Logistic Regression model, and Optimal Task and Incentive Al-
location Policy
In this section, we model the way each consumer i assesses a suggestion ri to reach a
decision (accept (C1), or reject (C0)) using the LR model. Given a vector of values
r = (p, d′) for the different attributes, LR predicts the probability that consumer i will
make the positive choice (accept (C1)) as follows:
P ia(r) = Pi(C1|r) =
1
1 + e−wi·r
= σ(wi · r), (5.9)
where wi = (wi,0, wi,p, wi,d′) is the vector of the attribute weights (logistic regression
coefficients) for consumer i and σ(x) = e
x
ex+1 = (1 + e
−x)−1 (with σ(x) ∈ (0, 1), ∀x) is
the standard logistic (or sigmoid) function. wi,0 is the intercept coefficient, while wi,p
and wi,d′ are the weights assigned by consumer i to attributes pi and d
′
i, respectively. An
additional pseudo-attribute c0 = 1, corresponding to the intercept term wi,0, is added to
the suggestion r, i.e., r = (c0, p, d
′) = (1, p, d′). Also, wi·r is the dot product of vectors wi
and r. We observe that the LR model predicts the above probability based on a weighted
integration of the available attribute values p, d′. On the other hand, the alternative
choice (reject (C0)) is selected with probability Pi(C0|r) = 1− Pi(C1|r) = 1− P ia(r).
For the prediction of the probability P ia(r), the CD needs to learn the weight vector
(profile) {wi}, i ∈ I, which captures the importance that consumer i places on the
different attributes in reaching a decision. These weights are learned from historical
data (i.e., past load reduction suggestions and the corresponding responses) through a
supervised learning process, whereby the individual consumer LR models are trained
using these data (training datasets). The supervised learning process followed in the
case of LR models is analytically described in Appendix A.
5.5.1.1 Optimal allocation of incentives and load reduction tasks in the case
of LR: A sigmoid optimization problem
In section 5.4, we mentioned that the goal of the CD is to optimally control the suggestion
attributes pi, d
′
i so as to achieve an expected load reduction greater than or equal to
Q (units of energy) with the minimum possible total offered reward. Also, we showed
above (Eq. (5.9)) that in the case of LR, the probability P ia(ri) that a consumer i will
undertake a suggested load reduction task is a sigmoid function of attributes pi, d
′
i. So,
using Eq. (5.9), the optimization problem (5.5)-(5.8) of section 5.4 becomes:
min
p,d′
∑
i∈I
pi (5.10)
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s.t.
∑
i∈I
d′i σ(wi,0 + wi,ppi + wi,d′d
′
i) ≥ Q′ (5.11)
pmin < pi ≤ pmax, ∀i ∈ I (5.12)
0 ≤ d′i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I. (5.13)
Since both the objective function (5.10) and the function of constraint (5.11) have con-
tinuous first partial derivatives, the method of Lagrange multipliers can be used to solve
the above problem. Namely, using a Lagrange multiplier λ ≥ 0 for the constraint (5.11)
(the other two are discarded and are introduced later through a constraint on the cor-
responding payment and task allocation policy of the CD), the Lagrange function is
defined by
L(p,d′, λ) =
∑
i∈I
pi − λ
(∑
i∈I
d′iσ(wi,0 + wi,ppi + wi,d′d
′
i)−Q′
)
. (5.14)
The attribute weights wi, ∀i ∈ I are obtained through the training process described
in Appendix A. The Lagrangian (5.14) is the new objective function that needs to be
minimized. We observe that the optimization problem turns out to be a sigmoid opti-
mization one. The goal is to find some (p∗,d′∗) ∈ C and λ∗ ≥ 0 such that L(p∗,d′∗, λ∗) =
min{L(p,d′, λ) : (p,d′) ∈ C, λ ∈ R+}, where C = {(p,d′) ∈ R2|I| | pmin ≤ pi ≤ pmax, 0 ≤
d′i ≤ 1,∀i ∈ I} is a closed convex set which determines the constrained feasible solution
space for all controllable attributes pi, d
′
i, for i ∈ I. The solution (p∗,d′∗) of the above
problem is the optimal payment and task allocation scheme in the case of LR models.
The problem (5.10)-(5.13) is a nonlinear programming (NLP) one. There are commer-
cially available NLP solvers that employ Lagrange multiplier algorithms, such as the
interior-point method or the sequential quadratic programming method [115], for solv-
ing constrained nonlinear programming problems. In section 5.6, we use such as a solver
in order to obtain our numerical results.
5.5.2 Fast-and-Frugal Tree model, and Optimal Task and Incentive
Allocation Policy
In this section, we build a behavioral decision-making profile for each consumer i using
the FFT model. A tree such as the one in Fig. 5.1a is called a fast-and-frugal tree,
according to the definition we presented above (Section 5.1). This is a typical FFT that
models the following decision-making process: If d′i ≤ Td′i then consumer i decides to
accept the offer ri (i.e., ri belongs to class C1). Else, if d
′
i > Td′i then the consumer
considers pi; if pi ≥ Tpi then the consumer decides to accept the offer ri, else if pi < Tpi
then the consumer rejects ri (i.e., ri belongs to class C0). Tpi and Td′i are appropriately
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Figure 5.1: (a) An example FFT and (b) its alternative form for a consumer i that
prioritizes the cue d′i of the suggestion ri over the cue pi. APi,l/Ni,l is the estimate of
the probability that an instance (i.e., suggestion) assigned to leaf l belongs to class C1.
APi,l is the number of training instances of (actual) class C1 at leaf l, and Ni,l is the
total number of training instances at that leaf.
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Figure 5.2: An example FFT that prioritizes the cue pi of the suggestion ri over the
cue d′i. Its cue ranking and exit location are different from those of the FFT in Fig.
5.1a.
selected decision/classification thresholds. The structure of the tree implies that con-
sumer i ranks the attribute di first and the attribute pi second, i.e., s/he prioritizes d
′
i
over pi. A different ranking would lead to a different tree. Fig. 5.2 depicts an example
FFT with different cue order and different exit structure that may arise in our scenario.
Fig. 5.1b depicts the alternative form of the FFT in Fig. 5.1a; we apply the following
convention here: each right branch is associated with the fulfillment of the condition
at the top the branch and is labeled with 1, whereas each left branch is labeled with
0. Also, if a leaf stems from a branch labeled 1, then the decision at this leaf will be
positive (i.e., its associated class is C1), otherwise the decision will be negative (C0).
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
04/06/2020 23:30:17 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 5. Optimal Design of Energy Consumption Reduction Campaigns Through
Behavioral Data-Driven Consumer Profiling 99
In order to build (i.e., train) a FFT model for each consumer i, the CD needs to (i)
find appropriate decision thresholds Tpi , Td′i for the available cues pi, d
′
i (or pi, d˜i),
respectively, (ii) order the cues, and (ii) find an appropriate tree shape (exit structure).
These three problems are solved using historical information (i.e., a training dataset for
each consumer i consisting of past load-reduction suggestions and consumer responses)
and a set of simple rules that are based on the optimization of a particular model
evaluation measure. The training process followed in the case of FFTs is analytically
described in Appendix B. After the tree has been constructed, its use for classification
involves only traversing the tree by answering one simple question (i.e., checking a
condition) at each level, and assigning the class label associated with the final node
(leaf).
Although decision-tree models are not naturally probabilistic, they can predict prob-
abilities, using information extracted from the classification of the training instances
[110–112], as follows: The full training dataset sits at the top of the constructed tree
and each training observation/instance traverses the tree (checking the condition at each
node) until it reaches a leaf node. Each leaf comprises a subset of the full set of training
instances. Then, each new observation that needs to be classified goes through the tree
to reach a leaf node and a class-membership probability is obtained for this observation
from the (training) relative frequency of the class in question at that leaf.
For example, if a new observation reaches a leaf node l that comprises 7 training instances
of (actual) class C1 and 3 training instances of (actual) class C0, then a probability
7/10 = 0.7 would be assigned to be from class C1. Namely, the probability that an
instance at leaf l belongs to class C1 is P (C1|l) = 7/10. Let APl be the number of
training instances of (actual) class C1 at leaf l and Nl be the total number of training
instances at that leaf. Then, P (C1|l) = APl/Nl. Since each leaf of the decision tree
corresponds to a region of the two-dimensional feature space, the above probability
estimation procedure assigns the same probability estimate to all points in the region.
It has been proved that this methodology provides poor probability estimates, since the
decision tree was constructed using these same training instances and so the estimates
tend to be too extreme, i.e., close to 0 or 1. One way of improving them is to make
them smoother, i.e., to adjust them to be less extreme [111–113]. The Laplace correction
method presented in [111], which has become a de facto standard for practitioners, can be
used for smoothing these frequency-based probability estimates. This method replaces
the conditional probability estimate P (C1|l) = APl/Nl by P ′(C1|l) = (APl+1)/(Nl+C),
where C is the number of classes. This simple, common smoothing method has been
used for the production of improved probability estimates from decision-tree models like
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CART and C4.5 [111, 113]. Since these models are more complex versions of FFTs 1,
the Laplace correction can also be used to improve the class-membership probability
estimates given by FFTs 2.
Applying the Laplace correction method to the frequency-based probability estimates
derived from the FFT model built for a consumer i, the probability P ia(ri) that the
consumer will accept an offer ri (i.e., that instance ri belongs to class C1) is given by:
P ia(ri) = Pi(C1|ri) =
Λi∑
l=1
Pi(l|ri)P ′i (C1|l) =
Λi∑
l=1
Pi(l|ri)APi,l + 1
Ni,l + 2
, (5.15)
where Λi is the number of leaves of the FFT, Pi(l|ri) is the probability that leaf l is
reached by instance (suggestion) ri, and P
′
i (C1|l) is the smoothed/improved estimate of
the probability that an instance assigned to l belongs to class C1. APi,l is the number of
training instances of (actual) class C1 at leaf l and Ni,l is the total number of training
instances at that leaf. In our two-class problem, the Laplace correction method replaces
the probability estimates Pi(C1|l) = APi,l/Ni,l, for l = 1, . . . ,Λi, obtained from the FFT
of consumer i by P ′i (C1|l) = (APi,l + 1)/(Ni,l + 2).
In order to predict the probability P ia(ri) of Eq. (5.15), the CD needs to find a) the
probabilities Pi(l|ri) and b) the values of APi,l, Ni,l, ∀l = 1, . . . ,Λi. Based on the
constructed FFT of a consumer i, a) each probability Pi(l|ri) can be expressed as an
indicator function of the conditions (tests) leading to leaf l, and b) the values of APi,l,
Ni,l can be estimated after the classification of all training instances using the tree (as
described above). For example, from the FFT of Fig. 5.1a, it is:
P ia(ri) = 1{d′i>Td′
i
}1{pi<Tpi}
(APi,1 + 1
Ni,1 + 2
)
+ 1{d′i>Td′
i
}1{pi≥Tpi}
(APi,2 + 1
Ni,2 + 2
)
+ 1{d′i≤Td′
i
}
(APi,3 + 1
Ni,3 + 2
)
, (5.16)
where 1A is an indicator function of the event A with 1A=1 or 0 if event A is true or not,
respectively. Here, we assume that leaves are numbered from left to right. We observe
that in the case of FFTs the probability P ia(ri) is a step (piecewise constant) function
of attributes pi, d
′
i. Also, for a given suggestion r, only one of the Λi terms of equation
(5.15) is nonzero.
1In the case of CART and C4.5, a) cues are looked up sequentially but not necessarily one at a time,
b) the decision on which cues to use at each level and how to order them is made by statistical tests,
and c) it is not necessarily the case that a decision can be made at each level of the tree [105, 116].
2Here, we assume that the available datasets for the consumers are not highly imbalanced. In the
case of highly imbalanced datasets (i.e., the two classes are far from equiprobable), the m-estimation
method presented in [112] might be more appropriate for the production of well-calibrated probability
estimates.
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5.5.2.1 Optimal allocation of incentives and load reduction tasks in the case
of FFTs: An integer linear programming (ILP) problem
As we mentioned in section 5.4, the objective of the CD is to optimally control the
attributes pi, d
′
i so as to achieve an expected total load reduction of at least Q
′ units
of energy with the minimum possible total offered reward. Also, from the structure of
a general FFT for a consumer i, we observe that each path from the root to a leaf l is
characterized by a) a set of conditions/tests (one at each branch), b) the sets of values
for the decision variables pi, d
′
i that satisfy the conditions at its branches, and c) a fixed
probability estimate (APi,l + 1)/(Ni,l + 2) that denotes the probability that consumer i
will accept an offer ri that corresponds to this path. According to this observation and
the objective of the CD, we identify the following cases:
 A path passes through a branch labeled pi < Tpi or pi ≤ Tpi . Then, the payment
to be offered to consumer i should equal pmin (i.e., the element of the set of values
[pmin, Tpi) or [pmin, Tpi ], respectively, that minimizes the total offered reward (i.e.,
the maximum potential cost of the CD).
 A path passes through a branch labeled pi > Tpi . Then, the offered payment to
consumer i should be Tpi + p (i.e., one of the smallest elements of the interval
(Tpi , pmax] ), where 0 < p < 1 is an arbitrarily small positive number.
 A path passes through a branch labeled pi ≥ Tpi . Then, the offered payment to
consumer i should equal Tpi (i.e., the minimum element of the interval [Tpi , pmax]).
 A path passes through a branch labeled d′i > Td′i or d
′
i ≥ Td′i . Then, the normalized
load reduction to be suggested to consumer i should be d′maxi = 1 (i.e., the element
of the set of values (Td′i , 1] or [Td′i , 1], respectively, that maximizes the expected
load reduction of consumer i ).
 A path passes through a branch labeled d′i < Td′i . Then, the normalized load
reduction to be suggested to consumer i should equal Td′i − d (i.e., one of the
largest elements of the interval [0, Td′i) ), where 0 < d << 1.
 A path passes through a branch labeled d′i ≤ Td′i . Then, the normalized load
reduction to be suggested to consumer i should be Td′i (i.e., the maximum element
of the interval [0, Td′i ] ).
 A path passes only through a single branch labeled pi < Tpi or pi > Tpi or
pi ≤ Tpi or pi ≥ Tpi . Then, the payment to be offered is determined as detailed
above and the normalized load reduction to be suggested should be d′maxi = 1 (i.e.,
the maximum element of the interval [0, 1] ).
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 A path passes only through a single branch labeled d′i < Td′i or d
′
i > Td′i or d
′
i ≤ Td′i
or d′i ≥ Td′i . Then, the normalized load reduction to be suggested is determined as
detailed above and the payment to be offered to consumer i should be pmin (i.e.,
the minimum element of the interval [pmin, pmax] ).
For example, there are three distinct paths in the FFT of Fig. 5.1a. For the path that
passes through branches d′i > Td′i and pi < Tpi , the offer ri should be (pmin, d
′max
i ) =
(pmin, 1) and the estimated probability that consumer i will accept it is (APi,1+1)/(Ni,1+
2). For the path that passes through branches d′i > Td′i and pi ≥ Tpi , the offer should be
ri = (Tpi , 1) and it would be accepted with probability (APi,2 + 1)/(Ni,2 + 2), whereas
for the last path, it should be ri = (pmin, Td′i) with acceptance probability (APi,3 +
1)/(Ni,3 + 2).
Therefore, the CD has a finite (countable) number of options (extracted from the FFT of
a consumer i) for a suggestion ri, each of which corresponds to a path and has given p, d
′
values. Also, each path is associated with a probability estimate that shows the likehood
that consumer i will accept the option/offer that corresponds to this path. So, each of
the Λi options is a predetermined optimal offer with a fixed acceptance probability,
corresponding to a certain path l (the number of paths is equal to the number of leaves)
of the FFT of consumer i, and is denoted as r∗il = (p
∗
il, d
′∗
il ), for l = 1, . . . ,Λi.
From the above observations, the optimization problem (5.5)-(5.8) of section 5.4 in the
case of FFTs turns out to be a discrete optimization one and it can be reformulated as a
variant of the standard knapsack problem [117]. In the following reformulated problem,
the objective function represents the total offered reward (by the CD) that results from
the selection of only one option (from the group of options) for each consumer i, and
the first constraint shows that the expected total load reduction that results from the
aforementioned selection of options needs to be greater than or equal to Q′ (units of
energy).
min
x
|I|∑
i=1
∑
l∈Mi
vilxil (5.17)
s.t.
|I|∑
i=1
∑
l∈Mi
zilxil ≥ Q′ (5.18)
∑
l∈Mi
xil = 1, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ |I| (5.19)
xil ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ |I|,∀l ∈Mi. (5.20)
In this formulation, Mi = {(vil, zil)|l = 1, . . . ,Λi} for i ∈ I is a set of items numbered
from 1 up to Λi, each with a value vil = p
∗
il and a weight zil = d
′∗
ilP
i
a(r
∗
il). Each of these
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items corresponds to a (predetermined) optimal offer r∗il = (p
∗
il, d
′∗
il ) associated with a
certain path l of the FFT of a consumer i. The value vil depicts the payment p
∗
il to
be offered to consumer i and the weight zil represents the expected normalized load
reduction d′∗ilP
i
a(r
∗
il) of consumer i due to suggestion r
∗
il. Here, the decision variable xil
represents the selection (xil = 1) or not (xil = 0) of the l-th item of set Mi, i.e., of
the l-th option r∗il for the consumer i, for i ∈ I and l = 1, . . . ,Λi. Constraint (5.19)
denotes that exactly one item must be selected from each set Mi, i.e., that only one of
the available Λi options must be selected for each consumer i.
In terms of the knapsack problem, the problem for the CD is to decide which items
(options) to include in a collection so that the total weight (expected total load reduction)
is greater than or equal to a given constant Q′ and the total value (total offered reward)
is as small as possible. In other words, the optimization problem amounts to accounting
over all possible options and selecting those ones that minimize the maximum potential
cost of the CD and lead to an expected total load reduction greater than or equal to Q′.
From the FFT of Fig. 5.1a, we have
Mi = {(vi1, zi1), (vi2, zi2), (vi3, zi3)}
=
{(
pmin,
APi,1 + 1
Ni,1 + 2
)
,
(
Tpi ,
APi,2 + 1
Ni,2 + 2
)
,
(
pmin, Td′i
APi,3 + 1
Ni,3 + 2
)}
.
(5.21)
We observe that the problem (5.17)-(5.20) is an integer linear programming (ILP) one.
Several advanced algorithms for solving integer linear programs are available, e.g., the
branch-and-bound or the cutting plane method [118, 119]. There are a number of com-
mercial solvers that implement such algorithms for the solution of ILPs [120]. We use
such a solver for the derivation of our numerical results in section 5.6.
5.6 Numerical Example
We consider a system consisting of two consumers, i.e., I = {1, 2}. We assume that a
simple questionnaire (sequence of offers) is provided to each one of them which invites
consumers to consider that they receive suggestions about load reduction tasks on their
smartphones and have to reply to them (accept or reject). Each offer consists of a
monetary payment p awarded to the consumer if s/he carries out the suggested task,
and a percentage d˜ by which a consumer’s load needs to be reduced. The provided
questionnaire and the corresponding responses of a consumer i, for i = 1, 2, form the
training dataset for this consumer.
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Figure 5.3: The resulting FFT of consumer 1: priotity to the payment attribute p1.
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Figure 5.4: The resulting FFT of consumer 2: exclusive reliance on the percentage
load reduction cue d˜2.
Table C.1 in Appendix C depicts the data we used for the creation of the synthetic
training datasets S1tr, S2tr for the two consumers. We generated 24 random pairs (p, d˜)
(i.e., offers) and labeled them as 1 (accept (C1)) or 0 (reject (C0)) based on the differ-
ent consumer preferences. Specifically, we assume that consumer 1 prefers offers with
medium to high compensation (p) and low to medium effort (d˜), whereas consumer 2
has a preference for low effort tasks, irrespective of reward. Initially, we assume that
pmin = $0.5 and pmax = $15.
First, we train the LR models for the two consumers using the available training datasets.
Namely, we estimate the w1, w2 vectors of attribute weights that best fit the models us-
ing the questionnaire suggestions and the corresponding consumer responses. Following
the training procedure described in Appendix A, we get w1,0 = −0.0882, w1,p = 0.3794
and w1,d˜ = −0.0608 for the LR model that captures the preferences of consumer 1,
while for the LR model built for consumer 2 we have w2,0 = 1.4642, w2,p = −0.0164
and w2,d˜ = −0.0696. Thus, the LR model of consumer 1 predicts (using Eq. (5.9)) that
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consumer 1 will accept an offer r1 = (p1, d˜1) with probability
P 1a (p1, d˜1) = σ(w1,0 + w1,p p1 + w1,d˜ d˜1) = σ(−0.0882 + 0.3794 p1 − 0.0608 d˜1), (5.22)
and the LR model of consumer 2 predicts that consumer 2 will accept an offer r2 =
(p2, d˜2) with probability
P 2a (p2, d˜2) = σ(w2,0 + w2,p p2 + w2,d˜ d˜2) = σ(1.4642− 0.0164 p2 − 0.0696 d˜2), (5.23)
Next, applying the simple FFT construction algorithm (described in Appendix B) on the
available training datasets, we obtain the FFTs for the two consumers. The resulting
decision trees, which are depicted in Fig. 5.3 and 5.4, provide ample evidence of the
high heterogeneity in consumer preferences. Consumer 1 assigns more importance to
attribute p1, since s/he inspects the offered payment p1 first and then considers the
suggested percentage of load reduction d˜1 for making her/his decisions. Consumer 2
appears to rely exclusively on single cue d˜2 for making her/his choices.
We classify the training offers using the contructed trees and we getAP1,1 = 0, AP1,2 = 0,
AP1,3 = 11, AP2,1 = 0, AP2,2 = 6, N1,1 = 8, N1,2 = 4, N1,3 = 12, N2,1 = 18 and
N2,2 = 6. Also, we have Λ1 = 3, Λ2 = 2, and C = 2. From the FFT of consumer 1 (Fig.
5.3) and Eq. (5.15), the probability that consumer 1 will accept an offer r1 = (p1, d˜1) is
P 1a (p1, d˜1) = 1{p1<Tp1}
(AP1,1 + 1
N1,1 + 2
)
+ 1{p1≥Tp1}1{d˜1≥Td˜1}
(AP1,2 + 1
N1,2 + 2
)
+ 1{p1≥Tp1}1{d˜1<Td˜1}
(AP1,3 + 1
N1,3 + 2
)
= 1{p1<4.32}
( 1
10
)
+ 1{p1≥4.32}1{d˜1≥69.2%}
(1
6
)
+ 1{p1≥4.32}1{d˜1<69.2%}
(12
14
)
,
(5.24)
while the set of options (extracted from this tree) for the suggestion r1, is {r∗11, r∗12, r∗13} =
{(pmin, d˜max), (Tp1 , d˜max), (Tp1 , Td˜1−d)}={($0.5, 100%), ($4.32, 100%), ($4.32, 68.7%)}
(for d = 0.5%) with acceptance probabilities 1/10, 1/6 and 12/14, respectively.
From the FFT of consumer 2 (Fig. 5.4), the probability that the consumer will accept
an offer r2 = (p2, d˜2) is
P 2a (p2, d˜2) = 1{d˜2≥Td˜2}
(AP2,1 + 1
N2,1 + 2
)
+ 1{d˜2<Td˜2}
(AP2,2 + 1
N2,2 + 2
)
= 1{d˜2≥22.89%}
( 1
20
)
+ 1{d˜2<22.89%}
(7
8
) (5.25)
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and the set of options for the suggestion r2 is {r∗21, r∗22} = {(pmin, d˜max), (pmin, Td˜2 −
d)} = {($0.5, 100%), ($0.5, 22.39%)} with acceptance probabilities 1/20 and 7/8, re-
spectively.
In Appendix C, we provide details about the building process of the above LR models
and FFTs. We also study the performance (fitting accuracy) of the resulting models,
i.e., how well the model decisions fit the decisions (responses) of the two consumers, and
we present a performance comparison between them.
Now, assume that the CD needs to incentivize the two consumers so as to achieve an
expected total load reduction of at least Q = 1.5 kWh at a specific peak slot of the
day. The baseline energy demand of each consumer at the target slot is e01 = 3 kWh
and e02 = 2 kWh, respectively. Thus, d
max
1 = 3 kWh and d
max
2 = 2 kWh. The following
question arises: Which are the most economically efficient suggestions that can induce
an expected total load reduction greater than or equal to Q? The answer can be given
through the solution of the optimization problems (5.10)-(5.13) and (5.17)-(5.20) of
subsections 5.5.1.1 and 5.5.2.1, respectively. We solve the two problems using MATLAB
functions that implement the interior-point and branch-and-bound algorithms.
In the case of LR, the optimal suggestions are r∗LR,1 = ($12.26, 59.3%) and r
∗
LR,2 =
($0.5, 25.1%), which can induce a maximum potential cost of $12.76 on the CD and
an expected total load reduction of 1.5 kWh ≥ Q. On the other hand, in the case
of FFTs, the optimal suggestions are r∗FFT,1 = ($4.32, 68.7%), r
∗
FFT,2 = ($0.5, 22.39%),
and they can achieve an expected total load reduction of 2.16 kWh > Q at a total offered
payment (maximum potential cost) of $4.82. If the CD wants to achieve an expected
load reduction greater than or equal to Q = 0.8 kWh, the optimal suggestions are
r∗LR,1 = ($6.44, 35.96%), r
∗
LR,2 = ($0.5, 25.1%) and r
∗
FFT,1 = ($4.32, 68.7%), r
∗
FFT,2 =
($0.5, 22.39%). The total offered reward and the expected total load reduction are $6.94
and 0.8 kWh ≥ Q, respectively, in the case of LR, while in the case of FFTs they are
$4.82 and 2.16 kWh > Q.
From the above results, we observe that in both approaches and for both values of Q,
the optimal offers for consumer 2 are approximately the same. These optimal offers
imply that the CD should offer consumer 2 the minimum allowed reward (pmin) for
the suggested percentage reduction (≈ 23%) that causes the maximum expected load
reduction. The attribute values show that both models for consumer 2 have successfully
discovered the decision-making profile of the consumer (which prefers low effort tasks
(d˜2 < 22.89%) irrespective of reward). The obtained optimal suggestions for consumer 1
aim to achieve the rest of the required expected reduction (which is smaller for Q = 0.8).
In the case of LR and for both values of Q, the optimal payments to be offered to
consumer 1 are proportional to the suggested percentage load reductions (due to the
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weighted integration of p1, d˜1 for the estimation of the offer acceptance probability).
The FFT optimal suggestions, in contrast, are identical for both values of Q. This
stems from the fact that the CD has a countable number of options ({r∗11, r∗12, r∗13})
for the suggestion r1, and it selects the same option for both values of Q. Again, the
optimal attribute values signify the succesful identification of the consumer 1 preferences
(medium to high reward for low to medium effort).
We observe that the CD provides suggestions to both consumers since pmin = $0.5 (and
so a percentage load reduction that is proportionate to the $0.5 payment should at least
be suggested to each consumer) and due to the equality constraint (5.19) (that restricts
the CD to select exactly one option from the available set of options for a suggestion ri).
However, if we set pmin = 0, then the solution of the optimization problem (5.10)-(5.13)
implies that suggestions will be offered only to those consumers for whom pi > 0. In
the optimization problem (5.17)-(5.20), for pmin = 0, we can relax the constraint (5.19)
such that
∑
l∈Mi xil ≤ 1, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ |I|, and we can also assume that for a path that
passes through a branch labeled pi < Tpi or pi ≤ Tpi the offered payment should be
pmin + p. Then, the CD designer can select at most one option from the set of options
for a suggestion ri, and thus, only those consumers for whom
∑
l∈Mi xil = 1 will be
offered a suggestion.
5.7 Related work
There is a line of works that relies on principles of optimization and game theory to
model energy consumer behavior and interaction, and to propose appropriate incentive
mechanisms for consumer engagement in demand-response programs. In order to for-
mulate the participation of customers in DR programs, work [102] develops an economic
load model which represents the changes of customer’s demand with respect to electricity
price changes, incentives as well as penalties imposed to the customers. Each customer’s
action is determined by maximizing a quadratic customer benefit function. In work
[101], the consumer is characterized by a concave utility function of total consumption
that also factors her personal valuation. A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pricing mechanism
is performed under the assumptions that user private consumption information is not
available, and that users are asked to reveal their consumption. The work [121] studies
a prosumer-centric approach for achieving social optimality in energy trading between
prosumers and a central unit, and for encouraging energy prosumers to participate in
energy trading with the central unit. Each prosumer decides on the amount of energy
to supply so as to maximize a concave utility function, while the central unit aims to
set the price so as to minimize the total cost of energy.
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In work [99], the authors consider a dynamic pricing scheme which is convex to the
total hourly energy demand. Each user, which is characterized by a payoff function,
exchanges daily consumption schedules with others and updates them accordingly to
minimize her/his energy cost for the next day. Work [122] considers two market models,
a competive one and an oligopolistic one, for demand response in power networks, where
customers are price taking. In both market cases, the utility company’s goal is to charge
appropriate prices so as to match electricity supply or to shape electricity demand, and
each customer’s goal is to maximize her/his net utility which is a concave function of
her/his shed load or power draw, respectively. The work [123] is a survey of works
where the consumer aspect arises in problems of energy exchange, energy consumption
scheduling, appliance scheduling and storage facility management.
In the same context, work [86] devises a hierarchical demand response market model
where several competing aggregators, which act as intermediaries, provide monetary in-
centives to home users to modify their demand pattern. Each user tries to maximize
her/his (concave) net payoff function which captures the received compensation and
the dissatisfaction caused due to deviation from the reference consumption. In work
[124], the authors design incentive offers to consumers with unknown characteristics.
Each consumer is characterized by a cost per unit of load reduction that needs to be
truthfully elicited, and by a probability of accepting the offer made, which needs to
be learned. Work [98] introduces the uncertainty in load curtailment stemming from
end-consumer non-engagement through the definition of a conformance probability that
depends on consumer valuation and on the provisioned incentives. This probability as
well as incentive mechanisms in the form of rewards and fines are inserted in appro-
priately defined utility functions for the consumers which capture the expected benefit
from the curtailment.
In the context of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, there is significant
amount of work on modeling the bounded rationality of decision-makers. Two different
points of view have arisen from researchers’ attempts to construct models of the heuris-
tics that people use to make decisions. Work [125] expresses the first one. The “heuristics
and biases” program presented in that work documented deviations of human behavior
from the classical economic model through a number of laboratory experiments. The
second point of view is expressed in work [126]. The presented “fast and frugal heuris-
tics” program developed a suite of simple mathematical models known as simple deci-
sion heuristics, and analyzed how well these models describe human behavior. Works
[127, 128] also presented various such heuristics that the authors have identified and
tested. Due to their simplicity, they have been used in many real-world decision tasks.
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For example, in work [106] they have been used for making coronary-artery disease di-
agnoses, in [129] for prescribing antibiotics to children, in [130] for detecting depression,
and in work [107] for making legal decisions.
There is a large amount of work that compares the performance of decision heuristics and
computationally more complex methods developed in statistics and artificial intelligence.
For example, works [105–107, 116, 131–134] show that simple heuristics can outperform
(in inferential speed and accuracy) traditional more complex methods. Specifically,
the authors of [116] showed, by computer simulation, that the predictive accuracy of
fast-and-frugal trees compares well with that of logistic regression and of classification
and regression trees (CARTs). Also, works [135, 136] made a performance comparison
between heuristics and compensatory integration models (including regression models)
using simulated judgement data, whereas work [107] made a similar comparison based
on human judgement data. Works [134, 137] also identified the conditions/situations
under which simple heuristics are more effective than traditional “rational” models.
Similarly, in work [105], the author reviews studies in business, medicine, and psychology,
where computer simulations and mathematical analyses reveal conditions under which
heuristics make better inferences than optimization, and vice versa.
Another line of works outlines the importance of behavioral science in energy consump-
tion [138, 139]. The work [138] presents an overview of behavioral-science foundations
that may be used to improve performance of smart-grid methods such as demand-
response programs, time-of-use pricing, energy feedback through smart meters, disag-
gregation at the appliance level, and smart automation through smart appliances. The
work [140] highlights key principles from psychology and behavioral economics to pre-
dict and change household energy consumption and energy conservation behavior. It is
argued that this behavior often fails to align with personal values or material interests
of consumers. The authors in [141] design a large-scale behavioral intervention survey
by developing a psychological model based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to
investigate the influence of information on environmental behavior and green electricity
purchase. Results show that price is not the only barrier to purchasing green electricity,
and that behavioral, normative and control beliefs influence the decision to purchase
green electricity.
Finally, works [142, 143] are closely related to our work. The authors of both works ac-
knowledge that users that participate in mobile crowdsensing (MCS) campaigns exhibit
high diversity in decision making because they assess differently attributes related to
recommended/presented tasks. In work [142], the authors draw on logistic-regression to
learn users’ individual preferences from past data and formulate non-linear optimization
problems to determine the tasks and incentives that should be optimally offered to each
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user. Work [143], in contrast, demonstrates how users can be profiled in light of cogni-
tive heuristic models and draws on empirical data to compare different decision-making
heuristics for MCS task selection. It is assumed that users receive offers about pairs of
crowdsensing tasks on their smartphones, and that they are asked to choose one of them
to carry out.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the optimal incentive and load reduction task allocation
problem faced by the designer of an energy consumption reduction campaign. The
aim of the designer is to target incentives and load reduction tasks appropriately based
on the different consumer profiles, so as to best fulfill the purpose of the campaign.
The individual consumer preferences (profiles) and the corresponding probabilities of
performing the suggested tasks are discovered through two different behavior-based data-
driven approaches, which employ the logistic regression model and the fast-and-frugal
tree model. In the case of logistic regression the optimization problem turns out to be
a sigmoid optimization one, while in the case of fast-and-frugal trees it is an integer
linear programming one. We also provided a numerical example that shows the optimal
solution for a special case of the problem.
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6.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, we studied the issues of energy storage management and dimensioning,
renewable energy exploitation, consumer engagement and consumer modeling. Specifi-
cally,
 Chapter 2: In this chapter, we underlined the importance of energy storage man-
agement and dimensioning in smart grid systems. First, we studied the problem
of optimal storage device management with the goal to achieve a certain opti-
mization objective for the energy supplier. Our setup and methodology took into
account the dynamics of demand load and renewable sources, and the optimal
policy turned out to be a threshold-based one that is expressed through the statis-
tics of these dynamics. Our results provided evidence about the potential of our
approaches in reducing energy-supplier operational costs even with limited storage
capacities. Next, we dealt with the joint energy storage placement, dimensioning
and control problem. We explored the way storage capacity placement impacts
the overall cost of energy generation. In determining the optimal policy, it turned
out that various aspects of power flow need to be taken into account. It has been
111
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shown that the solution policy for this problem involves various parameters such
as the demand profiles of prosumers, and power flow and balance constraints. Our
numerical results demonstrate the significant impact of energy storage placement,
dimensioning and control on power generation costs.
 Chapter 3: Here, we emphasized that in the pursue of green web crawling (and
by extension, of green smart grid operations), the dynamics of RESs should be
considered. We studied the real-world problem of minimizing the total staleness of
web pages in the repository of a web crawler while keeping the amount of carbon
emissions on remote web servers, due to the page refresh operations of the crawler,
low enough. The optimal page refresh policy, which turned out to be a greedy
one, can be implemented in an online fashion taking into account the staleness
of the pages in the web repository and the dynamics of the RESs at the remote
servers. Each proposed heuristic policy achieves a different objective and relies on
different parameters to make its scheduling decisions, using less information than
the optimal policy. The real-life dataset provided by the Yahoo! Labs Barcelona,
in order to evaluate the performance of the proposed policies, was large and also
represented high-quality content. Our experimental results a) proved the existence
of a tradeoff between staleness and greenness, b) indicated the relative importance
of different system parameters, and c) gave as a good sense of the performance in
a realistic system due to the scale of the collected dataset.
 Chapter 4: In this chapter, we made a first attempt to develop a theory from first
principles on the design of a simple class of serious games for energy efficiency in
smart grids. The game designer optimally selects the game parameters, so as the
utility-maximizing choices of consumers to minimize the operational cost of the
energy supplier for energy production. The sole game parameters utilized are the
sizes of the upper list (i.e., winners) and of the lower list (i.e., losers) of consumers
according to their energy-consumption reduction. Our simulation experiments
showed that even such simple serious games can provide adequate incentives to the
consumers, so that the energy supplier achieves specific demand-side management
objectives. Our serious-game model can be deployed in practical settings and
is privacy-friendly, since only normalized energy consumption increase/decrease
needs to be shared by the users with the game designer.
 Chapter 5: Here, we presented two data-driven approaches to profile the energy
consumer and to bring in the foreground behavior-based models for predicting con-
sumer behavior. We used a machine-learning tool and a cognitive heuristic to build
such models for the consumers. Namely, the models are based on logistic regres-
sion and fast-and-frugal trees. The ultimate goal was to target load-curtailment
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suggestions/offers appropriately based on the different derived criteria that con-
sumers employ to decide whether to accept such offers. In this work, we made an
effort to draw links between the presented optimization problem and important
modeling work in the areas of machine learning and cognitive sciences. The pro-
posed approaches appear to be effective in capturing the different importance that
each consumer places on different criteria and the uncertainty on consumer actions.
Although this work could be implemented on several smart grid applications, our
emphasis has been on an energy consumption reduction effort.
6.2 Future challenges
We conclude this thesis by discussing some research challenges in the area of smart grid
that open interesting research directions.
A first research challenge is that of predicting uncertainties that significantly affect the
smart grid system performance. The unpredictability of renewable energy generation is
a first source of uncertainty. In this direction, novel mechanisms need to developed in
order to encompass such uncertainties in smart grid systems. These mechanisms should
charge prosumers based on the impact of uncertainty on the system, and the cost of
bearing such uncertainty. Moreover, new incentives need to be designed in order to
manage uncertainty both at the prosumer side (reduction of uncertainty) and at the
generation side (actions to mitigate its effects).
The great number of unpredictable and uncontrollable RESs creates another challenge;
that of tackling their variable energy output. The real-time control of the renewable
energy supply is costly and difficult. Nevertheless, a feasible and cost-efficient alternative
is to exploit any possible flexibility in demand so as to absorb variations in the RESs’
output. It is expected that consumers will have an active role in the provision of services
for balancing supply and demand.
Another challenge arises from the uncertainty on demand. Demand uncertainty has sig-
nificant implications in real-time control decisions at a system level. Demand forecasting,
which might not be feasible to be performed at the level of end-users, is a difficult and
costly operation. However, the potential of crowdsourcing could be leveraged in order to
predict demand. In the unpublished manuscript [144], the authors made a first attempt
to discuss an example scenario where consumers are asked to submit their forecasts
about their demand in the next period, and are compensated through a pricing scheme
based on the quality of prediction.
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In order to better balance supply and demand, entities such as aggregators could act
as mediators between consumers and energy suppliers. Aggregators could interact both
with the energy suppliers by buying energy, and with the consumers or micro-grid entities
by controlling energy storage devices and flexible demand loads. In such a setting, the
aggregators would like to coordinate any consumer interactions so as to reach their
balancing goals, while profit-maximizing consumers might compete with each other.
Here, we identify the need to design a hierarchical DR market model that will capture
the interactions of consumers (home users), energy suppliers, and aggregators. Such
a hierarchical market needs to be designed with operating rules and protocols such as
contracts or options to regulate the market. The work [86] is a first step toward studying
a hierarchical 3-layer market comprising generator entities, aggregators and consumers.
Prosumers with co-located storage devices in the premises of their renewable energy
sources may refrain from selling the generated renewable energy to the main grid and
they may engage in a game-theoretic interaction so as to maximize their profit. The
volatility of RESs and dynamic electricity prices create possible situations that may
significantly impact the design of electricity markets and regulation policies for the
smart grid. Game theory concepts can be applied to devise novel pricing mechanisms
that could guide the system to a socially optimal equilibrium. Such schemes will need
to be appropriately integrated in such a hybrid energy grid (with both distributed and
centralized energy generation), since they are expected to have significant impact on the
centralized energy generation.
Furthermore, concepts and models stemming from the sharing economy could be applied
to smart grid systems. The sharing economy and the concept of collaborative consump-
tion are based on the sharing of resources. RESs and storage devices are shared by
multiple smart grid entities in various sharing regimes and architectures. In this direc-
tion, long-term planning decisions (e.g., storage and RES dimensioning and placement),
and short-term dynamic decisions (e.g., storage management, power flow, dynamic in-
centives, dynamic interactions with the main grid) will need to modeled. These decisions
aim for real-time alignment of energy supply and demand at minimum cost for the sys-
tem.
Finally, the use of behavioral science and behavioral economics in order to understand
the consumer/prosumer behavior in the smart grid system is another challenge. Prospect
theory, one the various dominant theories in behavioral sciences, could be used to under-
stand consumers’ choices based on their actual behavior and their assessment of potential
gains and losses versus assessed levels of risk. Various cognitive heuristics such as the
one used in chapter 5 will also aid in understanding the role of consumers/prosumers
in the smart grid. This knowledge is expected to reshape the role of utility operators,
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
04/06/2020 23:30:17 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks and Future Challenges 115
renewable source integration, demand-response programs and incentive provisioning in
an effort to guide prosumers to energy consumption behaviors that are beneficial to
the system. Moreover, novel social-driven demand-response mechanisms could be de-
signed, which would exploit the impact of the social factor, both in the effectiveness of
demand-response mechanisms and in cooperative consumer/prosumer coalition forma-
tions by means of social norms and competition for social pressure. It is clear that the
confluence of multiple disciplines such as algorithm design, game theory, power systems,
economics, machine learning, and cognitive psychology is required.
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Training the Logistic Regression
models
For each consumer i, there is a training set Sitr consisting of K past load-reduction
suggestions and her/his responses to each,
Sitr = (ri1, yi1), (ri2, yi2), ..., (riK , yiK), (A.1)
where rij = (pij , d
′
ij) is the j-th suggestion to consumer i and yij is the corresponding
response, 1 (accept) or 0 (reject), depending on her/his choice.
One way to estimate the consumer weight vector wi = (wi,0, wi,p, wi,d′) is to follow the
Maximum-Likelihood principle and maximize the logarithm of the following likelihood
function with respect to wi,
P (yi|wi) =
K∏
j=1
Pi(C1|rij)yij (1− Pi(C1|rij))1−yij ,
with rij = (1, pij , d
′
ij) (a pseudo-attribute cij,0 = 1 is added), and yi = (yi1, . . . , yiK).
However, in order to prevent overfitting and improve the generalization of the learned
model, in practice we apply a regularization technique. Namely, we add a regulariza-
tion penalty λi2 ||wi||2 on weights (L2-regularization), which places preference on smaller
values. This technique corresponds to imposing a Gaussian prior distribution on model
parameters wi [103], [104].
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Now, the aim of the training process is to find the weights wi that minimize the overall
error function
E(wi) = −lnP (yi|wi) +
λi
2
||wi||2
= −
K∑
j=1
[
yij · ln(Pi(C1|rij))
+ (1− yij) · ln(1− Pi(C1|rij))
]
+
λi
2
||wi||2, (A.2)
with Pi(C1|rij) = σ(wi · rij).
The gradient of the above overall error function (deviance plus a cost on the size of
attribute weights) (Eq. (A.2)) with respect to wi can be shown to be
∇E(wi) =
K∑
j=1
[Pi(C1|rij)− yij ]rij + λiwi. (A.3)
This gradient can be used by a gradient-descent algorithm1 to iteratively converge to
the optimum vector wi through
w
(τ+1)
i = w
(τ)
i − η∇E(wi) , (A.4)
where the step size (learning rate parameter) η determines the aggressiveness with which
the algorithm moves toward the minimum. Since the error function above is a convex
function [103, 104], the minimum is a global one. The regularization parameter λi is
selected so that the classification performance of the LR model in a validation dataset
is maximized (cross-validation technique) [103, 104].
1Gradient descent is a first-order iterative optimization algorithm. To find a local minimum of a
function using gradient descent, one takes steps proportional to the negative of the gradient (or of the
approximate gradient) of the function at the current point. If instead one takes steps proportional to
the positive of the gradient, one approaches a local maximum of that function; the procedure is then
known as gradient ascent[145].
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Training the Fast-and-Frugal
Trees
In order to create an FFT, one can, of course, test all possible orderings of attributes
and shapes of trees on a provided training dataset and optimize fitting performance
[110]. However, in the general case, this requires enormous computation if the number
of attributes is large. They argue that naive decision makers will basically have a good
feeling of how well each cue alone predicts the criterion (class label). Thus, they define
and use Diagnosticity and Validity1 of a cue as measures of goodness (or predictivity or
accuracy) to order the cues. Another measure of global goodness of an attribute that
could also be used for the ranking of attributes is Informedness or Youden’s J2. All these
metrics can be viewed as statistical measures of the performance (classification accuracy)
of a binary classification test that uses a single attribute as an indicator (predictor) to
determine the outcome (class). They are estimated using only counting and ratios.
Once cue validities/accuracies have been estimated, tree construction involves only a
few simple rules [110].
actual C1 actual C0
x ≥ Tx (predicted C1) αx βx
x < Tx (predicted C0) γx δx
Table B.1: Contigency table over an abstract attribute x.
1Diagnosticity is the average of sensitivity and specificity, while Validity is the average of positive
and negative validity (or predictive value) [110, 146, 147].
2Informedness or Youden’s J (J) is the sum of sensitivity and specificity minus 1. Youden’s J statistic
(also called Youden’s index) captures the performance of a binary classification test. It is also known as
deltap’ and generalizes from the binary/dichotomous to the multiclass case as Informedness. It quantifies
how informed a predictor (i.e., attribute) is for the specified condition (i.e., outcome or criterion). It
specifies the probability that a prediction/decision is informed in relation to the condition (versus chance
(i.e., random guess)), and takes into account all predictions [147–149].
118
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
04/06/2020 23:30:17 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Appendix B. Training the FFTs 119
FFT construction: First, a four cell contingency table [150, 151] is constructed for
the consumer response (1 (accept, C1) or 0 (reject, C0)) over each attribute (along with
a classification threshold) using the training dataset Sitr. These tables summarize the
predictions (both correct and wrong) based on each cue for given classification thresholds
(split points) and can be used for the estimation of the aforementioned measures of cue
accuracy (i.e., diagnosticity, validity, informedness, etc.). They are expressed using raw
counts of the number of times each predicted class label is associated with each real class.
Each row of the table represents the instances in a predicted class while each column
represents the instances in an actual class. Table B.1 shows an example contingency
table over an abstract attribute x for given threshold Tx.
A simple rule for the selection of the classification threshold Tx is to pick that value (and
the corresponding inequality sign) that maximizes some measure of goodness of the cue
x. Here, the criterion we use for measuring the accuracy of a cue and judging whether
one attribute x (with classification threshold Tx) is better (i.e., more predictive, accurate
or informative) than another is Youden’s J. Its magnitude gives the probability of an
informed decision between the two classes C1, C0 based only on attribute x and given
threshold Tx; its value ranges from -1 to 1 (> 0 represents appropriate use of information,
0 represents chance-level performance, < 0 represents perverse use of information, and
1 indicates perfect prediction)[146, 149]. It is defined as Jx=TPRx-FPRx [146–149].
From the contingency table B.1, the proportion TPRx=αx/(αx+γx) is the true positive
rate (or sensitivity or recall or hit rate (HR)), i.e., the proportion of real positive (C1)
cases that are correctly predicted positive based only on cue x and threshold Tx. The
proportion FPRx=βx/(βx+ δx), which defines an error rate, is the false positive rate (or
fallout or false alarm rate (FAR)), i.e., the proportion of real negative (C0) cases that
are incorrectly predicted positive based only on x and Tx. Thus,
Jx = TPRx − FPRx = αx
αx + γx
− βx
βx + δx
. (B.1)
The effectiveness (diagnostic power) of an FFT heuristic is determined by both the
TPR and the FPR likelihood ratios. Specifically, a high TPR is desired, as it means
accurate identification of positive (C1) cases. However, this benefit might be offset by
false positives that are triggered when negative (C0) cases are also identified as positive.
Using the index of performance J , the following simple algorithm for FFT construction
solves the problems of classification threshold (and inequality sign (of the corresponding
condition)) selection, cue order and exit location. It is the same one used for the con-
struction of FFTs in R (programming language and software environment) [152], and it
can be summarized in four steps:
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Fast-and-Frugal Tree construction algorithm
1. For each cue, select a classification threshold (and inequality sign) that maximizes
the difference between the TPR and FPR (i.e., the index J) of classifications of
all training instances based on that cue. If the attribute is numeric, the threshold
is a number. If the attribute is a factor, the threshold is one or more factor levels.
These thresholds are calculated completely independently of all other cues.
2. Rank cues in order of their highest TPR-FPR (J) value calculated in step 1.
3. Create all possible trees by varying the exit point at each level to a maximum of
5 levels.
4. Reduce the size of trees by removing lower levels containing less than 5% of the
dataset.
From the example FFT of Fig. 5.1a (section 5.5.2) and the above algorithm we deduce
that Jd′i > Jpi for optimal thresholds Td′i , Tpi (that maximize the difference TPR-FPR),
i.e., consumer i prioritizes the suggested (normalized) load reduction d′i over the reward
pi given for carrying the suggested task out.
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p ($) d˜ (%) Consumer 1’s response (A1) Consumer 2’s response (A2)
10 9 1 1
12 46 1 0
13 58 1 0
14 96 0 0
5 12 1 1
6 33 1 0
8 63 1 0
9 92 0 0
1 21 0 1
2 25 0 0
3 71 0 0
4 80 0 0
10.5 10 1 1
11 40 1 0
13.5 59 1 0
15 97 0 0
5.7 13 1 1
7 35 1 0
8.5 64 0 0
9.5 93 0 0
0.5 18 0 1
1.6 23 0 0
2.3 27 0 0
3.5 78 0 0
Table C.1: Example questionnaire and consumers’ responses.
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C1 C0
p1 ≥ Tp1 (predicted C1) 11 5
p1 < Tp1 (predicted C0) 0 8
Table C.2: Contingency table over cue p1.
C1 C0
d˜1 < Td˜1 (predicted C1) 11 6
d˜1 ≥ Td˜1 (predicted C0) 0 7
Table C.3: Contingency table over cue d˜1.
C1 C0
p2 ≤ Tp2 (predicted C1) 2 0
p2 > Tp2 (predicted C0) 4 18
Table C.4: Contingency table over cue p2.
C1 C0
d˜2 < Td˜2 (predicted C1) 6 0
d˜2 ≥ Td˜2 (predicted C0) 0 18
Table C.5: Contingency table over cue d˜2.
Appendix C
Building procedure details and
performance analysis of the fitted
LR and FFT models of section 5.6
Table C.1 depicts the data (sequence of offers and consumer responses) we used for
the creation of the synthetic training datasets S1tr, S2tr for the two consumers in the
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Specificity (%) Sensitivity (%) d-prime (D’) AUC
LRnr,1 100 91 3.109 0.955
LRr,1 100 91 3.109 0.95
FFT1 92 100 3.121 0.96
LRnr,2 100 100 3.296 1
LRr,2 100 83 2.877 0.91
FFT2 100 100 3.296 1
Table C.6: Performance statistics of the fitted LR and FFT models.
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Figure C.1: Classification tables for (a) the LR model and (b) the regularized LR
model of consumer 1.
numerical example of section 5.6. These datasets were used for the building of the
individual consumer LR models and FFTs.
For the building of the two LR models of section 5.6 we followed the training process
of Appendix A, while for the construction of the consumer FFTs we applied the simple
algorithm of Appendix B). The regularization parameters that maximize the classifica-
tion performance of the two LR models are λ1 = 0.0289 and λ2 = 0.0321. We got two
FFTs for consumer 1 and one single FFT for consumer 2. Here, we kept only one tree
for consumer 2; namely, the one that has the maximum difference TPR-FPR. The clas-
sification thresholds that maximize the difference between the TPR and FPR (i.e., the
index J) of classifications of all data based on each cue p1, d˜1, p2, and d˜2 are Tp1 = 4.32,
Td˜1 = 69.2%, Tp2 = 1.26 and Td˜2 = 22.89%, respectively. The contingency tables over
cues p1, d˜1, p2, d˜2 and for the above thresholds Tp1 , Td˜1 , Tp2 and Td˜2 are depicted in Ta-
bles C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5. Furthermore, for the same thresholds it is Jp1=0.62, Jd˜1=0.54,
Jp2=0.33, and Jd˜2=1.
After we have derived the LR and FFT models for the two consumers in section 5.6, we
would like to know how well the model decisions fit the decisions made by the consumers.
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Figure C.2: Classification tables for (a) the LR model and (b) the regularized LR
model of consumer 2.
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Figure C.3: Classification tables for (a) the FFT of consumer 1, and (b) the FFT of
consumer 2.
There is a series of performance statistics that can be calculated and checked for that
purpose. First, we construct a classification table for each LR (both regularized (LRr)
and non-regularized (LRnr)
1) and FFT model. These tables, which are depicted in Fig.
C.1, C.2, C.3, show how each model’s decisions compare to the truth. Entries on the
main diagonal (Cor. Rej. and Hit) correspond to correct decisions, while the other
entries (Miss and False Al.) correspond to incorrect decisions.
As we can see, the obtained models performed exceptionally well: the LRnr, LRr and
FFT models of consumer 1, and the LRr model of consumer 2 made correct decisions in
23 out of all 24 cases (96% correct). The FFT and LRnr models of consumer 2 decided
1Here, we also provide a performance analysis of the non-regularized LR model in order to em-
phasize the benefits of regularization (overfitting avoidance). The weights (regression coefficients)
of the non-regularized LR models for the two consumers are wnr1 = (1.286, 1.44,−0.243), wnr2 =
(330.05,−15.91,−14.06).
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Figure C.4: Performance comparison of the FFT and LR models of (a) consumer 1
and (b) consumer 2.
correctly in all 24 cases (100% correct). Additional performance statistics, including
Specificity (=1-FPR), Sensitivity (=TPR), d-prime (D’) (=Z(TPR)-Z(FPR)) 2, and
AUC (=(TPR-FPR+1)/2) (area under the curve of ROC (described below)) can be
estimated. These statistics show the cumulative performance of the models. Table C.6
shows their estimated values for all fitted models. We observe that the LRnr and FFT
models of consumer 2 are classification tests with perfect fitting accuracy.
Finally, Fig. C.4a, C.4b show two ROC 3 (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves
which compare the performance of the resulting models (FFTs (in green), LRnr (in
purple) and LRr (in orange)). Specifically, Fig. C.4a shows that the performance
(FARFFT1 , HRFFT1)=(0.08, 1) (i.e., JFFT1=0.92) of the FFT of consumer 1 is com-
parable to that of the LRnr and LRr models of the same consumer with (FARLRnr,1 ,
HRLRnr,1)=(FARLRr,1 , HRLRr,1)=(0,0.91) (i.e., JLRnr,2=JLRr,1=0.91). From Fig. C.4b,
we observe that the LRnr and FFT models built for consumer 2 have identical per-
formance, (FARFFT2 , HRFFT2)=(FARLRnr,2 , HRLRnr,2)=(0,1) (i.e., JFFT2 = JLRnr,2=1
(perfect fit)), and that they outperform the LRr model of the same consumer with
(FARLRr,2 , HRLRr,2)=(0,0.83) (i.e., JLRr,2=0.83).
2Function Z(p), p ∈ [0, 1], is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the Gaussian
distribution. Here, we adjust any extreme values (i.e., 0 or 1) of TPRs and FPRs, to prevent infinite
values or indeterminate forms of D’, according to an approach presented in [153]. Namely, rates of 0 are
replaced with 0.5/n and rates of 1 are replaced with (n − 0.5)/n, where n is the number of positive or
negative training instances.
3A ROC curve shows the ability of a quantitative diagnostic test to correctly classify subjects as the
decision threshold is varied. A diagnostic test able to perfectly identify subjects with and without the
positive condition (here, C1) produces a curve that passes through the upper left corner (0, 1) of the
plot. A diagnostic test with no ability to discriminate better than chance, produces a diagonal line from
the origin (0, 0) to the top right corner (1, 1) of the plot. Most tests lie somewhere in-between these
extremes [154].
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